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Abstract
This research investigates the mechanisms that underpin object location mem-
ory. It approaches this endeavour by examining a recently reported phenomenon
of spatial memory, that of exclusivity. Exclusivity states that given the oppor-
tunity to encode or retrieve two spatial memories, only one memory is relied
upon for object location. This implies that two memories for where an object
is located are not better than one. The role of limited capacity has been impli-
cated in the exclusive processing of multiple objects. Accordingly, the aim of
this thesis is to explore possible methods that enhance cognitive capacity in a
way to overcome exclusivity. These methods include expertise, semantics and
learning. It was proposed that expertise would allow for holistic processing of
information and it would therefore increase the likelihood of spatial memory
integration. Also, the connection between two related spatial memories was
manipulated through the employment of semantic categories to aid in paired
memory recognition. In addition to this, a learning paradigm was used which
allowed for repeated exposure of spatial information over a 5 and 10 day period.
The results of these studies indicate a failure to overcome exclusivity. This
suggests that exclusive processing is a robust feature of spatial memory. The
findings offer a number of important insights for the field. They provide two
important accounts for the processing of multiple object locations. One argues
memories are encoded and retreival in a strategic manner to avoid interference.
The second proposes fragments of memories are encoded and constructively
drawn upon at recall. This thesis also puts forward a unique explanation of
how multiple object locations are learnt over time.
Chapter 1
Introduction
Thinking about space is integral to numerous aspects of psychology. Space
defines many features of our world, a good illustration comes from the domain
of music, with a musician’s ability to interpret musical scores. Anyone who has
knowledge of sight-reading would not contest the importance of space intrinsic
to music production. Just as notes provide the user with the necessary indicator
of tone, space provides the time in which each note should be played. Thus,
without the capacity to translate notes into melody, via spatial interpretation,
there would be no music. This analogy of space can be generalised to everyday
life, and when it is, the importance of space becomes more conspicuous. To
treat space purely in terms of physicality is over simplistic and does not reflect
the interaction of experience and meaning with space.
We live surrounded by space and as a consequence have developed many bio-
logical and cognitive mechanisms that allow us to thrive whilst constrained by
physical and spatial boundaries. Representing space allows one to navigate and
to locate essential objects. The fluent and easy manner in which we rely on an
understanding and knowledge of space conceals the complexity of the processes
inherent within it. Regardless of place or time each person has the ability to
access with little effort a spacial ‘picture’ regarding familiar surroundings. For
example, we are all able to transverse the route to work, the location of our
office, or the relative position of countries and continents on the planet from
memory. Thus, the primary focus of this research pivots on a fundamental
question of psychology, how do we build coherent representations of space?
The structure of this introduction reflects the scientific endeavours that guide
the current research. To understand the processes that underlie the construc-
tion of a representation of space, one must first interrogate the findings that
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illustrate what form such representations may take. Thus, the first part of this
introduction reviews the literature describing the organisation of spatial repre-
sentation in memory. Specifically, it focuses on the components that make up
such representations and how these result in certain biases. Inevitably the final
product of processing spatial information (i.e., a coherent accessible represen-
tation of space) will be influenced and determined by the mechanisms that are
involved with its construction. Therefore, the second part of the introduction
reviews the evidence on factors that influence the way spatial information is
encoded, retrieved and interact. Specifically, it centres on questions concerning
whether spatial information is encoded automatically, whether it is retrieved in
parallel or serially, and finally whether it is integrated or combined. The second
part of this introduction is crucial because it offers insights into possible areas
of limited capacity when processing spatial information.
1.1 Representing space mentally
The first part of this chapter highlights research which has sought to probe
spatial memory regarding how information may be organised. It begins with
the idea that one constructs a cognitive map of the environment and that such
a map-like structure contains within it certain components which can result in
memory distortions. This leads onto the next section which focuses on com-
ponents of cognitive maps such as landmarks and routes and again, highlights
how distortions are intrinsic to the representation of such features mentally.
The final section reviews the research which has focused on the individual’s
role in constructing a mental model of space; specifically, that involving viewing
perspective and orientation.
1.1.1 Cognitive maps and distortions
When thinking of spatial memory one nearly always thinks of maps. There
is an intrinsic view derived from the idea that the manner in which humans
reconstruct reality externally (e.g., ordinate survey map) in some way must
reflect how they would represent it mentally. To a certain extent this is grounded
in some evidence (Wilson & Wildbur, 2004) and is certainly always a logical
starting point. However, as psychology repeatedly informs us, there is a big
difference between reality and how the mind reconstructs reality. One only
need refer to visual spatial illusions such as the Ponzo (train tracks) lines to
illustrate how distortions are incumbent within the visual system, yet markedly
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informative. Despite the fact spatial judgement can be an accurate process
(Jonides & Baum, 1978; Baird, 1979), estimation of object distance and location
has been shown to suffer systematic error. The studying to such errors has led
to insights as to the structure and organisation of spatial information.
Considered the forefather of ideas about conceptual cognitive maps, Tolman
(1948) theorized that possessing a cognitive map of ones environment is highly
adaptive. When referring to cognitive maps Tolman (1948) was not making
any aspersions that reality is encoded as a geographical map, rather he was
simply stating that certain elements of our spatial environment are represented
mentally, and in a way that affords us to achieve many of the daily activities
we do not even stop to consider. What Tolman (1948) argued was that rats,
and by extension possibly humans, navigated their environment not simply by
representing a collection of singular routes (A to B, A to C etc) but rather they
held much more global conceptualisations of their environment. Intuitively,
this sparked some researchers to contest that spatial information is stored as
a holistic representation of metrically retained spatial relations (Kosslyn, Ball,
& Reiser, 1978), rather like a mental image. However, to regard such mental
representation as the internal drawing of a map has shown to be doubtful.
Some of the first works on how individuals represent geographical locations
comes from Stevens and Coupe (1978). They found that geographical locations
can be represented either superordinately or subordinately with regards to other
geographical locations. For example, Stevens and Coupe (1978) found that
individuals tended to misjudge the city of Reno as being farther west than
the city of San Diego, when in fact Reno is further east. They attributed
this bias to prior knowledge of the state location that each city resides, Reno
being situated within the state of Nevada and San Diego in that of California.
The relations of these states is contradictory to that of the two cities, in other
words, Reno (Nevada) is located further west of San Diego (California) however
the majority of the state of Nevada is situated further west than California.
Therefore individuals’ higher level representation for the positions of the states
was interfering (or superordinate) to their judgements as to the locations of the
cities.
This kind of research shows that such forms of spatial information as geograph-
ical locations are layered and more specifically are represented in a hierarchical
manner determined by scale of space. The consequence of this hierarchy leads
to the observations of spatial estimation errors on the part of the individual.
These errors were regarded by Stevens and Coupe (1978) to stem from a storage
computation trade-off where superordinate spatial information dictates location
estimates for elements that fall within and below ‘higher’ categories. This sug-
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gests that actual geographical locations of cities may be grouped in mnemonic
clusters determined by higher-order spatial information (i.e., the state within
which the city is located). The presence of memory bias is a consequence of an
ineffectiveness to ‘communicate’ hierarchically across clusters. Thus, individ-
uals are able to draw on higher or lower order spatial information depending
on the query. In some cases the query may draw on higher order information
producing an error related to a lower order spatial position. This suggests that
cognitive maps are fragmentary and not integrated and people switch between
levels of representation in the hierarchy.
The processes of spatial clustering is argued to be an effective memory strategy
which generally is useful for spatial judgement (i.e., in the majority of cases
cities in California will be farther east than comparable cities in San Diego).
More importantly, these findings demonstrated that space, rather like verbal
information (Jonides & Baum, 1978; Baird, 1979), is represented abstractly
rather than literally (i.e., not metrically) and in a fragmentary manner.
Hirtle and Jonides (1985) argued that cognitive maps possess more than simple
spatial proximity. They showed that not only can spatial components be or-
ganised by geographical clusters but also by subjective clusters imposed upon
geographical layout. Additionally, dependent on the kind of cluster imposed
(e.g., whether groups of buildings were related or unrelated by function) would
dictate the direction of location estimation bias (overestimation and underesti-
mation respectively). The directions of the distortions were such that individu-
als tended to recall locations closer together if they were from the same spatial
cluster than if they were from different clusters. This finding was replicated
and extended by McNamara (1986) who additionally showed that directional
judgement (i.e., whether an object was to the left or right of another object)
was also biased by superordinate spatial relations between clusters.
Chase (1983) shows complexity of hierarchical structures is dependent upon lev-
els of knowledge regarding locations. He found experienced taxi drivers to have
far more detailed hierarchical organisation of area within which they worked
in comparison to novices. This shows that knowledge and experience are im-
portance factors determining the formation of spatial hierarchies. Hirtle and
Mascolo (1986) enforced semantic barriers within a spatial array and found
that semantically defining objects within a cluster can in turn produce ‘mental
clustering’. Furthermore, mental clustering by way of semantics also produced
similar distortion effects.
The above evidence is quite compelling and strongly highlights the existence of
cognitive structures which have an impact upon the manner in which spatial
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information is stored and subsequently recalled. One dominant organisation of
spatial information is hierarchically. It appears that the spatial components of
separate perceptual experiences are not necessarily organised in separate per-
ceptual units1 but are rather stored in a hierarchical fashion dependent on the
geophysical structure intrinsic to the spatial array, subjective interpretation of
geophysical structures, and pre-existing spatial or semantic knowledge.
1.1.2 Reference points, landmarks and distortions
The location of an object is intrinsically relative. One must quantify the position
of an object in relation to that of something else. Stemming from the perception
literature researchers showed that individuals rely heavily on landmarks in their
environment to find their way and conclude that spatial knowledge is built
up through the perception of distinct environmental features (i.e., landmarks)
(Allen, Siegel, & Rosinski, 1978; Siegel & White, 1975). Thus, it is not surprising
that perceptual structures such as reference points are also present in stored
spatial representations, observed during the recalling of spatial information.
Consequently, much work has been focused on this area (Bryant & Subbiah,
1994; Lindberg & Garling, 1987; Nelson & Chaiklin, 1980; Schmidt, Werner,
& Diedrichsen, 2003; Sheth & Shimojo, 2001; Sadalla, Burroughs, & Staplin,
1980).
Landmarks are a fundamental feature that organises spatial information and it
is clearly used to the benefit of spatial location judgements from memory (Allen
et al., 1978; Siegel & White, 1975; Blaisdell & Cook, 2005). For example, as
the number of landmarks increase so too does the precision of an individual’s
spatial memory (Blaisdell & Cook, 2005). However, a number of authors have
contended that the dominant manner in which landmarks are relied upon can
lead to systematic recall distortions (Holyoak & Mah, 1982; Nelson & Chaiklin,
1980; Tversky, 1992). For example, Sadalla et al. (1980) asked individuals to
judge the distance between pre-measured salient landmarks and other points
of reference. Subjects systematically judged distances between landmarks and
non-landmarks to be smaller than between either two non-landmarks or two
landmarks. Rosch (1975) also found that distances between locations in a city
and salient landmarks result in asymmetry in terms of perceived distance be-
tween such objects.
Although, certain biases are evident with the recalling of spatial information in
1Although it is recognised that psychological clustering can be the result of perceptual
boundaries (McNamara, Hardy, & Hirtle, 1989), the majority of authors have emphasized
that such clustering is a consequence of memory structure above all else.
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relation to a landmark it has also been shown that such biases can be systematic
and predictable. For example, Nelson and Chaiklin (1980) showed that location
accuracy increases as the distance from a border or reference point decreases.
They argue that Weber’s Law can account for this phenomenon in that the size
of the just-noticeable difference (jnd) (i.e., the difference between stages of expo-
sure to sensory stimuli) is directly proportional to the absolute magnitude of the
judged spatial quantity. In other words, as the difference between one spatial
location and another increases so does the level of error embedded within a spa-
tial judgement regarding said location. More importantly, Nelson and Chaiklin
(1980) examined the ‘type’ of distortion that occurred and demonstrated that
the direction of distortion was systematically biased towards a given landmark
rather than away from it. Based on these findings they propose five postulates
that make up a weighted-distortions model of landmark biases: 2
Postulate 1: The further away a target is from a landmark the less
accurate spatial judgement is
Postulate 2: The direction of distortion is toward the landmark
Postulate 3: The magnitude of the direction-of-distortion effect is
dependent upon the distance from the landmark
Postulate 4: In a multiple-landmark situation, the weight (W) for
each landmark’s spatial-distortion effect decreases with further dis-
tance from the landmark
Postulate 5: In a multiple-landmark situation, the weight (W) for
each landmark’s spatial-distortion effect is directly proportional to
viewing time
Just as previous work shows that subjective hierarchies can impose a structuring
of spatial information (Hirtle & Jonides, 1985), similarly individuals may sub-
jectively impose subjective landmarks too. Bryant and Subbiah (1994) demon-
strated that individuals segregate regions of space and the categorical bound-
aries of such segregation are used as points of reference in order to localise and
narrow the position of a target object in space. Subjective landmarks also show
the same bias patterns (namely attraction bias) as that of physical landmarks.
Schmidt et al. (2003) suggest that object location biases are determined by the
nearest landmark and that such bias is ‘locally invariant’ with the introduction
of an additional landmark. They suggest that if two landmarks are present then
the direction and magnitude of recall bias is dependent on the nearest landmark.
2Several of these postulates have been both supported and developed by subsequent work
(Bryant & Subbiah, 1994; Lindberg & Garling, 1987; Lansdale, 1998)
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To account for this they propose a partition principle for dual-landmark presen-
tations where distortion sources are derived from two separate single-landmark
distortions rather than the combining of two distortions into a different distor-
tion pattern. They argue that the combined effect of two-landmark distortions
cannot be estimated by each single landmark’s distortional field. (Schmidt et
al., 2003) also argue that the apparent landmark attraction bias may actually
be a ‘virtual landmark’ repulsion bias. In other words, the creation of a virtual
landmark biases object location away from that landmark giving the impres-
sion of it’s attraction to a nearby actual landmark. Components of this finding
have been replicated (i.e., virtual landmark creation), although the majority of
evidence is in favour of general landmark attraction (Nelson & Chaiklin, 1980;
Bryant & Subbiah, 1994; Hubbard & Ruppel, 2000) as opposed to virtual land-
mark repulsion.
Lederman and Taylor (1969) extend landmark attraction to boundary attrac-
tion. They demonstrated that visual and tactile perception of the location of a
point in rectangular field is biased toward the boundary of the field. This sug-
gests that borders or boundaries of visual arrays can act in a similar manner as
single reference points. Having said that, Okabayashi and Glynn (1984) shows
that complex curved boundaries are less predictable and showed that the shapes
of boundaries have varying effects on types and degree of bias.
In summary, the research shows that individuals attribute a landmark-type func-
tion to certain elements in their visual field. These elements, known as land-
marks, are important to the recalling of an object’s location. Overall, landmarks
generally improve recall by offering a point of reference from which a relative lo-
cation judgement can be made, they may also introduce certain biases (namely,
an attraction bias where an object is recalled closer to the landmark than it was).
Individuals choose what to make a landmark or not (Tversky & Schiano, 1989).
This may be determined by it’s proximity to a to-be-remembered object (i.e.,
the closer the landmark the more accurately an object is recalled), comparative
size to other landmarks, or subjective importance to a target object.
1.1.3 Orientation and perspective specificity
As described above, space must be defined in relation to something else. Such
reference can be either relative to another object (allocentric) or relative to the
perceiver (egocentric). For example, the whereabouts of a bowl of fruit may be
judged in relation to the table it has been placed upon (e.g., it is in the top right-
hand corner) or relative to the individual who is perceiving the bowl of fruit
(e.g., it is diagonally to the left of me). A large body of work has examined the
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role of the perceiver and specifically the orientation from which a spatial array
is positioned in relation to oneself (Shelton & McNamara, 1997; Diwadkar &
McNamara, 1997; Mou & McNamara, 2002; Bryant & Tversky, 1999; Franklin
& Tversky, 1990; Wang, 1999).
Orientation has been described as the alignment of environmental perception
and knowledge (i.e., memory) regarding spatial components in that environ-
ment (Peruch & Lapin, 1993). It is well documented that humans (as well as
animals) show preference for certain stimuli arrangements and such preferences
can impact upon spatial location estimation. For example, the estimation of a
stimulus position is much improved when stimuli are arranged vertically or hor-
izontally (as opposed to oblique angles), known as the ‘oblique effect’ (Appelle,
1972). Much research has examined whether a preferred direction of orientation
is apparent in memory representations.
Evans and Pezdek (1980) suggested that when an environment is primarily
learned through a map, it allows for relationships between items to be formed
as a single perspective. However, when the environment is primarily learned
through direct experience such relations are only accessible via the number of
perspectives that they have experienced. This notion is supported by a num-
ber of findings. Bisiach (1988) showed that individuals with unilateral neglect
were only able to imagine perspectives related to the non-neglected side. For
example, those with left side neglect when asked to imagine facing north in
a familiar environment could only reproduce perspective regarding east ori-
ented stimuli. This suggests that when individuals reconstruct space they do
so by accessing a viewer-dependent representation of space rather than a global
viewer-independent representation.
Further evidence comes from studies where participants are tested for their
recognition of a spatial array either from an experienced perspective or from a
novel perspective. For example, Shelton and McNamara (1997) asked partici-
pants to memorise a spatial array comprising seven objects in a room from two
orthogonal viewpoints. They were then taken to a different room in a different
part of the building and were required to recall said object from either a view-
point that matched the originally learnt perspective, or a viewpoint that was
incongruent. They found participants’ responses were faster and had greater
accuracy from a representational viewpoint that was in line with their initial
coding perspective. Shelton and McNamara (1997) argued this was evidence
that individuals form egocentric viewpoints that equate to a ‘mental image’ of a
spatial scene. Also, they argued that retrieval of spatial locations from memory
is achieved simply by retrieving the encoded visual image. Diwadkar and Mc-
Namara (1997) demonstrated the same findings employing a similar paradigm
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and concluded that interobject spatial relations are also coded and therefore
represented in a view-point dependent manner. They proposed that when par-
ticipants make judgements from novel views (i.e., different than at encoding),
they must normalise such a view to ‘fit’ with the encoded view.
Together Shelton and McNamara (1997) and Diwadkar and McNamara (1997)
findings suggest that the quality of judgement for an object’s location is highly
dependent on access to an initially encoded spatial representation. This implies
that representations of space are limited to perceptual experiences; that is, one
has greater difficulty making a location judgement from a non-experienced view-
point of an object. However, this is not to say that individuals are completely
precluded to making a judgement from a novel view only that it is less accurate.
Just as Diwadkar and McNamara (1997) propose, individuals probably try to
manipulate (e.g., mentally rotate) the encoded view to fit the novel view (or vice
versa), with some location information being lost among the process of doing
so.
Later research challenges the idea of egocentrically dominant spatial representa-
tions and shows that recalling an object’s location may not be solely dependent
upon it’s relation to the individual (i.e., egocentric). For example, Shelton and
McNamara (2001b) manipulated the geometric structure of a room by varying
the viewing angle. A square mat was laid out in a square room with to-be-learnt
objects placed on it. Subjects were then asked to learn an object array from
two stationary view-points. The viewpoints included face-on to the mat (i.e.,
inline with the mat and the room at 0◦) and from the point of the mat’s cor-
ners (i.e., misaligned with the geometry of the room and mat at 135◦). Thus,
if spatial information was coded in an egocentric-dependent manner, then one
would expect to observe greater memory accuracy as long as the participants’
encoding and recall viewing angles were consistent, regardless of whether they
were aligned or misaligned with the room and mat. Shelton and McNamara
(2001b) found that when individuals made relative spatial judgements from a
misaligned view-point (i.e., congruent with the initial egocentric representation)
they performed just as poorly as judgements made from any other misaligned
view, even those they had not learnt the objects from. This striking finding
highlights that individuals had only represented one dominant view of the ob-
jects’ spatial layout - inline with the ‘natural’ structure of the room. In other
words, benefits from retrieving spatial information were only evident if the ego-
centric representation was inline with dominant geometric features that make
up the frame of reference within which the objects are bound. This suggests
that egocentric (object to person) and allocentric (object to object) frames of
reference are both implicated in the recalling of an object’s location.
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Subsequent findings support and refine such a notion. Shelton and McNamara
(2001a) used a circular room and showed that in the absence of intrinsic allocen-
tric frames of reference (i.e., the frame of a square room) egocentrically learnt
views were again preferential. For instance, if an individual learnt the room
from 135◦ they would be better at recalling objects’ locations at that viewing
angle than any other. It would appear that without the presence of an intrinsic
frame of reference, egocentric frames are utilised.
Although it is evident that both allocentric and egocentric frames of reference
can be employed, Mou and McNamara (2002) showed that employing an allocen-
tric frame of reference tends to be more accurate. Specifically they showed that
performance tended to be better for a novel but allocentrically aligned heading,
than a familiar view from direct egocentric experience. Subsequent work exam-
ining eye movements shows patterns at encoding and test both reflected move-
ments similar to intrinsic allocentric reference directions. This firstly strength-
ens the argument that intrinsic geometrically-defined frames of reference are
dominant, but also shows that one’s eye movements and thus attention focuses
on allocentric reference frames at encoding and similar motor-actions are sub-
sequently employed at retrieval (Mou, Liu, & McNamara, 2009).
However, Burgess (2006) posits that whether or not egocentric or allocentric
frames of reference are dominant is determined by the nature of the task.
Burgess (2006) highlights that the effectiveness of egocentric representations
is apparent at small distances and with few locations. However, as such factors
increase so does cognitive computation. As one moves through their spatial
environment the calculations of object-to-object locations increase dramatically
because judgements are represented in relation to one’s position egocentrically.
Therefore each person-to-object location alters. However, if one is able to hold
an allocentrically-defined representation then the only new source of informa-
tion required for processing is that of one’s own position. Thus, a perspective-
independent representation is much more efficient and capable of accessing an
entire familiar spatial representation from multiple novel view-points, whereas
an egocentrically-defined system is strictly limited to a priori view-point expe-
rience. Burgess (2006) suggests egocentric and allocentric representations must
therefore coexist.
Some research is in line with the ideas of Burgess (2006) and argue that whether
egocentric or geocentric (i.e., allocentric) dominance is present may itself be de-
pendent on additional factors. Presson, Delange, and Hazelrigg (1989) proposed
that spatial information can be represented in functionally different ways. They
hypothesized, similar to Shelton and McNamara (1997), that if viewpoints were
orientation-specific (i.e., viewpoint-dependent) one would expect more errors to
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be present when a test view differed from the view in which the spatial content
had been encoded. Likewise, if the test view was the same orientation as the
learnt view then one would expect fewer errors in location judgements. The
experimental set-up for Presson et al. (1989) involved varying the size of a map
from 2ft to 12ft and then having subjects learn the map from a specific view-
point. They then tested the participants’ memory accuracy for routes on the
map from either the learnt view-point (aligned) or from a different view-point
(contraligned). After controlling for scale transformation effects (i.e., difference
in map scales), instructional sets, and referent space size, they found that bi-
ases from the contraligned view-point were significantly reduced as the map size
increased. This suggests that under certain conditions the representation of
spatial information is less constrained to a particular viewing perspective and
thus reflective of orientation-free representations.
The evidence indicates that as individuals move through there environment or
have to deal with larger and more complex spatial arrays they rely on allocen-
tric and therefore more viewpoint-independent representations Burgess (2006);
Presson et al. (1989). However, it remains unclear whether viewpoint-dependent
dominance is simply a consequence of the limited number and variety of view-
ing perspectives employed in previous work. In an attempt to encourage the
development of viewpoint-independent representations Shelton and McNamara
(2001a) offered subjects additional views of a room layout. They hypothesized
that with more learnt viewing perspectives individuals may develop a more co-
herent representation and thus be able to make accurate judgements from novel
perspectives. In fact, they showed this not to be the case. Additional expe-
riences did not overflow to non-learnt perspectives, suggesting individuals had
independent representations, one for each learnt view. This suggests that the
development of allocentric and thus viewpoint-independent representations of
space may not simply be the result of multiple and different egocentric repre-
sentations of a visual array.
Waller and Hodgson (2006) building on the work of Wang and Spelke (2000)
and Burgess, Spiers, and Paleologou (2004) advocate a dual-system represen-
tation of space. One system is concerned with tracking relations between the
perceiver and objects in the visual field. It is therefore egocentrically orientated,
relatively precise, and temporally constrained. They argue that it remains in
the mnemonic system for short periods of time after initial visual input. Due
to it’s precision, if it is available it is a preferred choice for the perceiver. How-
ever, in the case of uncertainty individuals may switch to a second less precise
but more enduring system anchored in long-term memory. If sensory infor-
mation is reintroduced then reliance can again switch back to an egocentric
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view. This idea has been echoed in other work which attempts to consolidate
viewpoint-specific and viewpoint-free representations (Waller, 2006). Presson
et al. (1989) theorise that integrated viewpoint-free spatial information and
orientation-specific information may be available flexibly. They also argue that
integrated conceptualisations are likely to stem from long-term memory repre-
sentation compared to viewpoint-dependent ones that are related to perceptual
processes. The corollary of this would mean allocentric systems are continuously
mediated by egocentric input from perceptual and short term memory processes
(Burgess, 2006).
The overall evidence seems to suggest a difference in reference frame dominance
dependent upon whether the task involves on-line or off-line processing. On-line
processing of spatial information is subject to transient ‘snapshots’ of spatial
relations determined by self-to-object encoding (egocentric). In comparison,
off-line processing relies on a more enduring representation defined by object-
to-object relations (allocentric) and is viewpoint-free. Although the evidence is
building for orientation-free representations of space it is evident that certain
egocentric and allocentric perspectives are employed to a great deal in everyday
processing of spatial information. However, the majority of research on this area
has tended to focus on relatively short-term spatial constructs (Wang & Spelke,
2000; Shelton & McNamara, 1997; Mou, McNamara, Valiquette, & Rump, 2004;
Shelton & McNamara, 1997). It is yet to be established the consequences of
long-term learning on one’s reliance on viewpoint-free representations. Research
suggests that dealing with large scale spatial arrays where movement is involved
would be the most likely environment to encourage the development of enduring
and coherent mental representations of spatial (i.e., where separate representa-
tions have been integrated). Arguably, such situations where repeated exposure
is involved (i.e., a familiar environment) are the ones where multiple long-term
viewpoint-independent representations are developed as opposed to short-term
perceptual experiences (e.g., Shelton & McNamara, 2001a).
1.2 Models of spatial memory
There have been a number of important model and research developments within
the field of spatial memory. All have attempted to describe observable findings
drawn from individuals’ reports of object location, each with subtle nuances in
method and accountability. There is a clear dual-component approach to spatial
coding according to the majority of proposed models. One component is con-
cerned with fine-grain, coordinate, metric-type properties of an object’s location
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and refers to the precise location of an object. The second is concerned with
the category, frame, and ‘rough’ location of an object and refers to the proximal
location of an object (Huttenlocher, Hedges, & Duncan, 1991; Lansdale, 1998;
Kosslyn, 1980; Bryant & Tversky, 1999).
1.2.1 Categorical-coordinate model
Kosslyn (1987) proposed a categorical-coordinate model in which he theorized
there to be two distinct subsystems involved in the computation of categori-
cal and coordinate spatial information received from the senses. Coordinate
representations specify the location of an object in terms of a precise metric
(e.g., the magazine is 5cm from the edge of the coffee table), whereas categori-
cal representations are more global quantifications and place an object within a
framework (e.g., the magazine is on the coffee table). Under this theory, it was
hypothesized that separate neural networks should be responsible for each form
of processing.
Some empirical work has supported this notion, mainly showing that the left
hemisphere shows advantage for categorical spatial relations whereas the right
hemisphere for coordinate estimation (Kosslyn, 1987; Kosslyn et al., 1989; Koss-
lyn, Thompson, Gitelman, & Alpert, 1998; Hellige, 1989). It is argued because
such subsystems are discreetly different in terms of computation (i.e., categor-
ical and coordinate information processing), each subsystems dominance will
be dependent upon the task. For example, initially one may need to recognise
roughly where an object is (i.e., on the coffee table [categorical processing]),
then when action is required (i.e., grasping [coordinate processing]) one will
need more local and metric-driven information. Thus, a functional difference
exists between the two systems. The coordinate system guides action and the
categorical system recognises shapes (Borst & Kosslyn, 2010). Sergent (1991)
logically states that coordinate information must contain within it some relative
information such as a frame of reference, implying that coordinate and categor-
ical information may not be entirely independent as first thought by (Kosslyn,
1987). Some evidence has emerged to support such a notion of interconnected-
ness (Bruyer, Scailquin, & Coibion, 1997; Niebauer, 2001). This evidence seems
to reflect established ideas of hierarchical storing of spatial information (Stevens
& Coupe, 1978). Thus, fine-grain coordinate information is stored at a lower
level of a hierarchy to that of categorical information.
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1.2.2 Categorical adjustment model (CAM)
Huttenlocher et al. (1991) proposed the categorical adjustment model (CAM).
This model can be likened to that of Kosslyn’s (1980), but in addition it is
able to account for numerous biases observed in the spatial memory system
which imposes its own cognitive structure on the information received from the
visual system. Huttenlocher et al. (1991) also propose a dual-systems account
of human spatial processing. They argue there are two levels of encoding an
object’s location. First, an object is encoded in terms of fine-grain information.
This relates to a representation in memory regarding the absolute unbiased
location of an object, that is not to say the exact location of the object, but
rather an unbiased encoded representation. Second, an object is coded with
regards to a bounded region termed by Huttenlocher et al. (1991) as a ‘category’.
According to Huttenlocher, a general example of fine-grain and categorical infor-
mation can be likened to that of a piece of orange cloth. The orange cloth itself
considered as a category, which consists of a range of specific shades consid-
ered to be fine-grain information. This can be generalised to the spatial domain
where a spatial display may be coded in terms of bounded sections (category) at
particular coordinates (fine-grain). The model also assumes each category pos-
sesses some kind of preferred (in the sense of memory structure) typical location
where an object is most precisely remembered (i.e., unbiased). The prototyp-
ical location in the Huttenlocher et al. (1991) examples is considered to be a
central location (i.e., the centre point of a categories boundaries). Shifts to-
ward typicality can be seen elsewhere in the literature such as Belli (1988), who
demonstrated memory for an artificially coloured object will shift towards the
usual colour of the object. Likewise, Neuberg and Fiske (1987) found that when
attention is compromised, judgements of people are bias towards stereotypical
categories.
According to the CAM, a distribution of estimated biases is observed when an
object is located outside of its typical position. Hence, as long as categorical and
fine-grain representations are encoded exactly and aligned, no bias is present in
an individual’s response (although the estimation may still be inexact in terms
of the object’s absolute location, just exact in terms of where they remember it
to be). However, when categorical and fine-grain representations are misaligned
there is a level uncertainty ingrained within the representation and therefore
individuals make an estimate as to an object’s location and consequently bias
is observably introduced.
According to the model, bias stems from two possibilities. First, because recall
is made up of the fine-grain information and the typical or preferred location
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according to the category, a weight-average estimate is calculated which resides
somewhere between the two representations. The degree to which it is weighted
towards either is dictated by the level of precision within each source of infor-
mation. If the source of information relating to an object’s coordinate location
(fine-grain information) is less precise than that relating to the typical location
(given the categorical boundaries) then recall estimation will be biased towards
the more precise source (i.e., towards the typical location of the category). The
opposite bias is assumed if it is weighted (more precise) for fine-grain informa-
tion. The second basis of estimation comes from the fact space is represented in
terms of divided categories and as such boundaries are imposed upon the rep-
resentation. This means overlap with other categories’ boundaries is possible
when the object is located close to a category boundary. Thus, when fine-grain
information is inexact and near to a boundary the distribution of possible values
will be truncated causing a shift in reporting towards the centre of the category.
Huttenlocher et al. (1991) refer to these two sources of bias as prototype effects
(see above) and boundary effects respectively.
There is much empirical evidence to support such a model of spatial memory
bias (Huttenlocher, Newcombe, & Sandberg, 1994; Huttenlocher, Hedges, &
Vevea, 2000; Huttenlocher, Hedges, Corrigan, & Crawford, 2004; Huttenlocher,
2008), illustrated most cogently in a series of experiments where participants
were asked to remember the location of a dot in a circle (Huttenlocher et al.,
1991). Response patterns provided strong evidence that participants were actu-
ally dividing the circle into quadrants (categories) and the centre point of these
quadrants acted as a prototype or preferred response location. Additionally,
the weighting of uncertainty between fine-grain and categorical information led
to predictable patterns of bias that were extremely well accounted for by their
proposed quantitative model.
1.2.3 Hybrid encoding of location memory model (HELM)
Lansdale (1998) proposed the hybrid encoding of location memory (HELM)
model. Amongst other things, this model introduces an elegant method of quan-
tifying spatial memory and allows for the independent specification of response
bias. The model utilises confusion matrices as the basis of analysing the recall
of spatial information. Lansdale (1998) argued that this form of quantifying
spatial memory is far more powerful and informative than previous abstracted
statistical analyses (see Chapter 2 for a more detailed account). The HELM
model assumes two forms of encoding necessary to account for location recall
performance - exact and inexact. The model offers certain advantages over pre-
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vious models. Primarily it allows for the analysis of exact and inexact recall
under one model. It also enables the modelling of responses biases that may
be unique to a set of stimuli. Lansdale (1998) shows clear evidence that the
encoding of location specifies varying representations which contain degrees of
inexactness. Just as in Huttenlocher et al. (1991), each encoding of location
generates a mostly symmetrical distribution of inexactness around the exact
location.
HELM proposes three processes in the recalling of location information. One
component of a spatial representation is exact memory, without error and com-
mensurate precision. An example of this might be to estimate an objects lo-
cation in terms of a broad direction or location (e.g., ‘over to the left’ or ‘ in
the living room’). The second component is inexact recall which assumes that
memory for an object is represented inexactly. This inexactness is manifest as
a response in and around the target location. HELM assumes equal strength
in memory of inexact traces and as a consequence the distribution of possible
responses is uniform around the exact location. HELM then models the prob-
ability of encoding such a response and the clustering of responses around the
correct location. The third component deals with the possible biases that may
be present in responding to a spatial array on a continuum (i.e., left-right lin-
ear spatial array - which is typically employed when fitting the HELM model),
where some responses are more likely than others.
Essentially HELM states that memory is encoded with a level of precision and
that level of precision will determine the distribution of possible responses drawn
from memory. Lansdale (1998) distinguishes between exact and inexact in terms
of bias and contends (similar to Huttenlocher et al., 1991), only inexact memory
is subject to response bias. This is a central theoretical tenet of the model and
separates exact and inexact as unique psychological processes, whereby exact
recall is an all-or-nothing process and inexact recall is a spectral process. 3
1.2.4 Intrinsic-reference and spatial-framework model
Two models have been developed with similar objectives in mind. The intrinsic-
reference model (Mou & McNamara, 2002; Mou et al., 2004) and the spatial-
frame-work model (Bryant & Tversky, 1999; Franklin & Tversky, 1990) both
sought to establish the representation of space with the perceiver in mind, com-
pared to other models which focus on the interaction of encoding specifications
related to singular or inter-object representations.
3The experimental design employed for the testing of HELM is heavily utilised in the
current research and it is therefore further discussed detail in Chapter 2
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The intrinsic-reference model has been developed by Mou, McNamara and col-
leagues (Mou & McNamara, 2002; Mou et al., 2004; Shelton & McNamara,
2001b; Mou, Fan, McNamara, & Owen, 2008; Mou et al., 2009) and aims to
explain discrepancies in memory performance where recalling objects’ location
from some matched egocentrically established representation perform is no bet-
ter than novel viewpoints. The work is borne from early findings which showed
a clear preference for egocentric-dominant reference frames (Diwadkar & McNa-
mara, 1997; Shelton & McNamara, 1997, see section on Oriention specificity).
Later findings were incompatible with simple egocentric-viewing preference and
instead Mou et al. (2008) extended the idea of frames of reference to focus on
inter-object representations. The basic premise of the model is that the align-
ment of one’s memory representation with either an initial egocentric viewing
perspective or geometric frames of reference intrinsic to a room layout (e.g.,
borders or object arrangements etc.) will determine the quality of spatial judge-
ments from memory. The model is quite clear that egocentric viewing perspec-
tive is subordinate to geometric frames of reference. The model has also been
generalised whereby object locations are coded in relation to ‘intrinsic reference
directions’. According to the model, preferred reference choice can be deter-
mined by many intrinsic factors including the geometry of the spatial array,
perceptual organisation of interobject relations, instructions, and alignment of
egocentric viewing perspective and spatial layout (Mou et al., 2009; Mou &
McNamara, 2002) .
The spatial-framework model (Bryant & Tversky, 1999; Franklin & Tversky,
1990) shares multiple similarities with the intrinsic-reference model and ar-
guably is attempting to explain the same findings. The model proposes that
space is encoded in terms of the relation of the body to a spatial array and re-
trieval of encoded information is dependent on the congruency of such relations.
Evidence where participants would construct spatial representations from verbal
descriptions, showed there to be a preference to encode things in a ‘front/back’
fashion in relation to one’s body and an ‘up/down’ fashion when in relation
to the environment. Additionally, memory retrieval times reflected that when
other axes in the spatial array where confounded with either body-dominant or
environment-dominant axes, advantages were observed for either axes over any
other. However, when body-dominant axes and environment-dominant axes
were confounded body axes were typically relied upon. As a consequence of
these findings, Franklin and Tversky (1990) have proposed that body axes are
employed as frames of reference for the encoding of objects in space. According
to this model, the availability and salience of egocentric axes is dependent on
perceptual and functional components of the body and environment. This is in
17
contrast to the intrinsic-reference model that proposes environmental structures
to be dominant.
However, there have been some recent findings which weaken the theoretical
assumptions of the spatial-framework model. Quite interestingly when Mou
et al. (2004) (see also Avraamides & Carlson, 2003) used arrows to indicate
a directional location of objects instead of verbal instructions (e.g., ‘left of...’,
‘right of..’) the spatial-framework model did not hold. They subsequently con-
cluded that spatial-frameworks are not a result of spatial memory organisation
and representation but rather originate from discrepancies in interpretation and
therefore processing of directional language. Further support for this comes from
Avraamdes and Sofroniou (2006) and Avraamides and Carlson (2003).
Each model attempts to account for specific aspects of spatial memory. Each has
sought to tackle some very different yet necessary questions with regards to how
representations of space are developed, function and relied upon. One singular
model that explains how the relations between objects and landmarks, between
objects and local frames of reference, local frames of reference and global frames
of reference, and all of such relations with regards to the observer’s perspective,
locomotion, and prior knowledge is still a distal accomplishment. When consid-
ered in such sobering terms the realisation that no single model can account for
all scientific directions of endeavour is not entirely surprising. However, some
general consensus and enduring aspects are emerging from dual-components ac-
counts which focus on the interaction of fine-grain and more global location
processing. In comparison other models have placed the perceiver at the centre
of the debate and argued for the importance of geometric frameworks which
are ingrained in one’s environment. The lacuna between these perspectives is
an understanding of how the two relate to one another. In other words, how
individuals integrate fine-grain and categorical information into frames of refer-
ence and in turn, how frames of reference are integrated into coherent models
of space.
1.3 The neurological foundations of location
memory
1.3.1 What & Where (How) systems
Neurological findings add some support to the evidence derived from behavioural
insights. Postma, Kessels, and van Asselen (2004) posit there to be three func-
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tional steps to remembering where something is located. First, the object of
interest must be recognised. Second, its location in space must be specified,
and third, the object’s identity and its location must be combined. Initial evi-
dence for the first two propositions comes from Milner and Goodale (1995) who
found the presence of two distinct neuronal ‘streams’ within the brain, both of
which originate from the visual cortex and can be generalised as consisting of a
‘what’ and ‘where’ functionality.
One stream partitions out through the occipitotemporal cortex to the anterior
of the inferior temporal cortex, with an extension to the ventrolateral prefrontal
cortex and is known as the ventral stream. Damage to this area typically results
in an inability to visually recognise objects. The processing of object identity
in the ventral stream is reasonably well established in the literature (Kravitz,
Saleem, Baker, Ungerleider, & Mishkin, 2013). However, the second stream
which stretches to the parietal lobe, known as the dorsal stream, has been chal-
lenged as simply dealing with ‘where’ information. In fact, the intricacies of
both streams are more complicated than originally conceptualised by Milner
and Goodale (1995).
Evidence now suggests that the ventral stream deals with object identity and
object quality information. It has been implicated in processes such as habit
formation, long and short-term memory, reward, and value (Kravitz et al., 2013).
Reflective of these processes the ventral system involves the representations of
stable and enduring features of visual information, rather than relations that
are specific to a particular array of objects.
More contradictory to the original ‘what’/‘where’ system (Milner & Goodale,
1995) is a reconceputalisation of the dorsal (i.e., ‘where’) stream into a ‘how’
system. Research now shows that the dorsal stream stretches from the early
visual cortex to posterior regions of the parietal cortex. This is known as the
occipitoparietal circuit and consists of the parietal-prefrontal pathway (which
deals with eye movement and spatial working memory), parietopremotor path-
way (which deals with representation of visual coordinates relative to body
position [necessary for visually guided action in space]), and the parieto-medial
temporal pathway (which is specialised for processing distant space and space
in a object-centred reference frame - arguably an element of navigation).
Although these two areas were originally thought to mostly be independent of
one another it is now thought both are capable of spatial processing (Milner &
Goodale, 2008) and in fact communication along the entirety of the streams is
more likely (Webster, Bachevalier, & Ungerleider, 1994). For example, the ven-
tral stream provides information needed to represent landmarks where as compo-
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nents of the dorsal stream provide spatial information for their relative position
(useful for navigation) (Kravitz, Saleem, Baker, & Mishkin, 2011; Kravitz et
al., 2013). These types of information are thought to be integrated around the
hippocampal regions. Additionally, both pathways receive information from the
front eye fields, suggesting eye movements initiated by one stream may activate
the other (Kravitz et al., 2013).
In terms of egocentric and allocentric processing it is possible that each occur
in both streams, although categorical (view-point dependent) specifications of
space may be confined to the left hemisphere and coordinate (viewpoint-free)
to the right (Kosslyn, 1987). Recent findings by Niebauer (2001) go further and
suggest that categorical encoding may represent a preliminary step in specifying
space with more precise coordinate processing following.
In summary, the ventral system seems to deal with object identity and qual-
ity informaiton on a more conscious level and the dorsal system is involved
with visually guided action, navigation and spatial working memory on a more
unconscious level.
1.3.2 Neuronal maps
The above neurological findings are predominately related to perceptual pro-
cessing of spatial information but there is also much evidence with regards to
the mnemonic processes that occur with spatial information. O’Keefe and Nadel
(1979) introduced the idea of the hippocampus as a cognitive map. In doing so
they theorised that via patterns of neuronal firings the hippocampus constructs
a map-like structure of the spatial environment. There is now building evi-
dence that supports this concept (O’Keefe & Dostrovsky, 1971; Hafting, Fyhn,
Molden, Moser, & Moser, 2005; Burgess, Jackson, Hartley, & O’Keefe, 2000;
Solstad, Boccara, Kropff, Moser, & Moser, 2008; Taube, 2007).
The first piece of evidence comes from O’Keefe and Dostrovsky (1971) who
discovered the existence of a neuron that would only fire when the organism
was in a particular location and that location alone. When in another location
the neuron would fall silent. These neurons are known as place cells (O’Keefe
& Dostrovsky, 1971). A series of additional cells have since been discovered
including grid cells (Hafting et al., 2005), border cells (Burgess et al., 2000;
Solstad et al., 2008), and head-direction cells (Taube, 2007). The functions of
these cells can be seen to mimic what has been observed in various behavioural
experiments.
For instance, place cells are involved with coordinate or fine-grain information
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regarding spatial locations. Border cells are closely related to informing a place
cell when or when not to fire and represent frames of reference intrinsic to the
place cell’s firing field (Burgess et al., 2000; Solstad et al., 2008). Grid cells
form equilateral triangular shapes of firing patterns and the combination of
many different grid cells form a nexus of firing patterns allowing for navigation
via metric representations of space (Hafting et al., 2005). Head-direction cells
have shown to be sensitive to the head-direction of the perceiver, namely, that a
particular head-direction cell will only fire when the individual is facing a specific
orientation. The anatomical locations of these cells are mainly limited to the
hippocampal regions including the entorhinal cortex (Burgess et al., 2000). The
striking predictability of how these unique cells’ behaviour has led to a group of
researchers being able to predict the precise location of an individual within a
virtual environment purely on the basis of their brain’s neuronal firing patterns
(Hassabis et al., 2009).
In agreement with behavioural work regarding preferred lines of axes (Franklin
& Tversky, 1990; Bryant & Tversky, 1999; Sholl & Nolin, 1997), evidence from
neuroscience shows that axial perceptual preference may well be attributable to
neuronal structuring in the brain. Appelle (1972) demonstrated a perceptual
preference for horizontal and vertical organised visual arrays. This has been
supported with evidence from neuroscience with the recording of fewer neu-
ronal units located in the oblique angles than in vertical or horizontal axes (Li,
Peterson, & Freeman, 2003).
1.4 Automaticity of coding spatial information
Owing to the clearly abundant nature to which humans process and rely on spa-
tial information for a large majority of tasks, it begs the question as to whether
spatial information is coded automatically or requires some degree of effort.
This is very important to examine because a large body of research shows a
direct relationship between the amount of effort required to process information
and the level that one attends a stimulus, and one’s subsequent memory perfor-
mance (Craik & Lockhart, 1972; Lozito & Mulligan, 2006). Relating this back
to the question of how we build representations of space, the ease with which
we are able to process spacial information is an important component of the
building process.
Hasher and Zacks (1979) laid forth a number of cardinal conditions that must be
met in order to determine whether an input source is processed automatically.
The five criteria they set out are as follows: i) Whether one attends a stimulus
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or not (intentional vs incidental exposure) will only affect a process if it is not
automatically encoded; ii) instruction of how one should carry out an automatic
task should not result in any performance change; iii) interference of tasks with
other operations will have little impact upon automatic processes; iv) anything
that impacts attentional capacity (affective or otherwise) should not reduce task
performance if the process is automatic; v) one would not expect to observe
developmental changes (once they have been established from early childhood)
in performance for automatic processes.
Some research provides evidence that the coding of spatial information is in line
with Hasher and Zacks (1979) criteria (see Mandler, Seegmiller, & Day, 1977;
Ellis, 1990, 1991). However, in response to the methodological weaknesses ap-
parent in previous work (e.g., Mandler et al., 1977), Naveh-Benjamin (1987)
conducted one of the first experiments that considered quantification of spatial
memory itself; working under the premise that only once spatial memory perfor-
mance could be measured appropriately could its automaticity be tested. The
approach taken regarded spatial memory ability to be on a continuum, where
a representation could be anywhere from completely accurate to including de-
grees of inexactness (see Chapter 2 of this thesis for a more detailed overview).
Naveh-Benjamin (1987) set up five experiments each to address one aspect of
Hasher and Zack’s (1979) criteria. The results are contradictory to earlier work
and suggest spatial coding does not fit with criteria set out by Hasher and Zacks
(1979) to substantiate automaticity.
Taken together research provides evidence that the processing of spatial infor-
mation either involves little effort (Ellis, 1990, 1991) or alternatively involves
some degree of effort Naveh-Benjamin (1987, 1988). A point that is illustrated
very nicely by these types of contradictory findings is that each approach are
attempting to make generalisations to the processing of all spatial information.
However, it is clear that such generalisations are not congruent with either both
examinations of the evidence, or the sheer complexity and variety of the tasks
spatial information is used for. It is logically inevitable that some tasks will
require the employment of spatial information in a very precise and necessary
fashion in order to carry out certain tasks successfully. In contrast, some tasks
will require little or no information regarding the spatial element. For example,
if one were presented with one object in a room it is likely that one will recall the
location of that object regardless of instructions or attention. However, if one
were to be presented with three objects in the same room one would arguably
have to employ more attention in order to recall the three objects as precisely
as one had previously with a single object. This is not to say that one form of
spatial processing is more automatic than the other, only that varying levels of
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effort (i.e., attention) are required which will be reflected in subsequent spatial
memory performance.
Lansdale (1998) furthers this point and argues that the level of measurement
previously employed may not have been fine enough to capture the maximal level
of precision that reflects the true performance of each experimental paradigm
(intentional vs. incidental) and therefore an overestimation of incidental recall
may have prevailed (resulting in no differences in performance between inten-
tional and incidental conditions). This idea is also inline with suggestions that
different levels of automaticity correspond to different levels of spatial encoding
precision. For example, if one were to test for three locations within a house
and each subject was asked which room of the house are the objects located in,
participants in the incidental and intentional condition may well both answer
with the corresponding rooms correctly. However, the participant in the inten-
tional condition may well be able to judge precisely where in each room the
object was located whereas the participant exposed to incidental learning may
not. Consequently, Lansdale (1998) found significant performance differences
between intentional and incidental learning of spatial information. Thus,
It is argued by Postma et al. (2004) that owing to the intrinsic nature of not only
establishing where an object is located but also what object it is that is located
there, spatial memory must involve both automatic and effortful mechanisms.
They speculate that object position per se may well be encoded automatically
however the binding process of object position and object identity is a rather
more effortful process. Additionally, the integration of precepts into a coher-
ent singular memory must involve some conscious effort. More support for this
comes from Creem-Regehr (2004) who demonstrates that the location of an ob-
ject in terms of coordinate details is encoded automatically, whereas the coding
of the object’s identity involves effort. This highlights that one cannot attend to
the identity of an object without encoding at least some location information.
Other evidence also supports a dual-processing account (i.e., effortful vs. non-
effortful components) of coding spatial information. Caldwell and Masson (2001)
provide compelling evidence that object location memory comprises two compo-
nents, automatic (unconscious) and effortful (conscious). Caldwell and Masson
(2001) employed a paradigm4 which enabled the comparison between conscious
and unconscious processes within the same task. Through varying instructional
commands two comparable conditions produce the same outcome for uncon-
scious and conscious processes or divergent outcomes. Thus, by examining the
pattern of results the level of interdependence between conscious and uncon-
4the process-dissociation procedure by Jacoby (1991)
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scious processing could be inferred. Results showed that two different levels of
conscious processing were involved in object location memory. This provided a
very neat explanation for some of the contradictory findings regarding the ef-
fortful nature of spatial encoding (e.g., Mandler et al., 1977). Age invariance as
proposed by Hasher and Zacks (1979) was assumed to indicate the presence of an
enduring automatic and thus unconscious process. Caldwell and Masson (2001)
showed that the conscious and thus effortful component of location memory
did not vary across age, rather only the unconscious (described as automatic)
component varied, demonstrating advantage for younger participants over older
ones. Additionally, they showed that habit strength influenced unconscious ele-
ments of memory but not conscious elements which suggests practice effects are
a consequence of qualitative changes to the more unconscious processes involved
in object location memory.
1.4.1 How do we ‘build’ coherent representations space?
This final section aims to highlight findings which support or oppose the idea
of spatial information integration. Much research has examined how and when
representations of space which are viewpoint-free (Shelton & McNamara, 1997)
are developed and relied upon. For example, Peruch and Lapin (1993) posit
whether spatial location involves connecting successive egocentric viewpoints
with intrinsic frames of reference. Although it has been well established that
people do not hold map-like representations (see the first part of this intro-
duction on distortions), it is also quite evident that coherent representations of
space are apparent through experience. For example, if one were to consider
their place of work, no doubt a fluid manipulation from multiple non-experienced
perspectives is achievable from memory.
Awareness of abilities such as these led Evans and Pezdek (1980) to pose an
interesting question. Specifically, they enquired as to the effects of asking indi-
viduals to learn a spatial environment from a map (i.e., a pre-formed holistic
interpretation of space). This way an interconnected (albeit a metrically scaled
one) representation could be created with one viewing. They found that individ-
uals were in fact much better at recalling interrelationships between buildings
from differently-viewed directions when learning them from a map compared to
individuals who learnt one or two views of the corresponding spatial environ-
ment. This suggests that holding a viewer-independent map-like representation
does appear to offer the possibility and benefits of viewpoint-free spatial judge-
ments. However, these may be difficult to develop from limited experiential
views.
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1.4.2 Integration of spatial information
Integrating multiple pieces of information are argued to have numerous ad-
vantages via a probabilistically additive effect (Jones, 1987), the elimination
of systematic bias (Bryant & Subbiah, 1994), or by increasing precision over
singular pieces of information(Lindberg & Garling, 1987). Thus, investigating
whether spatial information can exploit such benefits is important.
An example of multiple information advantage is highlighted cogently in the ver-
bal domain. Rubin and Wallace (1989) showed that two related routes (i.e.,cues)
to retrieving a memory were greater than the arithmetic sum of each memory
separately. In their study the subject would be prompted for a learnt word
(‘RED’) with ‘either/or’ cues such as ‘It’s a Colour’ or ‘It rhymes with dead’.
Participants would receive both cues ‘It’s a colour’ and ‘It rhymes with dead’.
They found that recall was much better for the ‘either’ condition over the ‘or’
condition. In other words, the multiple cues for the same memory were more
efficient in extracting the memory for the target object over and above the sum
of its individual memories. Rubin and Wallace (1989) argued that some form of
aggregation or integration of the related information had taken place producing
a qualitatively different and more powerful memory cue. This phenomenon is
often described as ‘superadditivity’, where not only do the multiple cues en-
hance recall but improve it beyond the aggregated recall efficiency of each cue
separately.
Findings like this are the basis for assuming integration is reflective of some
form of additive effect where the aggregation of two pieces of information has
greater effect on memory performance over the sum of its constituent parts.
This has also been observed in the visual domain where combining separate
fixations form a more detailed visual representation (Hollingworth & Henderson,
2002). Shimamura and Wickens (2009) put forward a biological account of
superadditive memory strength suggesting the medial temporal lobe acts to
bind contextual features through a process of hierarchical relational binding.
Within the field of spatial memory research is divided as to whether such pro-
cesses can and do occur. This next section highlights the research which pre-
dominantly supports processes conductive to integration of spatial information.
Sawa, Leising, and Blaisdell (2005) using a touch screen procedure and Blaisdell
and Cook (2005) using an open-field search task both demonstrate evidence for
the possibility of spatial information integration in pigeons. The experimental
design was such that pigeons would learn a stimulus pairing where the spatial
distance was kept constant (e.g., A-B). They would then train the subjects
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as to the location of a target stimulus in relation to only one of the original
stimulus (e.g., A-C). Therefore participants would have no a priori knowledge
of the spatial relation between C and B (e.g., B-C). Thus, it is argued that if
they are able to estimate C’s location given B as a reference cue then they have
integrated the representations (A-B + A-C). The measure of integration was
whether there was an observable increase in correct estimates of C’s location
over successive learning trials. Interestingly, Blaisdell and Cook (2005) showed
that integration was not apparent until some 7 months after separate paired
association had been learnt with the target stimuli.
Sturz, Bodily, and Katz (2006) used human participants and applied the same
integration paradigm as Blaisdell and Cook (2005) did with pigeons. Their
findings showed the same outcome, that is, individuals were able to infer a novel
relationship between previously learnt routes. However, Sturz et al. (2006) argue
for a different conclusion than integration. They found that humans initially
used a generalisation strategy, which means they would make judgements as to
the target’s location from the novel cue as if it were the learnt cue. In other
words, they would simply repeat the learnt spatial relation for the novel spatial
relation judgement task. They would then shift this estimation until it became
progressively close to the target location from the view-point of the new novel
landmark. Thus, given the appearance that they had inferred its location based
on previous knowledge of other stimuli relations. Additionally unlike Blaisdell
and Cook (2005) who showed reminder trials seemed to help pigeons locate the
novel spatial relation, Sturz et al. (2006) showed absolutely no effect of this
nature in humans. These findings are reiterated in a real-life replication study
by Sturz, Bodily, Katz, and Kelly (2009). Again, Sturz et al. (2009) argue
that no integration has taken place on the basis that individuals showed initial
preference to generalise a novel location based on a learnt spatial relation rather
than infer its position based on knowledge of related spatial relations.
Molet, Jozefowiez, and Miller (2010) provide contradictory evidence to that of
Sturz et al. (2006, 2009). They found evidence for integration in the absence
of search-task availability. Essentially they made search a non-option because
they only allowed for a single choice on each trial to be made and moved the
target object at test. This meant any search strategies would not carry over to
the outcome trial. This left a strong possibility that search strategy could not
explain the finding and therefore integration was a more plausible occurrence.
Molet, Bugallo, and Gambet (2011) support such findings of integration and
generalise them to virtual reality settings. They also posit a spatial coding
hypothesis based on the temporal coding hypothesis by Savastano and Miller
(1998) which states that, i) an association between two spatially related events
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occurs in the presence of contiguity (close proximity) and, ii) the spatial element
of the association is incorporated as part of the associative process (i.e., a spatial
representation is formed that the stimuli share), iii) the spatial information
contained within the associations plays a role in the topography of the response
when only one associate is presented, iv) individuals are able to superimpose
spatial relations that share a common target that was never presented together
(Molet et al., 2011).
Molet, Gambet, Bugallo, and Miller (2012) sought to study the conditions under
which disparate information may cause conflicting associations to be blocked.
Based on ideas by Escobar, Matute, and Miller (2001) they focused on the
test context as a factor that may determine whether two associations will be
retrieved when they have been learnt separately with a common element to
each. Escobar et al. (2001) argue that the condition under which information
is retrieved may not only increase recall of stimulus initially learnt under those
conditions but that it may also decrease the recall of any conflicting information
(see also Anderson, Bjork, & Bjork, 1994, for a similar concept). Molet et al.
(2012) tested this idea by requiring learning of the same cues with different spa-
tial relations across two different virtual environments. Essentially, individuals
would learn the positions of A-B and also the location of a target object in rela-
tion to A-B. Then a second association would be learnt using the same stimulus
(A-B) but this time they were located in a different position within a different
environment and with a different outcome object. This meant that there was
landmark overlap between stimuli and Molet et al. (2012) showed that retrieval
context can be used to differentiate learnt association and prevent interference.
In essence, subjects used the retrieval context to help disambiguate any conflict
between stimulus interference.
However, another and equally likely possibility that could be applied to such
an experimental paradigm (Molet et al., 2012; Sturz et al., 2006; Blaisdell &
Cook, 2005; Sawa et al., 2005) is that the subjects hold two separate but related
representations and they are simply accessing such presentations in a step-wise
manner. For example, when cued with reference point A this triggers the A-B
relation which in turn triggers the B-S relation. Thus, the subject may not
represent all three relations in one coherent unit but he/she is rather cuing
associated corresponding spatial information for each relationships. The idea
that an inference is made between A-S would therefore not hold if a step-wise
strategy was employed.
There is also another methodological problem with some of the applied designs
owing to individuals always making judgements (the ones considered evidence
for integration) by using only one cue, then inferring a targets location based on
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knowledge of its spatial relation to another related cue. However, integration as
has previously been argued, would necessarily assume that each component has
been integrated into a qualitatively different representation. Therefore, each
representation consists of all common spatial relations. One could equally ar-
gue that more reliable evidence of integration (rather than a step-wise serial
retrieval of spatial information) would arise when subjects are afforded the op-
portunity to make a spatial judgement when presented with both learnt cues.
If individuals’ judgements given two learnt cues are greater than one this would
more convincingly argue for the presence of spatial integration.
1.4.3 Non-integration of spatial information
There is also quite substantial evidence for the lack of spatial integration in
humans. The next section highlights the difficulties that are evident with in-
tegration of spatial information. It provides an opposing argument to spatial
integration as highlighted previously in this chapter and suggests that related
spatial representations are held very distinct from one another.
Foo, Warren, Duchon, and Tarr (2005) investigated the possibility of route in-
tegration in humans and examined whether novel short-cuts could be inferred
after learning a number of related map-like routes (i.e., vectors). They found
inference of a third novel route was generally inaccurate in terms of both esti-
mation of distance and angular direction of the novel route. The patterns of
errors were such that individuals tended to underestimate both the angle and
distance of the short cut from a finishing position back to the start, suggestive
that subjects were unable to draw on two separate but related route memories
to make an inference regarding a third unlearn route.
Additionally, Foo et al. (2005) showed that when landmarks were uncertain error
dramatically increased suggestive of learning effort for both the acquired route
and the novel short-cut. However, whenever landmarks were consistent perfor-
mance gains were observed. The overall inaccuracies of short-cut estimation
provides evidence for representations of routes that are not metrically quanti-
fied. If they were, then estimation of distances and angular direction should also
be inferred based on such metric information. However, Foo et al. (2005) also
note that such errors were typically somewhere in the vicinity or roughly in the
right direction of where the short-cut should metrically be. This imprecision is
perhaps expected given the evidence on biases and distortions present in spatial
representations (see section 1.1 of Chapter 1). They argue the findings demon-
strate that path integration systems in humans are coarse and inaccurate but
that this does not preclude the presence of such integration. Interestingly, error
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decreased (accuracy increased) when landmarks were present. Foo et al. (2005)
argue this is reflective of short-cut estimation that is based nearly completely on
landmark configuration rather than actual path-like representations (i.e., lines
between paths).
Further research comes from Foo, Duchon, Jr., and Tarr (2007) who provide evi-
dence that humans dominantly rely on local landmarks to calculate the distance
and angle of a short-cut. This is in comparison to employing path-integrated
type knowledge (i.e., global survey-like representations). This suggests that
spatial judgements may be dependent upon the division of spatial distance in-
formation. This could be explained by the fact landmarks appear to allow
individuals to break up space into more accurate sections. This would be inline
with research that suggests spatial accuracy to be a function of distance from a
landmark (Nelson & Chaiklin, 1980). Thus as one moves along a route if more
landmarks are present aggregation of each spatial segment could potentially be
more accurate than estimation of the whole distance.
Wang and Brockmole (2003) and Brockmole and Wang (2002) examined whether
integration was present across nested environments. For example, one small-
scale environment (a laboratory) located within a large-scale environment (a
campus). They found that subjects did not integrate their newly acquired
knowledge about spatial relations of the small-scale array within their exist-
ing knowledge of the large-scale environment. When asked to point towards
landmarks located within the campus representation and/or the laboratory rep-
resentation, participants showed larger pointing errors for campus landmarks
over laboratory landmarks. This, Wang and Brockmole (2003) argue, reflects
the hierarchical nature of spatial representations (Hirtle & Jonides, 1985) and
suggests nested spatial representations are kept separate within the mnemonic
system. They argue that such retrieval independence suggests both represen-
tations cannot be maintained in working memory. Also, either they are not
retrieved simultaneously or they are not retrieved as a single unit, meaning
they have not been integrated (Brockmole & Wang, 2002).
Similarly, Avraamides, Adamou, Galati, and Kelly (2012) and Greenauer and
Waller (2008) investigated the integration of spatial relations across different
perceptual experiences. Specifically, they tested the idea that if an individual
learnt a spatial array from two separate view points were they then better at
judging the relations between those spatial arrays. Their findings suggest that
individuals kept each representation separate in distinct spatial units.
The idea that representations of space are held in unique units is contradic-
tory of the evidence that suggests it is possible to integrate spatial information.
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Recently there have been findings to suggest that not only are spatial represen-
tations held in distinct units but more strictly that these units are not freely
able to be drawn on even independently. This phenomenon is known as ‘spatial
memory exclusivity’ (Baguley, Lansdale, Lines, & Parkin, 2006) and is the focus
of the final section.
1.5 Spatial memory exclusivity
“the assumption usually made [concerning the effect of combining two proba-
bilistic processes] is that the stochastic relation among the processes is one of
independence. However, it would often appear in principle no less plausible to
entertain an assumption of exclusivity instead.” - (Jones, 1987, p.230)
Exclusive processes can generally be defined as those that occur mutually ex-
clusive to one another. In the case of an event where both processes have the
possibility of being engaged, the outcome will result in only one being so (Jones,
1987). Memory exclusivity, more specifically, refers to instances where two
memory searches or retrievals are found to be exclusive of one another. There is
evidenced of exclusive memory retrieval in semantic and autobiographical mem-
ory (Maylor, Chater, & Jones, 2001). Maylor et al. (2001) argued that search
rates of disjunctive categories (e.g., fish and cars) should exceed search rates of
a single category (e.g., fish or cars) if non-exclusive processing was occurring.
They found that subjects drawing from two distinct categories performed no
better than those searching from a single category either for semantic or autobi-
ographical memory. They argue that if access to long-term memory is exclusive
then such exclusive processing as witnessed in semantic and autobiographical
memory should be apparent in other areas of memory retrieval.
However. there are some arguments as why mulitple cues might nearly always
result in performance gains. Fragmentation hypothesis (Jones, 1976), for exam-
ple, proposes multiple cue advantage that is in contrast to findings of spatial
exclusivity. The fragmentation hypothesis states that a memory trace is made
up of fragments that represent components of a learnt visual stimulus. The
memory trace is activated on presentation of any single element as a cue. Jones
(1976) highlights that on average one would expect to see some advantage for
multiple cuing simply because it is more likely that at least one of the elements
is stored in the memory trace. For example, if a stimulus contained 4 elements
and providing all elements are stored within a memory then only one of those
elements is needed to cue recall of the stimulus. However, if only 2 element were
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stored within a memory then one would expect multiple cueing to have a higher
chance of activating either of the 2 stored elements, thus, on average resulting
in some recall advantage.
Tulving and Pearlstone (1966) and Tulving (1974) argue that the function of
semantic categories in the recalling of verbal information have been shown to
be similar to that of reference points in recalling spatial information (Lindberg
& Garling, 1987). That is, prompting the recall of a word by its belonging to a
specific category may aid significantly in the recall of that word. This suggests
that if reference points act in a similar manner to semantic categories for words
then just as two reference points for the same target (i.e., two reference points
drawn from the same spatial category) should aid in recalling the location of that
object just as words drawn from the same semantic category aid in the recalling
of a word. This suggests that cueing with the spatial category (i.e., both anchor
points common to a target) should help to access the target location.
In contrary to such ideas, a special case of memory exclusivity has emerged
recently in the literature known as ‘spatial memory exclusivity’ (Baguley et al.,
2006). This type of exclusivity describes an event where given the opportunity
for retrieval of two related pieces of spatial information only one of these is re-
trieved. This suggests that not only in some circumstances is spatial integration
not possible but, in the case of multiple competing spatial memories, two spatial
representations for the same target object are no better than one. In a series of
experiments Baguley et al. (2006) manipulated the type, ordering, and pairing
of multiple reference points with a common target object. The premise was
to establish the benefit of holding two representations for a target object over
one. The experimental design involved presenting a target object (T) in relation
to a single reference point (A)(known as an ‘anchor point’) or alternatively in
relation to two anchor points separately (A-T, B-T) (see Figure 1.1). Thus, a
subject would either have one representation for a target object (A-T) or would
have two (A-T, B-T). This meant at test a single memory can be prompted with
its corresponding cue (A or B), or dual memories can be prompted simultane-
ously with their corresponding cues (A and B). In addition to the basic design
format, they attempted to ensure separate representations were being held and
also to encourage integration through manipulating the pattern of A-T, B-T
presentations. For example, A-T and B-T were presented in close succession so
identification of a common target element was salient.
The results across nearly all of their experimental manipulations showed that
no benefits were obtained from having two representations over one. This led
Baguley et al. (2006) to conclude that no integration between representations
(A-T, B-T) had occurred. After a comparison of various statistical models they
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Memory one 
A                                                  T 
Memory two       
                                                    T                                                                                                                                                                                 B 
Test – single memory (A or B) 
A 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       B                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         
Test – dual memories (A and B) 
A                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    B  
Figure 1.1: An example previous experimental paradigm
argued that the most likely explanation of such non-integration was accountable
by ‘exclusive’ processing of the two representations. That is, not only was
there no integration but the participants do not attempt to access a second
representation if they fail to access the first. Baguley et al. (2006) argue that
failure of retrieval from one representations does not lead to any attempt to
access a second. Thus, having learnt the location of an object in relation to two
reference points on different occasions subjects could only retrieve one of such
occasions. This is unique compared to previous research where representations
were held in unique spatial units but were equally accessible. Thus, exclusivity
provides a condition where either retrieval of two representations is not required
or not possible.
It is clear that exclusive processing is contrary to some notions of multiple
cuing and the beneficial role reference points should play in spatial location
judgements. However, the findings from (Baguley et al., 2006) are convincing
and stretch over a number of experiments all demonstrating consistent findings.
1.6 Research rationale
The area of spatial memory integration is of great importance to uncovering the
mechanisms behind a phenomenon that is relied upon daily with untold ease,
that is, the process of building a cognitive representation of one’s spatial envi-
ronment. The finding of spatial exclusivity provides the field with a phenomenon
that has the potential to lead to great insights into how multiple representations
of space interact or fail to interact. There is very little research into exclusive
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processes generally but particularly regarding spatial memory exclusivity. Yet,
an attempt to overcome exclusivity will undoubtedly lead to an understanding
as to why it occurs and under what conditions it may be present.
How spatial information is processed may go some way to explain under what
conditions integration is possible or not. It is a plausible starting point to make
an assumption as to why exclusivity (and thus, non-integration) may occur
under some circumstances. That starting point is to assume that is it a capacity
issue. This is logical considering the various research which is contradictory with
regards to the possibility of integration. Thus, this thesis tackles exclusivity by
aiming to manipulate processing capacity (e.g., the encoding and retreival of
spatial information) in a favourable manner with the aim of encouraging non-
exclusivity and thus integration.
The literature highlighted in the introduction provide background research for
investigating this. It is apparent that integration of spatial information is possi-
ble and in addition it has the potential to enhance memory. Three mechanisms
that may increase the potential for non-exclusive processing are examined in
this thesis. The first focuses of the way stimuli is perceived and subsequently
processed. It attempts to enhance the way related memories are stored holis-
tically. The second investigates limited capacity for retrieval of multiple pieces
of spatial information and also assesses the effects of distinction between like
memories. The third mechanism adopts an approach that introduced repeated
exposure as a means of freeing up any processing associated with learning new
spatial information. Although these mechanisms are expanded at the beginning
of each empirical chapter the three approaches are briefly summarised below.
1.6.1 Expertise
The role of expertise have not so far been investigated as a potential means of
overcoming spatial memory exclusivity. Only one study has attempted to tackle
this, an unpublished study carried out at the University of Loughborough by
Harding (2006). The results tentatively showed expert individuals (musicians)
performed marginally better at recalling the location of a letter when positioned
above two corresponding musical phrases in comparison to when the letter was
positioned above one. This was in contrast to the non-experts who performed
better when presented with just one musical score rather than with two. The
overall findings point to an expertise benefit of receiving additional spatial in-
formation. In light of these findings along with the commonly cited benefits
of experts within both the spatial and other domains two main questions are
considered in the current research: How might common expertise advantages
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(i.e., automaticity, familiarity, holistic processing) impact spatial memory ex-
clusivity?
1.6.2 Semantics
The second approach exploits the role of semantics in memory exclusivity. Se-
mantics clearly play an important part in spatial memory (Hirtle & Jonides,
1985; Pezdek & Evans, 1979), just as they do in the majority of memory pro-
cesses (Rohrer & Pashler, 1998; Logan & Schulkind, 2000). It is clear both
subjective and objective semantic influences help to organise spatial informa-
tion whether it be by category or hierarchy. Semantic information has been
shown to influence one’s ability to processing multiple pieces of information. In
turn, multiple information processing strategies may be key factors in memory
exclusivity, either circumventing or promoting it. This aspect of the thesis asks
the question of how is capacity for spatial information influenced by semantic
information processing?
1.6.3 Learning
The idea that repeated exposure and long-term experience are important factors
in spatial integration is supported from early work involving animals (Ellen,
Parko, Wages, Doherty, & Herrmann, 1982; Ellen, Soteres, & Wages, 1984).
After all, one cannot mentally transverse a friend’s route home or locate a
stranger’s office. These mental achievements are only available from experience
and are arguably the conditions under which they should be tested. Thus it is
more realistic in some ways to study exclusivity and the possibility of overcoming
it when individuals are repeatedly exposed to spatial information over time.
The spatial memory research area research area suffers from a dearth of human-
orientated work. Additionally, learning arguably brings together both semantics
and expertise under one approach. Baguley et al. (2006) also propose that one
possibility that may account for their findings is the novelty and abstractness
of the stimuli and task. They highlight that combination of spatial information
may require consolidation and practice with each separate component. What is
the role of learning in exclusive processing of spatial information?
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1.7 Summary
The question really arises as to whether capacity limitations can be circum-
vented to encourage integration of spatial information. If this is found to be
or not to be the case, either way, it will provide an insight into when and how
such aggregation takes place. Mental representations of space are undoubt-
edly the end result of extremely complex processes. However, the mechanisms
that underlie such seemingly spontaneous phenomena are far from being fully
understood.
The aim of this thesis is to provide a better understanding of conditions that
may allow for and encourage integration by circumvention of a phenomenon op-
posed to such development (spatial memory exclusivity). It seeks to add unique
insights into the existing knowledge base by adopting appropriate measures of
spatial memory, employing empirically grounded findings on expertise and se-
mantics, and finally, to allow for longer term, and therefore more temporally
realistic learning settings than have been applied previous.
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Chapter 2
Research Methodology
This chapter will set out the methodology employed throughout this research
project. It will firstly summarize previous designs employed by researchers in
the field of spatial memory and highlight the benefits and appropriateness of
the specific methodological stance taken here.
2.1 Research approach
Research tasks that aim to investigate spatial memory are extremely varied and
specialized. Their apparatus range from single dots, water-mazes, map con-
figurations, to virtual reality scenarios. All aim to investigate spatial memory
through the evidence contained within participants responses, whatever form
they may take. There appear to be nearly as many experimental tasks as there
are avenues of research into spatial memory. Such variation means concrete
comparisons across aspects of spatial memory are relatively difficult which un-
avoidably impacts the ability to draw overarching conclusions. The approach
taken in the current research is to establish consistency not only between the
current research and previous research regarding exclusivity, but also coherence
between the experiments contained within this thesis.
Although it is acknowledged than components of one form of spatial memory
(e.g., object location) are naturally involved in that of others (i.e., spatial nav-
igation), distinct areas of spatial memory can rarely efficiently be examined in
isolation. This is mainly due to the discrepancy between low-level and high-
level processing features of spatial memory. Thus, although many aspects of
spatial information encoding and retrieval fall under the term of spatial mem-
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ory, each aspect can encompass quite distinct processes. The requirements of
the methodological approaches that investigate features of high-level spatial
processing components can conceal those mechanisms of low-level processing.
This epitomises the beauty and difficulty of studying such a field as spatial
memory. That is, the breadth of processes available to study are complexly
interesting, however, at the same time make for a challenging topic to investigate
with absolute certainty. The range of tasks spatial memory is involved in stems
from the fact that nearly every action individuals perform contain some elements
of space. To understand how spatial memory works is essential to understand
how a large proportion of the memory system functions. Unquestionably, spatial
elements are ingrained in a huge proportion of information we process visually.
Therefore, it is not surprising that this variability in information sources has
a massive impact upon the idiosyncratic way in which spatial information is
encoded, represented, and recalled.
This thesis aligns itself with the view that it is necessary for spatial memory
research to be explicit regarding the aspect of spatial memory it is investigating
and also employs a methodological approach that is in-line with the research
objectives. The distinctions between spatially-related goals can be very subtle
but can have massive implications for the way spatial information is encoded,
structured, and retrieved. Thus, this research reduces ideas of mental spatial
representations to the minutiae of cognitive processes that may underlie it.
2.2 Measuring memory imprecision
Observing response errors from any mnemonic task is a crucial part in un-
derstanding memory processes (Naveh-Benjamin, 1987; Lansdale, 1998). The
adoption of this notion in the past has provided sagacious design approaches and
valuable mnemonic insight. Research frequently demonstrates that inbuilt psy-
chological processes have a tendency to contaminate information from the senses
and the result of such contamination is only understood when the patterns of
errors are examined. For example, errors evidenced in eye witness testimony
have informed research into episodic and autobiographical memory (Loftus &
Palmer, 1974), errors apparent in acoustic coding have led to insights into the
phonological representation of information in short-term memory (Baddeley,
1971, 1990). It is clear that within patterns of error lie important information
regarding the phenomena under scrutiny. Spatial memory is no exception to
this (e.g., Naveh-Benjamin, 1987; Huttenlocher et al., 1991; Lansdale, 1998).
Naveh-Benjamin (1987) heavily criticised previous research into location mem-
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ory and claimed that it had missed the recording of vital location information
present in memory, mainly due to constraints in analytical conventions. The
specific criticism was of researchers only paying attention to the percentage
of objects whose location was recalled exactly. Anything other than this was
considered an error. However, Naveh-Benjamin (1987) demonstrates that one
participant’s error could be very different from another. This is summed up
succinctly in his description of the following scenario:
“Subject A places all the objects in the test phase in close proximity of their
original location in the matrix, but none in the exact position. Subject B, on the
other hand, does not remember the spatial location of any of the objects presented
except one. So Subject B randomly places all the objects in relation to the spatial
arrangement in which they had appeared, except the one which is placed in its
exact position. Use of a measure of percentage of objects memorized in their
exact location, as is customarily done, will result in attributing better memory
for spatial location to Subject B, which, of course, can be quite misleading.” -
(Naveh-Benjamin, 1987, p.597).
Naveh-Benjamin (1987) highlighted this discrepancy in the case where subjects
only recalled 35% of objects correctly but on examination of their deviations
from correct (i.e., error) it showed that on average subjects had a good knowl-
edge of the relative location of the objects.
What can be learnt from past research is that one’s research design and method-
ology should not only be capable of capturing ‘correct’ responses but also errors
made with incorrect responses (i.e., degrees of correctness). Thus, the current
research employs the same assumptions that underpin Naveh-Benjamin’s (1987)
approach to spatial memory quantification (see below, e.g., Lansdale, 1998). In
addition to this it adapts the experimental design used by Baguley et al. (2006)
which is rooted in these ideas.
Specifically, the cued-recall design of Baguley et al. (2006) allowed for the test-
ing and comparison of multiple-cue (multiple memory) performance. In terms
of quntifying location memory performance a mixed approach is adopted which
is dictated by the research objectives. However, broadly speaking it either takes
on the form of a single-value metric compiled by Baguley et al. (2006) which
quantifies degrees of location accuracy (via the ‘Dscore’, see below), or alterna-
tively extends this metric to an approach which allows for a visual description
of location error distributions through the use of matrices (Lansdale, 1998).
Both, experimental design and unit of location-memory measurement are set
out below.
The measurement of spatial memory derived from Lansdale’s (1998) paper on
38
exact and inexact recall allows one to assess degrees of spatial memory accuracy
reflective of the levels of spatial information available to the participant (rooted
in Naveh-Benjamin’s idea of ‘near-miss’ errors), which argues individuals will
often have a good idea where an item is located but just not to the levels of
perfect recall. The advantage of this is that it can measure those instances when
people use inexact memory to estimate where an object is and recall its exact
location In other words, this approach makes good use of instances where recall
is inexact but close to exact. Additionally, inherent in the statistical modelling
associated with this measurement method, it enables one to examine any biases
present in the recall process (e.g., any tendencies to estimate closer or further
away from a particular landmark or target).
2.3 Experimental Paradigm
Space can only be quantified through the comparison of relational points. One
cannot substantiate space unless it has been defined by some boundary con-
dition. Inevitably the memory for a target object must be quantified by the
perceiver in relation to something else, a reference or anchor point. This is
a basic understanding of spatial memory processing and leads to the ideas of
relational points and in particular allocentric frames of reference (see Shelton
& McNamara, 2001b; Burgess, 2006). It is this relational aspect of spatial
memory that allows one to test hypotheses as to the effectiveness of multiple
memories. The incorporation of references point into the stimuli presentations
allows for the establishment of separate spatial memories which contain location
information regarding a common target object. The design specifically exploits
fixed reference axes (know as ‘anchor points’) combined with paired-associative
learning/cued-recall to establish multiple memories for a common target object
(see diagram section below for more details). A composite stimulus is employed
that participants see part or all of depending on conditions. Each presentation
is created by maintaining a constant position for a specific target location whilst
presenting the target a number of times in relation to unique anchor points. A
target object’s position can later be cued simultaneously with multiple anchors
or sequentially with a single anchor. Purely for point of understanding, this
process can be likened to viewing an object from two different perspectives. It
may be best illustrated with a simple example:
John places his house keys in one of nine draws organised horizontally in the
kitchen. At the far left hand side of the nine drawers is an anchor point in
the form of a kettle. At the far right hand side of the nine drawers is another
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anchor point in the form of a toaster. John firstly looks to the kettle on the right
and tries to remember the distance from the kettle to the drawer containing his
keys. He then looks to the left and again tries to estimate the distance from
the toaster to the drawer containing his key. After leaving the kitchen for a
period of time John returns and tries to remember within which drawer his keys
are located. Having been presented with both the kettle and the toaster at the
point of learning, John has the opportunity to rely on both of these appliances as
reference points to help him estimate within which drawer his keys are located.
Thus, just as that employed previously (Lansdale, 1998; Baguley et al., 2006) a
spatial array is configured into nine distinct units. The nine units are displayed
horizontally, regarded as a linear plane. Nine units are used because this has
shown to be sufficient to approximate the information in a continuous location
task without making analysis intractable. showed than the use of nine divisions
preserves most of the information of continuous data.
Targets are randomly assigned to each space until all spatial segments are filled
with a corresponding and unique target object, whatever form that may take.
At fixed positions to the left and right of the nine spatial segments are where
anchor points are placed to enable the cuing for specific memories for a target
object. Thus, for each memory the subject holds a unique association between
the anchor and the target, referred to as an ‘anchor-target relation’. At test, a
participant will be presented with a cue in the form of the anchor they were pre-
sented with at learning, referred to an ‘anchor-cue presentation’. Manipulations
as to the number of anchor-target relations and the number and combinations of
anchor-cue presentations allows one to test the effects of holding single or mul-
tiple memories for an object’s location. The exact nuances of the experimental
layout are illustrated below.
2.3.1 Diagrams of experimental conditions
Throughout this thesis a number of acronyms are used to describe variations
in target-anchor and cued recall presentations of stimuli. Although these are
described throughout the thesis they are illustrated below in diagrammatic form
to offer the reader a central point of reference with which to visually remind
themselves of the discrete differences between stimuli presentations. There are
three types of stimulus presentation.
The first is paired-single anchor presentation (PSA). This consists of presenting
a target object in a specified location twice. Once in relation to an anchor point
to the right of the target and once in relation to an anchor point to the left of
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Learning phase PSA: 
 
The participant is presented with a target object (‘L7’) in a specified location (location seven) along with an anchor point 
 
Left  
Anchor 
        L7    
 
The participant is presented with the same target object (‘L7’) in an identical location but with a different anchor point 
 
 
        L7   Right 
Anchor 
 
Test phase PSA: 
 
The participant is presented with a left anchor to prompt their memory of the target’s location 
 
Left  
Anchor 
          
 
The participant is presented with the corresponding right anchor point separately to prompt their memory of the same target’s location 
 
 
          Right 
Anchor 
 
Figure 2.1: Design for PSA learning and PSA test
the target (see Figure 2.1). The PSA presentation type can also be employed at
test (provided a contingency at learning has presented the target in relation to
two anchor points in some form). For example, a PSA test condition involves
presenting two cues for the same target object on separate occasions (see Figure
2.1).
The second type of presentation is dual-anchor (DA). This involves presenting
two anchor points simultaneously (see Figure 2.2). If DA is employed in the
learning phase then the participant would see two anchor points, one to the left
one to the right, along with a target object presented at some specified location
in between the anchor points. If DA was used as a test contingency then the
participant would see both anchor points , one to the left and one to the right.
They would then make a judgement to the targets location based on seeing this.
The final type of a stimulus presentation is in a single-anchor (SA) format (see
Figure 2.3). This presents a target object in relation to only one anchor point. If
employed at test the participant would just see one anchor point from which to
recall a target object’s location. The SA presentation can take two forms, single-
anchor left (SA-L) and single-anchor right (SA-R). In the majority of cases both
SA-L and SA-R are employed for control purposes, so that any directional bias
can be counterbalanced for the SA condition as a whole. However, they are
treated as an overall single anchor presentation type.
Each type of presentation can be applied at encoding or test or both. They
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Learning phase DA: 
 
The participant is presented with a target object (‘L3’) in a specified location (location three) along with an anchor point. 
 
Left  
Anchor 
         Right  
Anchor 
 
 
Test phase DA: 
 
The participant’s task at test is to recall the location of said object (‘L3’) given both anchor points simultaneously. 
 
Left  
Cue 
         Right  
Cue 
 
Figure 2.2: Design for DA learning and DA test
Learning phase SA-L: 
 
 
The participant is presented with a target object (‘L4’) in a specified location (location four) along with an anchor point. 
 
 
Left  
Anchor 
   L4       
 
 
Test phase SA-L: 
 
 
The participant’s task at test is to recall the location of said object (‘L4’) given a single anchor point. 
 
 
Left  
Cue 
         Right  
Cue 
 
Figure 2.3: Design for SA-L learning and SA-L test
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Design template: 
 
 
 
 
Learning phase PSA: 
 
 
The participant is presented with a target object (‘L3’) in a specified location (location three) along with an anchor point. 
 
 
Left  
Anchor 
  L3        
 
 
 
The participant is presented with the same target object (‘L3’) in an identical location but with a different anchor point. 
 
 
   L3       Right 
Anchor 
 
 
 
Test phase DA: 
 
 
The participant’s task at test is to recall the location of said object (‘L3’) given both anchor points simultaneously. 
 
 
Left  
Cue 
         Right  
Cue 
 
Left  
Anchor  
L1 L2 L3 L4 L5 L6 L7 L8 L9 Right 
Anchor  
Figure 2.4: Design for PSA learning and DA test
can also be employed in many kinds of combinations, for example, PSA may
be employed at learning with DA at test (see Figure 2.4). If this is the case
the condition will be abbreviated to PSA-DA to signify the learning and test
contingencies that make up an overall experimental condition.
2.3.2 Design template
A diagram is presented at the beginning of each experiment to aid it illustrating
the different manipulations made to common elements of the design, some of
which can be subtle. Each diagram takes the same basic structure (see Figure
2.5). The stimuli can vary according to a number of components of the stimuli
and dependent on these components the links and relationship they share with
one another can vary. For example, the anchor points can contain elements
that are common to each other or the target or both. Within the digram the
boxes represent actual stimuli types and the ellipses represent theoretical links
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What the left 
anchor is.... 
What the right 
anchor is.... 
What the target object 
is... 
 Signifies how the left and right 
anchors are related to one another 
No semantic 
link 
Signifies how the left 
anchor and target are 
related 
Characteristics of 
the target 
 Signifies how the right 
anchor and target are 
related 
Figure 2.5: Generic design template illustrating manipulations in each experi-
ment
between the boxes.
It is argued that the simplicity of this design is an important feature of investi-
gation. The use of complex configurations and/or pictures can sometimes blur
the underlying processes of object-location. It is hoped by manipulating com-
ponents within a simple design these processes will be more overtly observed
and consequently discussed.
2.4 Unit of analysis
Accuracy of location memory can be measured in terms of distance or devia-
tions from perfect accuracy. This is essentially the number of quantifiable units
a response is observed to be from its actual location. In this sense the accuracy
of location memory is conceived of in terms of location error. As the magnitude
of error increases accuracy necessarily decreases. Owing to the inverse relation-
ship between location error and accuracy these terms are used interchangeably
throughout the thesis and no distinction is required between the two unless
highlighted otherwise.
Two values stem from the measurement of location accuracy under the current
paradigm. The first is a raw score which relates to the number of deviations
a response is from an expected location. The second is a chance-corrected
score. The raw score represents an actual quantification of absolute distance
of a response in relation to a target location. The unit of measurement for
distance is relative to the size of the total spatial plane. This means that a unit
is the total size of the plane divided by nine. The raw score value represents the
number of such units a response is away from its expected location. Owing to the
symmetrical nature of the stimulus array the absolute deviation is calculated
(Baguley et al., 2006). This is necessary to omit any arithmetic signs and
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allowing for the summing of all raw scores per individual. The corrected-chance
value is necessary due to the variation in potential deviations across locations.
This variation arises from the horizontal nature of the array which is described
in more detail below.
2.4.1 Estimating and correcting for chance responses
When calculating deviations for a target’s given location there are probabilistic
discrepancies which are a consequence of the horizontal array. The maximum
deviation from the correct target location in a horizontal stimulus array depends
on the location of the item. In particular it is smaller for items at or close
to the centre of the array than at the extremes. For example, if one were
to be presented a target object in location 5 (i.e., central location), then the
maximum chance deviation a response could be from that location is four (i.e.,
if the response was in location nine). If the target was instead presented in
location nine a chance response could have a maximum of eight deviations. This
discrepancy can be corrected by scaling the observed score by its expectation
under an equiprobability model (i.e., one in which the location of the response
is determined by chance alone - as would happen if a participant guessed at
random).
The formula for calculating each location’s chance deviation value is the sum
of the possible absolute deviations either side of a given target divided by the
number of possible locations in the linear plane. Each response an individual
gives is divided according to the average deviation value by chance at which
the target was presented. The output value is labelled as a Dscore1. This is
best illustrated in confusion matrix form where the deviation structure for each
target location is clearly described (see Table 2.1).
In order to illustrate the information contained within a Dscore a few examples
will be calculated. For example, if a participant were presented with an object in
location three the chance number of deviations their response will be from that
target location is 2.6667 (see Table 2.1). That is, if the probability of responding
in all available locations was equal then the average number deviations away
from the given target location would be 2.6667. If that participant were to
respond in location one they would be two deviations away for the target and
would obtain a raw score of minus two. This would give an absolute deviation
1Although the Dscore represents location error it can quite easily be reformulated to a
form which signifies accuracy directly, simply by applying the formula 1 - Dscore. This is
know as an information transmitted score (Tscore)
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Location Chance value
L1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 = 4
L2 1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 = 3.2222
L3 2 1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 = 2.6667
L4 3 2 1 0 1 2 3 4 5 = 2.3333
L5 4 3 2 1 0 1 2 3 4 = 2.2222
L6 5 4 3 2 1 0 1 2 3 = 2.3333
L7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0 1 2 = 2.6667
L8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0 1 = 3.2222
L9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0 = 4
Table 2.1: Confusion matrix illustrating the calculation of expected deviation
values for each location
score of :
absolute(1− 3) = 2
The absolute score is then divided by the chance score for the location in ques-
tion which results in a corresponding Dscore of:
2
2.6667
= 0.75
2.5 The use of confusion matrices
Although the Dscore provides location information on a continuous scale and is
a more appropriate metric of memory than proportion of correct responses, an
additional form of analysis is employed which is intrinsically linked with Dscore
but allows for the bias in responding to be assessed. The use of confusion
matrices stems from the development and testing of the Hybrid Encoding of
Location Memory (HELM) model by Lansdale (1998). The employment of such
matrices, as of the type seen in Figure 2.1, allows one to not only measure
degrees of location accuracy as advocated by Naveh-Benjamin (1987) but to
observe any biases. Essentially the confusion matrix allows one to actually see
patterns in responses and offers an extremely rich source of information, which
is arguably required when examining a complex and fickle phenomenon such
as location memory. This thesis also employs confusion matrices to examine
learning (see Chapter 5) as it allows one to observe explicitly the pattern of
changes to such a matrix over time.
Although confusion matrices will not need to be interpreted by the reader in the
main body of the text, the process of seeing how confusion matrices reflect an
individual’s location estimation is important to illustrate the nature of the form
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Location L1 L2 L3 L4 L5 L6 L7 L8 L9
Target L1 0 0 0 X 0 0 0 0 0
Target L2 0 X 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Target L3 0 0 0 0 0 X 0 0 0
Target L4 0 X 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Target L5 0 0 0 0 X 0 0 0 0
Target L6 0 X 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Target L7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 X
Target L8 X 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Target L9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 X
Table 2.2: Confusion matrix illustrating a hypothetical response pattern for
one participant. Targets (i.e., presented location) are given vertically in the
first column and the participant’s responses are presented in the first row.
they take. A series of example responses for each target location are presented
in Table 2.2. As can be seen this participant got three locations perfectly correct
(L2, L5, and L9) with the rest quantified in terms of number of units away from
exact location (i.e., grey boxes). Confusion matrices will be directly relied upon
in Chapter 5 of this thesis where it is used to illustrate the change in precision
distribution of spatial information temporally.
2.6 Testing spatial memory models
Directly taken from Baguley et al. (2006) and based on ideas from Jones (1987)
three statistical models are used to account for performance outcomes. Three
models are specified, each of which attempts to account for a variety of possible
scenarios.
2.6.1 Exclusivity model
Results from analysis of the experimental data that fit the exclusivity model are
reflective of occasions where an individual accesses one spatial memory and no
attempt is made to access the second. Based on single memory performance,
the exclusivity model can be calculated which would equal the performance of
a single memory.
(Aj +Ak)/2
‘A’ in the formula represents availability of spatial information for one memory
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(i.e., from one anchor) with subscripts representing separate memories.2 Avail-
ability is estimated using the inverse of the Dscore. This is argued to represent
the amount of information contained within a memory (as opposed to error)
and is calculated simply by subtracting the Dscore from one (i.e., Tscore = 1 -
Dscore). Hence the exclusivity formula can alternatively be expressed as:
1− ((Tscorej + Tscorek)/2)
Performance one would expect for exclusivity can be obtained by inputting ob-
served performance from having a single memory (obtained using performance
in the SA-SA condition) into the exclusivity formula. From this it is easy to
see that if two spatial memories are acting exclusively then performance should
equal that of one spatial memory. This means a simple test of exclusivity is
to compare SA-SA condition performance (i.e., that observed from having one
spatial memory) with that of the PSA-DA condition performance (i.e., that
observed from having two spatial memories). If the difference between these
conditions is not statistically significant then one can argue that exclusive pro-
cessing of two spatial memories has occurred. If however there are significant
differences between these two conditions then it is likely exclusivity is not oc-
curring. In such circumstances it is important to then test alternative models
to help explain how two spatial memories are being processed in an advanta-
geous manner. The simplest model where some kind of performance gain for
two memories is expected is the independence model which is set out below.
2.6.2 Independence model
Data that fits the independence model suggests that retrieval of one memory is
unaffected by retrieval of another memory. This will result in higher levels of
recall from two cues than from one because a second attempt is made if retrieval
fails. Thus, exclusive processing assumes no attempt is made after failure of
one memory retrieval, however independence states that in such a scenario the
individual can switch to retrieve a second memory. The independence model can
be calculated based on single memory performance using a probability model
for independent events.
(Aj +Ak)− (Aj ∗Ak)
2availability refers to the probability of recall multiplied by memory precision. A simpli-
fying assumption of the model is to assume precision is on average cancelled out and therefore
a constant.
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The independence model is again calculated from SA-SA data that has already
been transformed into a Dscore but not a Tscore:
1− ((1−Dscore) ∗ 2− (1−Dscore)2)
or using the Tscore directly the independence model can be expressed as:
1− (Tscore ∗ 2− Tscore2)
2.6.3 Superadditivity model
Superadditivity is simply assumed to have taken place when memory perfor-
mance for two cues not only exceeds one cue but also exceeds that predicted
by the independence model. Under this model both memories are retrieved and
used to improve response. This suggests that performance increases are due
to some kind of calculation between the two memories (e.g., averaging them,
integrating them). Superadditivity implies that some form of aggregation or
integration of spatial information has occurred forming a different and more
precise representation than each separate memory singularly. Thus, the use of
integration in the context of this thesis implies data which takes the form of the
superadditivity model. Superadditivity can be implied if performance exceeds
that predicted by the independence model.
Aj∪k > (Aj +Ak)− (Aj ∗Ak)
2.7 Summary of research methodology
An approach to the study of location memory is presented here based in previous
work that:
1. has evolved from the same underlying objectives as previous research (to test
object-location memory and exclusivity)
2. employs a methodology that is specifically designed for capturing the complex
nature of object-location memory
3. allows for much easier and more robust comparisons to other research within
the object-location memory field
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4. maintains a level of consistency between conditions where exclusivity has
previously been found and where it will now be manipulated further
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Chapter 3
Expertise and Exclusivity
3.1 Introduction
Task ability is often determined by the attentional demands of the task in rela-
tion to availability of cognitive capacity (Newell & Simon, 1972). One domain
which consistently demonstrates the extension of typical attentional capacities
is that of expertise. There is considerable evidence that particular styles of per-
ceptual processing displayed by experts can lead to significant improvements in
memory performance (Simon & Chase, 1973; Ericsson, Chase, & Faloon, 1980;
Ericsson & Chase, 1982; Ericsson & Kintsch, 1995; Kiesel, Kunde, Pohl, Berner,
& Hoffmann, 2009).
The reduction of load on cognitive capacities can be attained via three main as-
pects of expertise processing, chunking of information, holistic processing, and
automaticity of encoding. There is currently only one study which has used
expert subjects (musicians) to overcome spatial memory exclusivity (Harding,
2006). This, however, was an unpublished project and it had some severe limita-
tions (e.g., small sample size, small effect size). Confirmation or disconfirmation
of such findings will help to understand the processes that underpin exclusive
spatial memory processing.
The remainder of this introduction is split into two parts. The first part deals
with the primary rationale for the chapter as a whole. The second part deals
with an additional aim that it is hoped will aid in understanding what informa-
tion is being encoded with each spatial memory.
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3.1.1 Primary aim
3.1.2 Expertise and chunking
Experts have been shown to perceptually organize spatial arrays in a way to
reduce demand on short-term storage of visuo-spatial material (Chase & Simon,
1973). Such storage is limited to about 3-4 objects (Cowan, 2001; Cowan,
Johnson, & Saults, 2005; Broadbent, 1971; Vogel, Woodman, & Luck, 2001)
which in turn are restricted by complexity (Alvarez & Cavanagh, 2004). Short-
term storage of visuo-spatial material is also greater for objects presented in a
uniformed manner than for those presented in isolation (Luck & Vogel, 1997).
Experts can avoid limitations of STM by ‘chunking’ information into larger LTM
units, which can be later accessed using markers in STM (Chase & Simon, 1973).
Jolicoeur, Tombu, Oriet, and Stevanovski (2002) showed more specifcially that
chunking at encoding or retrieval significantly reduces the requirements of the
central processor and consequently any blocking of information.
The efficiency of chunking is illustrated cogently in digit span tasks, where par-
ticipants can typically only recall seven pieces of information (Miller, 1956).
However, if they chunk the information (i.e., instead of 4 and 2, they remember
42), this limit can be expanded by some margins. For example, through chunk-
ing strategies it is possible to extend one’s digit span from 7 numbers up to 100
(Gobet & Simon, 1996). More recent works suggest that the capacity to recall
even just seven items also involves some form of chunking and a more realistic
estimate of short-term visuo-spatial memory is around 2-3 items (Cowan, 2001;
Cowan et al., 2005). In terms of the current research, the chunking of related
spatial information (i.e., two cues pointing to the location of a common target)
in LTM may increase the likelihood of accessing at least one of those memories.
3.1.3 Expertise and configural processing
Configural processing is the ability to recognise the relations between multiple
features of a visual stimulus (Navon, 1977). Experts have shown to possess such
a skill and they typically process expert-specific information in a more configural
and feature based manner than novices (Busey & Vanderkolk, 2005). This type
of processing has been associated with a number of expert domains including
chess, face processing, and sentence processing.
Much evidence has shown that the way individuals process faces is dependent
upon their ability to recognise the relations between features of the face (i.e., its
feature configuration)(Kimchi & Amishav, 2010; Rhodes, Hayward, & Winkler,
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2006). Maurer, Grand, and Mondloch (2002) highlight that face processing
crucially involves holistically ‘gluing’ together first-order relations into a Gestalt
representation.
In line with the idea of integrating the relations contained in a visual array,
Chase and Simon (1973) argued integration is typically achieved when a mean-
ingful relationship is required between remembered items. For example, Chase
and Simon (1973) showed chess players to have superior memory over novices
for the layout of a chessboard when it resembled a likely composition. They
argued that it is the meaningful links between chess pieces that enables such
rapid and reliable recall of complicated structures. This was further reiterated
when non-experts were shown to outperform experts in reconstructing a chess
board when the layout was non-normal and therefore in a configuration which
is not meaningful to experts. Inherent within a configuration of chess pieces
are inter-object spatial relations. This suggests that spatial components of a
stimulus array are encoded in a similarly beneficial configural manner as the
objects (chess pieces) themselves.
Another form of expertise where configural processing is apparent is that of
sentence processing. When an individual processes (i.e., reads) a sentence they
extract a representation of that sentence which is stored in long-term mem-
ory (Anderson, 1974). This is an integrated representation of its constituent
ideas. Foss and Harwood (1975) argued cuing with two related pieces of text
information may exceed the sum of corresponding single-cued probabilities (i.e.,
superadditivity) because text is encoded in a Gestalt manner, where a con-
figural path is established between two parts of a single sentence. Therefore,
recognition of related sections of text based upon common semantic themes and
elements may allow for recombination of related sections of text at a later time
(Sasson, 1971).
The fact that experts have the ability to extract higher-order relations from
multiple stimuli, whether this be a human face, configuration of chess pieces
or meaning from a series of words, enables them to develop ‘templates’ (Gobet
& Simon, 1996, 2000). These are described as schematic-like structures which
contain multiple individual perceptual components that together produce an in-
tegrated representation qualitatively different from each constituent part (Gobet
& Simon, 2000). In the current research (which uses text expertise) it is clear
how this element of expertise processing may help to overcome exclusivity or at
least encourage some form of integration between separately presented pieces of
expert-specific stimuli.
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3.1.4 Expertise and automaticity
One other aspect of expertise processing is that certain stimuli are encoded
automatically (i.e., with little attentional effort). Automaticity has been shown
to play a vital role in expertise processing (Feltovich, Prietula, & Ericsson, 2006)
and typically is the result of repeated exposure and practice with specific stimuli
(Posner & Snyder, 1975). It is argued that as stimuli become more familiar and
attended to there is a shift in processing strategy from algorithmic computation
to direct memory retrieval (Logan, 1988; Crutcher & Ericsson, 2000). A good
example of this comes from the Stroop effect (Stroop, 1992), where the semantic
meaning of a word is extracted with minimal processing effort.
Some research shows that chess experts are able to organise complex chess con-
figurations unconsciously, suggesting that little attention is required (Kiesel et
al., 2009). Other benefits of reduced processing effort include dual-task capa-
bilities. Shaffer (1975) showed that expert typists could both carry out typing
while reciting nursery rhymes. Hatano, Miyake, and Binks (1977) showed that
experts using an abacus to make arithmetic calculations could just as quickly
and accurately do so whilst answering non-related questions such as ‘what is
the highest mountain in Japan?’. Spelke, Hirst, and Neisser (1976) exemplified
the advantages of low-demand text processing. They showed with little prac-
tice students could read unfamiliar texts (at normal speed) whilst writing down
and comprehending relations among dictated words. More recently, Reingold,
Charness, Pomplun, and Stampe (2001) found chess experts were able to encode
chess positions automatically and in parallel.
In line with the idea of dual-task processing, Feltovich et al. (2006) point out
that automatic processes have the ability to make additional cognitive resources
available (i.e., attention) by way of minimising disturbance to central processing.
They go on to propose that this freeing up of resources allows for higher-order
functions to occur. Thus, only when lower-order processes become more au-
tomatic can higher-order action such as inference and integration be achieved
(Feltovich et al., 2006). With regards to exclusivity, the employment of expertise
may well allow individuals to take advantage of automatic processing benefits.
For example, stimuli may be processed in a manner which allows for attention
to be focused on important information (e.g., the location of an object), as well
as other elements of the visual array (e.g., the anchor points).
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Secondary aim
If one is to investigate the interaction of two pieces of spatial information, it
would be prudent to also examine interactions with non-spatial elements at both
encoding and retrieval. It is important to understand what information is and
is not being encoded and consequently retrieved. Interactions at learning will
certainly involve STM whereas interactions at retrieval will be more influenced
by LTM processes. Specifically, the focus of the secondary aim of this chapter
is to examine how object identity information and location information interact
and influence performance of each other.
Luck and Vogel (1997) found evidence that visual short-term memory capacity
is determined by the number of objects, not the number of object features. Luck
and Vogel (1997) presented participants with a stimulus array for 100ms, then
after a 900ms pause they were shown either the same or a different array for
2000ms. They were asked to respond to whether it was the same or different to
what they had seen in the first presentation. Objects were defined by a vary-
ing number of constituent features (e.g., orientation, colour). Luck and Vogel
(1997) found that if they increased the number of features this did not affect re-
call performance. However, if they varied the number of objects they found that
performance significantly deteriorated after around three items. These findings
suggest that object features are integrated to form a single unit of informa-
tion with each component retaining the capacity to be retrieved individually
otherwise recognition change of features would not have been possible (Luck
& Vogel, 1997). Follow up research extended the range of object features to
include spatial location (Lee & Chun, 2001). Lee and Chun (2001) found that
individuals’ performance (up to approximately 3-4 objects)1 was invariant to
spatial location information. Thus, object features including orientation, colour
and spatial location appeared to be integrated into a single unit made up of
object information in working memory.
Similarly, interactions between elements in LTM are of interest. Evidence sug-
gests that object fragments or components are integrated in LTM and thus the
cuing of any one fragment (i.e., object identity) will naturally cue all other
elements (i.e., its spatial location) (Jones, 1976). Jones (1976) showed that
cuing for location, colour, or object type (identity) by either one of the cued-
properties, all other properties or ‘fragments’ were instantly available, known
1This is not to say more objects cannot be stored in STM, only that they cannot be stored
to such a high-fidelity as to be recalled accurately. For example, a large stimuli array may
allow for the representation of more objects than 3-4, but at a cost of lower-fidelity than a
smaller array (Vogel et al., 2001). This may well lead to more chunking and the capitalisation
on guessing (Cowan, 2001; Cowan et al., 2005).
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as ‘all-or-nothing’ retrieval. Consequently he put forward the ‘fragmentation
hypothesis’ of cued recall.
The fragmentation hypothesis proposes that a memory trace is made up of
fragments that represent components of a learnt visual stimulus. The memory
trace is activated on presentation of any single element as a cue. This has
implications for the retrieval processes of a memory trace composed of more
than one element. Interestingly, this suggests that cueing with multiple elements
of a memory trace is no more effective than cueing by any single element on its
own, assuming that all elements had been encoded. However, Jones (1976) also
highlights that on average one would expect to see some advantage for multiple
cuing simply because it is more likely that at least one of the elements is stored
in the memory trace. For example, if a stimulus contained four elements and all
elements are stored within a memory, then only one of those elements is needed
to cue recall of the stimulus. However, if only two elements were stored within
a memory then one would expect multiple cueing to have a higher chance of
activating either of the two stored elements. Thus, on average this would result
in some recall advantage.
In summary, the secondary aim of Experiment 1 is to assess whether object
identity and object location aid on another. In other words, does knowing what
an is help to know where it is and vice versa.
3.1.5 Research rationale
It is clear that expertise processing has a number of advantages over novices
when it comes to perceptually organising and retrieving information related to
domain-specific stimulus arrays. The expert domain used in the current re-
search is that of text processing. The choice to use text was both empirically
grounded as well as pragmatic. Text was chosen specifically instead of tradi-
tional geometric shape-type objects, because text is semantically rich, processed
automatically (Rawson, 2004), in a higher-order and Gestalt manner (Foss &
Harwood, 1975; Anderson, 1974), and has the ability to be processed along side
concurrent tasks (Spelke et al., 1976). Additionally, previous research where
non-exclusivity (i.e., superadditivity) has been observed tended to employ text
stimuli (words/sentences) in one form or another (Anderson & Bower, 1972; Ru-
bin & Wallace, 1989), or other expert domain-specific stimuli (Harding, 2006).
Additionally, it is also argued that similar to a musical score (see Harding, 2006)
text also possesses a temporal component. For example, as an individual reads
along the text to the point of the target object they will have encoded temporal
information along with any spatial information. This, it is argued may aid in
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integration of compatible temporal information encoded from a related source
(i.e., a second anchor-target relation) (Arcediano, Escobar, & Miller, 2003; ?, ?,
?).
From a pragmatic point of view, text processing has a number of benefits as a
form of expertise. Text processing is a widely acquired expert skill that approx-
imately 99% of the population are capable of (CIA World Book, 2012). This
means sample sizes can be large enough for robust statistical modeling. Also,
a series of experiments could be sustained for the period of research employing
and manipulating a common stimulus type. This allows for a change in ex-
perimental outcomes to be measured in a more coherent and valuable manner,
giving a clear and comparable picture of research direction.
Additionally, in order to gain further insight into how exclusivity occurs, the
current research also examines the interaction between spatial and non-spatial
information at retrieval (i.e., secondary aim), specifically how object identity
and object location interact to produce memory .
3.2 Experiment 1
In Experiment 1 it was aimed to encourage integration between paired spatial
memories and thus discourage exclusivity. It sought to achieve this by employing
stimuli that are processed holistically and as meaningful units. It is argued that
individuals may not be wholly consciously aware of creating connections between
spatial information and it is proposed that having an underlying connection
between memories will increase the likelihood of integration.
3.2.1 Design
A 2 (SA vs. PSA [between]) by 2 (Semantic anchor link vs. Non-semantic anchor
link [within]) mixed design was employed. Experiment 1 aimed to test whether a
common link between two spatial memories for the same target helped overcome
exclusivity. Given that each paired anchor point (left and right) represented
separate spatial memories, a common link between memories was achieved by
establishing a connection in the form of sentence coherence, theme, and writing
style, between anchor points (see Figure 3.1).
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English 
Sentence 
English 
Sentence 
Greek Letter 
 Linked via writing style, theme 
of sentence and target object 
No semantic 
link 
No semantic 
link 
Unfamiliar 
Target 
 
Figure 3.1: Example of design for experiment one
3.2.2 Stimuli
Sentences were selected that possessed a theme and were representative of a
particular author’s style of writing but were not familiar to the individual. A
pool of fifteen sentences was created and tested on a pilot sample (N = 5) for
ease of combination. The nine most easily combined sentences, as measured by
correct combination by the pilot sample, were selected. Two example sentences
are: “A Thaum is the basic unit of magical strength. It has been universally
established as the amount of magic needed to create one small white pigeon or
three normal sized billiard balls.” (Terry Pratchett - The Colour of Magic), or
“About twelve o’clock we turned out and went along up the bank. The river
was coming up pretty fast, and lots of driftwood going by on the rise.” (Mark
Twain - The adventures of Huckleberry Finn).
The target object consisted of one of nine Greek symbols and was presented at
a specified location above the sentence. The sentence was split at the point of
the target object, leaving a left hand section of sentence and a corresponding
right hand section (see Figure 3.2). Anchor points were created by underlining
the first 2.5cm’s of the sentence (at the far left) and the last 2.5cm’s of the
sentence (at the far right). During PSA presentation participants would see
a target object (e.g., the Greek symbol pi) positioned above a sentence twice,
once in relation to a left-hand section of the sentence and once in relation to
the corresponding right-hand section of the sentence. At test, participants were
cued for a target object’s location with the underlined sections of text that acted
as relational anchor points from which spatial judgements could be made.
The stimuli, comprising nine non-famous yet stylistically distinct quotes taken
from well-known texts (e.g., Homer’s Odyssey; Emily Bronte’s Wuthering Heights)
were translated into Turkish for a non-expertise control. Turkish was selected on
the basis that it uses a Latin alphabet very similar to English. Thus, it would
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SA-L:  
A Thaum is the basic unit of magical strength. It has been universally established as the amount of magic needed to create one small white pigeon or three normal sized billiard balls. 
SA-R:  
A Thaum is the basic unit of magical strength. It has been universally established as the amount of magic needed to create one small white pigeon or three normal sized billiard balls. 
 
SA-P:  
 A Thaum is the basic unit of magical strength. It has been universally established as the amount of magic needed to create one small white pigeon or three normal sized billiard balls. 
 
 A Thaum is the basic unit of magical strength. It has been universally established as the amount of magic needed to create one small white pigeon or three normal sized billiard balls. 
Test Conditions: 
SAL:  
A Thaum is the basic unit of magical strength. It has been universally established as the amount of magic needed to create one small white pigeon or three normal sized billiard balls. 
SAR: 
A Thaum is the basic unit of magical strength. It has been universally established as the amount of magic needed to create one small white pigeon or three normal sized billiard balls. 
DA: 
A Thaum is the basic unit of magical strength. It has been universally established as the amount of magic needed to create one small white pigeon or three normal sized billiard balls. 
π 
π 
π 
π 
Figure 3.2: An example of learning and test conditions using whole sentences
as stimuli - experiment one
appear visually similar to English but without being processed in a manner
illustrative of expertise.
3.2.3 Participants & Procedure
A total of 43 participants (19 female; mean age = 27.3 years; SD = 7.7; Range
= 20-51) were recruited from the University of Leicester and paid £3.00 for
their time. All participants were English speakers and had normal or correct-to-
normal vision. Participants were blocked by anchor type (either SA-SA or PSA-
DA) and given four booklets (one learning and one test in English and Turkish)
with corresponding standardised instructions. The task was also explained to
them verbally, including the number of sentences to be presented and the type of
target object. It was emphasized that their task was to remember the location
of the Greek symbol in relation to the underlined section of text presented on
the left or right of the target object. Individuals were instructed to spend no
longer than 4-5 minutes on both the learning and test booklets. In between
59
learning and test a short distracter task was employed (counting backwards in
3s) to prevent short-term memory rehearsal. To assess memory for an object’s
content participants were given all anchor words again after estimating all target
locations, and were asked to identify which target object (i.e., Greek symbol)
was associated with (a) given anchor point(s) (i.e., underlined section of text).
This information was used to calculate a target recognition score (TRscore).
3.2.4 Results & Discussion
Performance across all conditions was better than chance (i.e., Dscore < 1). Fig
3.3 shows location error was lower in the English condition (SA-SA & PSA-DA),
however, participants in the PSA-DA condition (i.e, two-memory condition) did
not outperform participants in the SA-SA condition (i.e., one-memory) in either
language condition. The mean Dscore for the English PSA-DA condition was
0.53 (SD=0.22) and for the English SA-SA condition it was 0.69 (SD=0.32).
The mean Dscore for the Turkish PSA-DA condition was 0.86 (SD = 0.19) and
for the Turkish SA-SA condition it was 0.82 (SD = 0.24).
Multi-level modelling was performed as it allowed for the modeling of an non-
orthogonal predictor (TRscore) of Dscore (Baguley, 2012b). Three models were
estimated. Model one included TRscore (correct vs. incorrect), Anchor con-
dition (PSA-DA vs SA-SA), and Language condition (English vs. Turkish) as
predictors of Dscore. Model two was the same as model one but it included two-
way interactions. Model three included three-way interactions. Comparisons of
models one, two, and three predicting location error (Dscore) showed model two
to be a better fit of the data (see Table 3.2). This model showed both Target
Recognition (TRscore) and Language (Turkish as the reference category) were
significant predictors of Dscore (see Table 3.3).
Mean Dscore comparisons t df p
English PSA vs. English SA 1.70 36 0.09
Turkish PSA vs. Turkish SA 0.30 36 0.76
Overall English vs. Overall Turkish 4.23 76 < 0.001
Table 3.1: Summary of mean Dscore comparisons for PSA-DA vs. SA-SA across
both language conditions and anchor type, including an overall comparison be-
tween English and Turkish performance for Experiment 1
When presented with semantically coherent stimuli (English sentences) partici-
pants’ location error was significantly reduced over non-semantic stimuli. Anal-
ysis of interaction effects showed that in the SA-SA condition, recalling a tar-
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Figure 3.3: Mean location error (Dscore) including 95% CI for each anchor type
(PSA-DA and SA-SA) and for both expertise conditions (English and Turkish)
for Experiment 3
get’s content (TRscore) aided in one’s location memory accuracy (see TRscore
x Turkish Table 3.3). However, if an individual was presented with two an-
chors (PSA-DA), correctly identifying the target led to a significant decrease in
memory accuracy (see Table 3.3 and Figure 3.4).
The results suggest that having semantically rich information (i.e., English sen-
tences) available at encoding and retrieval enhances overall location memory
accuracy. This is in-line with literature that states that level of processing gen-
erally enhances memory ability (Craik & Lockhart, 1972; McDaniel, Friedman,
& Bourne, 1978). However, semantic coherence between two anchor points for
a common target object did not improve location memory over a single anchor
point. This suggests a common link between two memories, as manipulated
using stylistically distinct sentences, is not enough to encourage integration and
overcome exclusivity. Additionally, holistic processing of sentences did not ap-
pear to offer any observable benefits for the PSA-DA condition over SA-SA.
This suggests text expertise was not able to circumvent any load deficits that
may have been contributing to exclusivity.
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Model df AIC BIC logLik Test L.Ratio p
1 6.00 1246.48 1273.95 -617.24
2 9.00 1232.57 1273.78 -607.28 1 vs 2 19.91 <0.01
3 10.00 1233.81 1279.60 -606.90 2 vs 3 0.76 0.38
Table 3.2: Summary of model comparison statistics for model one, two and
three in Experiment 3
Estimate SE df t-value p-value
(Intercept) 0.66 0.06 675 10.91 <0.01
TRscore -0.26 0.08 675 -3.44 <0.01
Turkish 0.33 0.07 675 4.79 <0.01
PSA-DA 0.00 0.08 38 0.03 0.98
TRscore x Turkish -0.18 0.09 675 -2.05 0.04
TRscore x PSA-DA 0.33 0.09 675 3.63 <0.01
Turkish x PSA-DA -0.09 0.08 675 -1.03 0.31
Table 3.3: Parameter estimates for model two in Experiment 3 with anchor type
(PSA-DA vs. SA-SA), language (English vs. Turkish) and TR score predicting
location error (Dscore) for Experiment 1
The analyses suggest that the complex nature of the stimuli may have overloaded
cognitive capacity. The fact participants’ performance in the PSA-DA condition
was significantly worse than SA-SA across both language conditions indicates
a unique disadvantage of the stimuli for the PSA-DA condition. It is possible
that individuals were not able to match the correct two segments of the same
sentence at encoding. If this were the case then this type of mismatching has
been shown to be very counter productive for expertise processing. For example,
when faces are a mixture of incongruent halves (i.e., celebrity’s top halve and
unfamiliar bottom halve) people find it very difficult to recognise them (Young,
Hellawell, & Hay, 1987). That is, it is difficult to separate out the two halves
of the whole. In terms of the current research it is possible that if incorrect
connections were made during learning then presentation at test of the correct
halves would have disrupted the subjects’ ability to match learnt stimuli with
respective retrieval cues.
The current research is also in conflict with a previous finding using expertise
and clearly shows that expertise processing of domain-specific stimuli does not
offer any advantage for holding two spatial memories over one. Harding (2006)
used well-known musical scores and showed that they were a benefit to recalling
the location of a letter positioned above two segments of related pieces of music.
This suggests that perhaps it is not necessarily an expert’s ability to process the
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Figure 3.4: A plot showing the interaction between location error (Dscore) and
object identification (TRscore) across anchor conditions (PSA-DA vs. SA-SA)
for Experiment 1
information holistically or in a Gestalt manner which led to PSA-DA advantages
but rather the familiarity between related memories.
It could be argued that any advantage from employing stimuli that are encoded
with minimal effort and in a Gestalt manner may be cancelled out by either the
load of processing full sentence stimuli or the lack of a more explicit connection
between two related segments of a sentence. Therefore, experiment two seeks
to lighten cognitive load and increase probability of recognising the relation
between components of two related sentence segments.
3.3 Experiment 2
Experiment 1 showed overall performance gains for the English sentence stimuli.
Experiment 2 builds on Experiment 1 by employing stimuli which offer individu-
als an even stronger connection between paired memories. Experiment 2 retains
text as stimulus to observe comparable changes across the two experiments. In
order to enhance integration potentiality further by lightening cognitive load,
familiar sentences are employed.
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Familiarity in this instance will provide an explicit (rather than implicit, as
seen in Experiment 1) connection between paired anchor points (i.e., between
memories for the same target object). It is argued that familiarity will offer a
number of additional benefits to the processing of spatial information. First, it
will reduce overall processing load because the sentences will be processed more
automatically and this will also enable more attention to be directed towards the
task of encoding the location of the target. Attention can be focused towards
recalling the object and its location rather than trying to learn the content of
the sentence. Participants will not need to try and remember the content of the
sentence. Second, familiarity will enable individuals to position the target object
based on their knowledge of the sentence structure (i.e., the point along the
‘plot’ of the sentence at which the target object appears). Third, the sentence
sections form a coherently distinct unit which allows for the potential of holistic
processing and differentiation between other sentences.
3.3.1 Design
A 2 (SA vs. PSA [between]) by 2 (Familiar vs. Non-familiar [within]) mixed
design was employed. Exclusivity was assessed in the same manner for Experi-
ment 1 (i.e., comparing SA-SA with PSA-DA, see Experiment one - ‘Methods’).
Experiment 2 aimed to increase the link between two spatial memories for the
same target as well as reducing overall task load. Given that each paired anchor
point (left & right) represents separate spatial memories, a connection between
memories was achieved by establishing a common link between anchor points,
in the form of a priori knowledge of a sentence’s content, theme, and syntactical
structure (see Figure 3.5). To achieve this the current experiment uses nursery
rhymes as sentences which offer familiar and distinct content.
Unlike Experiment 1, Experiment 2 was programmed using E-Prime c© which en-
abled more consistent presentation of stimuli and recording of responses. Famil-
iarity was ensured by asking participants to tick next to each sentence whether
they knew the sentence well enough to reproduce it verbally with little rehearsal
or assistance. Nearly one hundred percent of participants ticked yes to all nurs-
ery rhymes. The current design ensures no additional cues such as the edge of
the computer screen were employed by dimming the light, thus, obscuring the
display’s borders.
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Figure 3.5: Example of design for experiment two
3.3.2 Stimuli
Nine nursery rhymes were selected based on popularity according to a survey
for National Bookstart Day of 2,500 people (Booktrust, 2009). Two example
sentences are: “Jack and Jill went up the hill to fetch a pail of water, Jack fell
down and broke his crown and Jill came tumbling after.” and “Humpty Dumpty
sat on a wall. Humpty Dumpty had a great fall. All the kings horses and all the
king’s men Couldn’t put Humpty together again.” The target object remained
the same as Experiment 1 (Greek symbol) and was presented at a specified
location above the sentence. As in Experiment 1, the nursery rhyme sentences
were split at the point of the target object, leaving a left hand section of sentence
and a corresponding right hand section (see Figure 3.2 for an equivalent example
using non-familiar sentences). Anchor points were created by underlining the
first 2.5 cms of the sentence (at the far left) and the last 2.5 cms of the sentence
(at the far right).
During PSA presentation participants would see a target object (e.g., Greek
symbol pi) positioned above a sentence twice, once in relation to a left-hand
section of the sentence and once in relation to the corresponding right-hand sec-
tion of the corresponding sentence. At test, participants were cued for a target
object’s location with the underlined sections of text that acted as relational
anchor points from which spatial judgements could be made. The non-familiar
English sentences from Experiment 1 were used as control stimuli. This offered
a comparison between familiar and non-familiar semantically rich stimuli.
3.3.3 Participants & Procedure
Participants were recruited from the University of Leicester and Nottingham
Trent University (N =60) and had normal or corrected-to-normal vision. Partic-
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ipants were paid £3 for their time. The learning phase involved the participants
being presented with all sections of the nursery rhymes with corresponding tar-
get objects on a screen. Each presentation was timed to last for 14 seconds. A
short distracter task (30 seconds) was used to prevent rehearsal. The test phase
involved presenting participants with either left or right (SA) or both anchors
(DA) to cue the target object’s location (i.e., one half of a nursery rhyme or
both corresponding halves). Participants would click with a mouse directly on
the screen where they remembered the target object to be in relation to the
given anchor(s). The test phase was not timed.
3.3.4 Results & Discussion
Results show that Dscore was better than chance (i.e., Dscore<1) across all
conditions. Figure 3.6 shows a slight advantage for PSA-DA over SA-SA in the
nursery rhymes condition. The mean Dscore for the nursery rhymes PSA-DA
condition was 0.61 (SD = 0.26) and for the SA-SA condition it was 0.63 (SD
0.28). The mean Dscore for the English PSA-DA condition was 0.83 (SD= 0.26)
and for the English SA-SA condition it was 0.69 (SD = 0.16).
The findings show the same detriment of employing non-familiar yet semanti-
cally rich stimuli in the form of English sentences. Specifically, the results show
that there was a significant decrease in location accuracy for PSA-DA over SA-
SA in the English condition as was observed in Experiment 1 (see Table 3.4).
However, there was no significant difference between PSA-DA and SA-SA for the
Nursery Rhyme condition. Overall location error in both PSA-DA and SA-SA
was lower in the Nursery rhyme condition over the English (non-familiar) condi-
tion. This suggests that holding existing knowledge of stimuli content enhances
object location memory performance. Although not statistically significant, the
initial experimental findings are promising because they show PSA-DA perfor-
mance to be greater than SA when anchor points are familiar (see Figure 3.6).
Dscore comparisons t-value df p
English PSA-DA vs. English SA-SA 3.18 57 < 0.001
Nursery PSA-DA vs. Nursery SA-SA 0.02 57 0.98
Overall Nursery vs. Overall English 3.17 118 < 0.01
Table 3.4: Summary of mean Dscore comparisons for PSA-DA vs. SA-SA across
both familiarity conditions including an overall comparison between non-familiar
and familiar performance for Experiment 2
Linear modelling was used to investigate whether anchor condition or stimulus
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Figure 3.6: Graph showing mean location error (Dscore) across all familiarity
(English vs Nursery) and anchor conditions (SA vs PSA) including 95 % CI for
Experiment 2
type were having an effect on location memory accuracy. Two models were esti-
mated. Model one included Anchor type (PSA-DA vs. SA-SA) and Familiarity
(English vs. Nursery) as predictors of Dscore. Model two additionally included
an interaction between Anchor type and Familiarity type (Anchor x Familiar-
ity). Model comparisons showed marginal differences between the two models.
On inspection of the interaction term model two was chosen as it was more
informative (see Table 3.5). A summary of model two can be seen in Figure 3.6.
This shows anchor condition (PSA-DA vs SA-SA) to be a significant predictor
of location accuracy. If an individual is in the PSA-DA condition they typically
perform worse than in the SA-SA condition. However, as can be seen from Fig-
ure 3.6, this is substantially attributable to non-familiar sentence performance.
The interaction effect (Figure 3.7) is perhaps more informative and shows that
if an individual was presented with nursery rhymes in the two memory con-
dition (i.e., PSA-DA) their location accuracy increased significantly, whereas
if they were presented with non-familiar sentences the performance gains were
marginal.
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Model df AIC BIC logLik Test L.Ratio p
1 5.00 2128.12 2153.12 -1059.06
2 6.00 2126.29 2156.30 -1057.15 1 vs 2 3.83 0.05
Table 3.5: Summary of model comparison statistics for model one and two in
Experiment 3
Estimates SE df t p
(Intercept) 0.69 0.04 1035 15.98 < 0.01
Anchor 0.13 0.06 1035 2.13 0.03
Familiarity -0.06 0.05 1035 -1.14 0.25
Anchor x Familiarity -0.15 0.08 1035 -1.95 0.05
Table 3.6: Parameter estimates for model one with Familiarity (English vs.
Nursery rhymes) and Anchor type (PSA-DA vs. SA-SA) predicting location
memory accuracy (Dscore) for Experiment 2
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Figure 3.7: An interaction plot between anchor conditions (PSA-DA vs. SA-SA)
and familiarity (English vs. Nursery rhymes) for Experiment 2
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3.4 General Discussion
3.4.1 What the findings mean for exclusivity
The overall findings show semantically rich stimuli will generally enhance lo-
cation memory performance. This suggests recalling the location of an object
in relation to a semantically rich source will be more accurate than a non-
semantically rich source. The results suggest expertise processing does not play
a role in overcoming spatial memory exclusivity. Through the use of exper-
tise it was shown that an ability to recognise two related memories and the
use of information which is holistically processed does not circumvent exclusive
processing.
Results also show that implicit semantic links between two sources of spatial
information (non-familiar yet semantically rich) do not encourage aggregation
of said memory sources. This suggests that if memory interference is occurring
and preventing integration then exclusive processing is not attributable to the
semantic incoherence of related memory units. In Experiment 2 the use of
nursery rhymes ensured that each memory could be explicitly recognised as
being part of a whole. This had no significant effect on performance for two
memories in comparison to one.
These results indicate that having familiar stimuli significantly improves spa-
tial memory performance over simply semantically rich content. This is most
saliently observed by examining the extent of improvement from having famil-
iar sentences for the PSA-DA compared with SA-SA condition (see Figure 3.7).
This illustrates sharply the importance of individuals being able to recognise
that two halves of the sentence belong to a complete unit of information. This
would hold no benefit for the SA-SA condition as individuals receive only one
part of the sentence (i.e., there is nothing to match it up to).
There is evidence of some performance gain from having familiar sentences.
Experiment 2 showed significant differences in location memory performance
between familiar and non-familiar sentences. Presumably, this indicates the
contribution of reduced load (i.e., not having to remember the sentence as well
as the target) when encoding location information. The benefits observed across
the PSA-DA condition from having familiar stimuli indicate the importance
of explicitly recognising the connection between information that is processed
alongside spatial information (i.e., information within which spatial information
is contained).
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3.4.2 What the findings mean for expertise
These findings are incongruent with those of previous research (Harding, 2006).
Harding (2006) manipulated semantic processing of spatial objects through the
use of musical expertise. Results from Harding (2006) showed that when a letter
was placed above two segments of a musical score, experts showed advantage for
having two memories over having one. The current findings support the idea
that familiarity of stimuli does show improvement when holding two related
memories in comparison to non-familiar stimuli. They are, however, in conflict
with the idea that general expertise processing offers any advantage for holding
two spatial memories over one. Thus, the ease at which domain-specific stimuli
are processed, the ability to chunk information into more manageable processing
units, and the capacity to extract higher-order connections between related
pieces of information is not sufficient to observe any benefits from holding two
spatial memories.
Quite why musical expertise demonstrates an advantage over reading exper-
tise is difficult to explain. However, it may be accounted for by the fact that
music-related stimuli are processed with more ease than that of whole sentences.
With each word of a sentence comes semantic content and the development of
a propositional representation, whereas musical scores evoke a representation of
patterns of auditory information. This difference in stimuli can be argued to
stem from a difference of visual and perceptual processing demands between the
two stimulus-types. Take for instance one word which consists of multiple letters
and contains semantic and acoustic content. In comparison, one note will consist
of one tone and has the advantage of only being stored acoustically. This again
reiterates the idea that a further reduction in stimuli processing might produce
levels of performance in line with Harding (2006). Additionally, the semantic
content that provides a connection between two memories, through familiarity,
is helpful up until a point. After that, it may burden memory capacity at a cost
to either location information or object identity information.
It could be argued that the familiarity of the sentences in Experiment 2 freed
up resources by not requiring participants to encode the sections of sentence
that acted as test cues. In the familiar sentence condition individuals could
extract the meaning of the sentence with little effort. Individuals could instead
rely on long-term existing knowledge in order to retrieve verbatim information.
Therefore, at encoding subjects could attend features of the stimulus other than
syntax, such as spatial content. In contrast, non-familiar sentences would involve
the encoding of verbatim information because this information was required at
test as a cue.
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The effortless manner in which we process text may have been counteracted
by the overloading of semantic content. This is evident in Experiment 1 where
the participants in the PSA-DA condition performed significantly worse than
participants in the SA-SA condition. The processing of unfamiliar text for the
purpose of recall was simply too much for an individual. This suggests the ef-
fortless nature of text encoding does not necessarily equate to effortless retrieval
and can hamper location memory, unless the stimulus is familiar. Arguably an-
other important factor, as observed in Experiment 2, is the semantic connection
between paired anchor points which came from employing familiar text (i.e.,
nursery rhymes).
The improvement witnessed from Experiment 1 to Experiment 2 suggests that
the advantages of stimulus familiarity are particularly beneficial for the PSA-
DA condition. This means that some element of familiarity must help the
interaction of multiple memories either at encoding or recall. It is argued that
this advantage could take the form of two possible benefits. First, familiarity
allows the two segments of sentence to be recognised as being two parts of a
whole. Second, it allows attentional resources to be focused elsewhere (e.g.,
object identity and object location). However, seeing as familiar stimuli would
improve recall in both SA-SA and PSA-DA condition it might be more plausible
that familiarity allows for easier identification of related anchor points, which
is not required when only having one memory for an object (i.e., in the SA-SA
condition).
3.4.3 Interaction of memory information
The results from the interaction analysis support the notion that the PSA-DA
condition placed more demand on cognitive load than the SA-SA condition, at
least in Experiment 1. Heavy task demands meant that competition between
fragments of the learnt memory was arguably preventing spatial information
retrieval in some instances, in favour of non-spatial information. This would
need to be tested in further experiments to establish whether under a reduction
of load two memory fragments interact in a more harmonious manner. In other
words, are participants able to employ object identity and object location infor-
mation collaboratively when they have the resources to process to both? This
examination would highlight whether task-overload induced the ‘what’/‘where’
trade-off as observed in Experiment 1 of this chapter.
What can also be deduced from these findings is that ‘what’ and ‘where’ infor-
mation are processed separately. This is evidenced by the existence of a trade-off
in Experiment 1. Neurological findings add support to this idea. Postma et al.
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(2004) posited there to be three functional steps to remembering where some-
thing is located. First, the object of interest must be recognised. Second, its
location in space must be specified, and third, the object’s identity and its lo-
cation must be combined. Lucke (2005) provides evidence that the binding of
object features occurs in spatial working memory (probably in the dorsal stream
Kravitz et al., 2013). This suggests that in the case of the current findings ef-
fort is required at the point of encoding to combine spatial and object identity
information. When effort is diverted, under conditions of heavy cognitive load,
working memory capacity is stretched leaving what and where information un-
able to be combined. Under such circumstances this seems to result in recalling
probably the most salient feature at time of encoding (i.e., either where the
object was or what the object was).
3.4.4 Explaining disparity between English sentence per-
formance from Experiment 1 to Experiment 2
The results show there to be a discrepancy between the English sentence per-
formance in Experiment 1 and Experiment 2, even though the same stimuli
was employed. As can be seen in Figure 3.3 the English PSA-DA and SA-
SA Dscore was much lower than that in Experiment 2 (see Figure 3.6). This
change can be explained by changes in procedural approach. Experiment 2, for
purposes of increasing consistency in trial presentation, transposed the stimuli
from Experiment 1 to a computer-based format. This, it is argued, provides
better consistency of trial presentations and higher level of record accuracy of
an individual’s response. This meant that presentation time for each trial was
less variable than that of Experiment 1 but was also overall reduced. Nelson
and Chaiklin (1980) show that the levels of distortion of location accuracy are
directly proportional to stimuli presentation time. Thus, the overall perfor-
mance decline seen in Experiment 2 can be attributed to less exposure time
to each anchor-target presentation. Given that the pattern of the relationship
remained consistent between PSA-DA and SA-SA performance across both ex-
periments strongly suggests the differences in absolute performance were likely
a consequence of procedural change (i.e., a reduction in viewing time). This is
supported when comparing the differences between mean Dscores for PSA-DA
and SA-SA conditions across both experiments (Exp. 1 = 0.15, Exp. 2 = 0.14),
which reflect near identical mean differences.
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3.5 Conclusions
At the beginning of this chapter it was hypothesised that the processing of
information in an expert manner would help to overcome exclusivity of spatial
memories. The evidence shows that for text expertise this was not the case.
This contradicts Harding’s (2006) findings where musical experts showed some
advantage for holding two memories for a target object in comparison to one
memory. The incongruence between the current findings and that of previous
work questions the generalisability of domain-specific expertise skills to the same
task.
However, the findings do provide foundations on which to develop alternative
strategies that may overcome exclusivity. The findings show that recognising
related pieces of information contained within two memories is important for
memory performance. When a link between memories is not apparent perfor-
mance in the PSA-DA condition is disproportionately impacted compared to
the SA-SA condition.
These results also indicate that the use of entire sentences (at least unfamiliar
ones) may require too much attention and result in an overloading of working
memory. If sentences are familiar this appears to attenuate the amount of effort
required to process the sentences. The consequences of extensive processing load
can be seen to result in an apparent trade-off between binding of an object’s
features at encoding. Thus, freeing up capacity to attend to an object is of
utmost importance to allow memory fragments to work together at retreival (at
least in the PSA-DA condition).
The results highlight that a heavy processing load significantly affects the two
memory condition (PSA-DA) more than the single memory condition (SA-SA).
This is evident by the fact the PSA-DA condition reached chance in Experiment
1 but the SA-SA condition did not. If processing effort was equal for both
conditions then one would expect equal detriment across both conditions. The
unequal detriment might be attributable solely to the nature of the stimuli, but
it might also be attributable to underlying effort required in the processing of
two pieces of spatial information. In other words, the load differential may be
accounted for by the stimuli or it might be a mixture of the stimuli that is
exacerbated by the effort required for encoding two spatial memories.
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Chapter 4
Semantics and Exclusivity
4.1 Introduction
Experiments 1 and 2 demonstrated that familiarity had a positive impact on
retrieving information from two related memories. This finding suggests that
expertise processing per se is not enough to overcome exclusivity. The finding
did show however that ability to recognise the connection between two sentences
had a positive effect on location memory performance. Furthermore it appeared
that sentence stimuli required excessive attentional effort. This led to a trade-off
between retrieving fragments of a memory trace (i.e., an object’s identity or its
location).
The experiments in this chapter therefore seek to reduce load at learning, in-
crease the semantic connection between related anchor points, and make related
memories more distinct from one another (Experiment 3). Experiment 4 also
adapts the presentation at learning and test of the stimuli to ascertain a better
understanding of whether two memories are actually held and accessible.
4.1.1 Semantics and parallel processing
From Experiments 1 and 2 it was clear that semantic content (if unfamiliar)
burdened memory processes. Moreover, it was also clear that the connection
of semantic content between two spatially-related memories improved accuracy
at recall. Thus, it appears it is rather the amount of stimulus content that
was the culprit for overloading memory capacity not semantic content per se.
This means if semantics can be employed in a way that has minimal impact on
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processing load but at the same time exploits ability to recognise the connection
between two related memories, it might be possible to overcome exclusivity.
Additional benefits may be observed from employing semantics in this more
efficient manner (i.e., no overload cost whilst retaining the benefits of semantic
coherence between memories). Grouping of stimuli semantically into distinct
categories may overcome any bottlenecks present in retrieving mnemonic in-
formation and consequently allow for parallel processing. Research shows that
retrieving two pieces of information can result in a bottleneck (Carrier & Pash-
ler, 1995) which limits the amount of information that can be passed from
memory stores to a central processor (Carrier & Pashler, 1995; Rohrer & Pash-
ler, 1998; Nino & Rickard, 2003). Once limited capacity has been reached this
results in a bottleneck where only some information can pass through. In such
circumstances information for a second source is either blocked or suppressed
until processing resources have been freed up from completion of a current task.
After processing completion more information can be received from the next
source. In such a case information is said to be retrieved serially.
However, some studies show that central processor capacity can be freed-up
when information is derived from a similar source. For example, when it is
derived from the same semantic (Rohrer & Pashler, 1998) or functional (Logan &
Schulkind, 2000) category. This is accounted for by reducing the need to switch
between categories. Such a shift in retrieval task means participants must restart
the retrieval process for every independent category (Nino & Rickard, 2003). In
other words, the effort needed to switch between representational categories
consumes a portion of processing capacity which restricts the availability to
process other information. Likewise, when no switching is required (i.e., both
memories are derived from the same category), information can be retrieved in
parallel.
Parallel retrieval has shown to be advantageous for semantic information. This
may have a knock on effect for spatial information and specifically exclusivity
(which may itself stem from similar limited capacities of a central bottleneck
as semantic information). That is, spatial and semantic information may be
integrated together which means freeing up of one would result in freeing up
of the other. There is some evidence for such integration in working memory
where components (i.e., semantic and spatial) of an object are integrated into
one unit at encoding (Luck & Vogel, 1997; Lee & Chun, 2001; Vogel et al.,
2001). The corollary of removing any bottleneck would mean concurrent cueing
of both spatial memories (i.e., PSA-DA) could take place and memories could
be retrieved simultaneously. This would increase the likelihood of aggregation
compared with the presence of a bottleneck. Thus, if integration of semantic
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and spatial information occurs then one might see the same benefits attributable
to semantic information retrieval as for spatial information retrieval.
Other advantages of clustering spatial information by a semantic category is
evident in the literature. Hirtle and Jonides (1985) showed that individuals
imposed semantic labels upon spatial information and that this led to psycho-
logical clustering of spatial representations. They argued that although impos-
ing semantic categories can result in small biases, generally it improves spatial
judgements from memory. They showed individuals’ ability to recall spatial in-
formation was more accurate within a semantic group than between semantic
groups. Thus, memory advantages are localised to judgements of items con-
tained within the same semantic category. Interestingly, Craik and Tulving
(1975) also found that individuals recall items better when attention is focused
on semantic information rather than physical features.
From Experiment 1 and Experiment 2 it is evident that task difficulty is an
issue and the more task complexity can be reduced, either through semantics
or familiarity, the greater the potential to observe non-exclusivity. Experiment
3 of the current chapter reduces task complexity in a number of ways. First, it
does not use sentences but rather single words. Thus, there is less to remember.
Second, it uses a semantically rich target word rather than a Greek letter. This
will create a stronger association between the target and anchor point. Third,
anchor words are categorically related across all testing conditions.
4.1.2 Semantics and distinctiveness
Semantic categories have another beneficial impact upon spatial memory ex-
clusivity other than allowing for parallel processing. From Experiment 1 and
Experiment 2 it is clear that being able to connect two related memories is im-
portant for accuracy of recall. An aspect that coincides with this is an ability
to distinguish between a pair of anchor points and other pairs of anchor points.
Thus, allowing for each related memory of a pair to be derived from the same
semantic category makes each related pair distinct from other related pairs.
An essential component of memory retrieval is distinguishing between memo-
ries, particularly when sources are many and similar. An excellent example of
this comes from Hu and Ericsson (2012) who studied the prolific memory expert
Chao Lu (current world record holder for recalling the mathematical constant
Pi to over 60,000 decimal places). Hu and Ericsson (2012) found that Chao Lu
relied heavily on encoding pairs of consecutive images in terms of uniqueness to
enable distinction from other chunks of subsequent digits. The ability (strategic
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or otherwise) to assign uniqueness to sets of memories has been demonstrated
consistently in the literature as a fundamental process in retrieval precision
(Neath & Brown, 2007). Howe (1998) attributes this to a reduction in interfer-
ence and potential confusion with other like memories (an example of which is
the von Restorff effect [von Restorff, 1933]). Interference between memories can
stem from a number of factors such a semantic similarity (Geraci, McDaniel,
Manzano, & Roediger-III, 2009), geometric similarity (Bireta, Surprenant, &
Neath, 2008), and phonological similarity (Conrad & Hull, 1964).
Guerard, Neath, Surprenant, and Tremblay (2010) investigated whether item
discriminability influences serial memory for spatial information. They induced
distinctness of memories by manipulating the physical (i.e., shape and dark-
ness) or temporal characteristics (i.e., interval between presentation) of a to-be-
remembered sequence of target dots. The results indicated that item discrim-
inability modulates memory performance of spatial information much in the
same way as it has in previous research for alternative ‘types’ of information
(e.g., verbal, see Neath, Brown, McCormack, Chater, & Freeman, 2006). The
key finding relevant to the current study is that discrimination between sets of
memories may overcome any interference observed previously (in the form of
exclusivity). This can be achieved by distinguishing pairs of anchor points and
therefore memory context from other pairs.
4.1.3 Research rationale
This section clearly sets out the objectives for each experiment contained within
the chapter.
The aims of Experiment 3 are to:
1. Introduce a semantic relationship between related anchor points
2. Increase the semantic content of the target object and examine
the importance of doing so
3. Make pairs of related memories distinct from other pairs
4. Make the relationship between the target object and the anchor
points distinct
5. Test whether a trade-off between ‘what’ and ‘where’ information
(as observed in Experiment 1) remains present once load is signifi-
cantly reduced
The aims of Experiment 4 are to:
6. Investigate the importance of presentation order of related mem-
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ories to establish if memory dominance is present
7. Examine whether separate yet related memories are available at
test
8. Test whether perceiving an integrated spatial memory at learning
in a single viewing increases the potential to overcome exclusivity
9. Isolate the impact of concurrent retrieval on exclusivity
4.2 Experiment 3
Experiment 3 assigns a semantic category to each pair of anchor points to make
them semantically linked and also semantically distinctive from all other pairs
of anchor points. It also introduces semantic content to the target object and
manipulates this on two levels (see Figure 4.1). These are whether the target is
drawn from the same semantic category as the anchor points or a semantically
neutral category to the anchor points.
4.2.1 Design
A 2 (SA-SA vs. PSA-DA) x 2 (categorical target vs. neutral target) mixed
design was employed. The first factor was again the test of exclusivity and ma-
nipulated the number of anchor points participants were exposed to at learning
and test (SA-SA vs PSA-DA), this was a within-subject factor. The second
factor manipulated the distinctiveness between the target object and the an-
chor points it was presented with. This was a between subject factor and was
manipulated on two levels (categorical target vs. neutral target). Interference
may occur in two instances between related pairs of anchor points and also be-
tween the target and each anchor point. The first is dealt with by the overall
stimuli employed in constructing the anchor points. The second was dealt with
by manipulating whether the entire content of both memories are derived from
the same semantic category, or target type varied according to the anchor’s cat-
egory. For example, anchor point one, the target object, and anchor point two
were either all derived from the same semantic category or the anchor points
were but the target object came from a neutral category (see Stimuli section).
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Figure 4.1: Example of design for experiment three
4.2.2 Stimuli
The stimuli comprised of 18 sets of categorically related 3-5 letter words (see
Table 4.1). This was designed to allow for distinction between pairs of spa-
tial memories by increasing distinctiveness between anchor-point pairs. It also
allowed for increased distinctiveness of each singular spatial memory within a
pair of memories by varying the categorical relatedness of the target object. A
unique category was used for each pair of anchor points that shared a common
target word. For example, a target word in location 7 was presented in relation
to two anchor points (one anchor to the left and one to the right). These an-
chor points shared a specific category (e.g., types of musical instrument, fish,
countries, etc). This meant each pair was categorically distinct from one an-
other. Additionally, the target was either categorically or neutrally related to
the anchor points (e.g., if category = musical instruments, then left anchor =
‘Guitar’, right anchor = ‘Piano’, target = ‘Violin’ or ‘Banana’). Neutral target
words were selected to possess high imagery (M = 5.9, SD = 0.70 out of a pos-
sible range 1-7) and high meaningfulness (M = 6.7, SD = 0.80 out of a possible
range 1-10) values (Paivio et al., 1968). Research shows better retention for
high imagery words (Light & Berger, 1975).
4.2.3 Participants & procedure
A total of 42 (24 female; Mean age=24.36; SD=2.14; Range=18-31) participants
were recruited from Nottingham Trent University and awarded research credits
for their time. The experiment was designed and carried out on a computer using
E-Prime c© software. Subjects were presented with a series of anchor-word trials.
Each trial consisted of a target word located a distance from an anchor word at a
fixed location (either to the left or right hand side of the screen depending upon
condition) and lasted for 14 seconds. The subjects were instructed to remember
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Location Category Right Anchor Left Anchor Target (categorical) Target (neutral)
1 Body parts Elbow Foot hand hope
2 Furniture Chair Table bed chief
3 Fruit Mango Banana apple slave
4 Trees Oak Birch pine board
5 Bodies of water Pacific Atlantic nile vest
6 US States Texas Florida alaska brain
7 Birds Pigeon Eagle swan nun
8 Musical Instruments Piano Guitar flute judge
9 School Subjects Chemistry Biology history salad
Table 4.1: An example of a randomly generated stimuli set for Experiment 3
where the target word was located in relation to the anchor word. In between
the learning phase and the test phase a short distractor task was employed
(counting backwards in 3’s) to prevent any short-term memory rehearsal. At
test participants clicked using a mouse where on the screen they remembered the
corresponding target word to have been located. After completing all location
estimations they were given all the anchor words again in the same format
as previously and they had to identify which target word was associated with
a given anchor word. This meant memory for an object’s identity could be
examined as a function of memory for its location (as in Experiment 1), but
under conditions of lighter processing load.
4.2.4 Results & discussion
The results were split into two stages of analysis. The first stage estimated
models regarding the effects of anchor type (PSA-DA vs. SA-SA) and target
type (neutral vs. categorical) on location accuracy (Dscore). The second stage
analysed the impact of target recognition, anchor type (PSA-DA vs. SA-SA)
and the interaction between the two on location accuracy (Dscore) (for purposes
of comparison with Experiment 1).
The reason why the analysis was split into stages is because only the data where
the target was neutral to the anchor points could be used for the interaction
analysis and the effect of target recognition on Dscore. This is because when the
target was categorically related to the anchor points the object’s identity could
be deduced from the semantic category of the anchor word cues. For example,
when given the cue words ‘Guitar’ and ‘Piano’, a subject could simply identify
the category as being musical instruments and select the correct target word
(i.e., the musical instrument-related target word). This meant no information
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regarding the relationship between location accuracy and correct object identi-
fication could be extracted from the categorically related target word condition.
If it had been included in the analysis it would have obscured the relationship
between neutral target correctness and location accuracy. This meant to estab-
lish the impact of correctly identifying an object on location accuracy categorical
target word data was excluded and a set of models were estimated with only
the neutral target word data.
The results show all conditions to be better than chance (i.e., Dscore <1) which
indicates some information for object location. The mean Dscore for the neutral-
target PSA-DA condition was 0.54 (SD = 0.23) and for the neutral-target SA-SA
condition it was 0.56 (SD = 0.31). The mean Dscore for the categorical-target
PSA-DA condition was 0.57 (SD = 0.35) and for the categorical-target SA-SA
it was 0.59 (SD = 0.26).
4.2.5 Contrasting Dscore performance in Experiment 2
and Experiment 3
Before analysis of Experiment 3 data is reported a comparison between overall
performance difference in Dscore between Experiment 2 (Mean = .73, SD =
.59) and Experiment 3 (Mean = .58, SD = .61) is summarised. Overall location
accuracy was increased (Dscore reduced) from Experiment 2 (t(1474) = 4.410,
p < 0.001) (see Figure 4.2). This suggests that the reduction of load by using
words instead of complete sentences had a positive effect of recalling location
information. This means that when load is reduced, location information can be
better attended to and therefore encoded and recalled. This is in line with the
literature which shows attention and spatial memory to be related (Lansdale,
1998; Naveh-Benjamin, 1987, 1988; Dayan & Thomas, 1995). This also has
implications for the literature on the automaticity of coding spatial information
and suggests that the more capacity to allocate attention to a presented stimulus
results in greater spatial memory performance. This suggests that effort is
involved in processing spatial information but more importantly that the level
of effort (i.e., attention) determines the quality of spatial information recall.
This is in line with much of the literature (Caldwell & Masson, 2001; Naveh-
Benjamin, 1987, 1988; Lansdale, 1998).
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Figure 4.2: Graph showing mean location error (Dscore) across PSA-DA and
SA-SA conditions for Experiment 2 and Experiment 3, including 95 % CI
4.2.6 Comparisons across anchor conditions for Experi-
ment 3
The first stage of model estimations is presented in Tables 4.2 and 4.3. Table 4.2
shows model comparisons between model one which includes anchor type (PSA-
DA vs. SA-SA) and target type (neutral vs. categorical) predicting location
accuracy (Dscore) and model two which additionally includes an interaction
term (Target type x Anchor type). As can be seen model one was a better
fit of the data. Model one showed neither anchor type nor target type to be
significant predictors of location error (see Table 4.8). This shows no difference
between holding one memory (i.e., SA-SA condition) and holding two related
spatial memories (i.e., PSA-DA) for a target object’s location. These findings
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Figure 4.3: Graph showing mean location error (Dscore) across anchor type and
target type for Experiment 3, including 95% CI
are comparable to that of Experiment 2 and reiterates the presence of exclusive
processing.
Model df AIC BIC logLik Test L.Ratio p
1-way 5 1382.07 1405.21 -686.04
2-way 6 1382.21 1409.98 -685.11 1 vs 2 1.86 0.17
Table 4.2: Summary of model comparison statistics for model one and model
two in Experiment 3
This indicates that having categorically related anchor points which are distinct
from all other related pairs of anchor points does not offer any observable advan-
tage for the PSA-DA condition over the SA-SA condition. This suggests that
semantically-related interference between paired spatial memories does not offer
an account of spatial memory exclusivity. The results also demonstrate that a
bottleneck of semantic information at retrieval may not be contributing to exclu-
sivity of related spatial information. Additionally, any advantage from having
categorically related anchor words was not localised to two memories but rather
increased overall performance for the SA-SA and PSA-DA conditions alike.
With regards to interference between the target and anchor points, categorical
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Estimate SE df t p
(Intercept) 0.62 0.06 713 10.95 0.00
Anchor (PSA-DA) 0.03 0.04 713 0.63 0.53
Target (neutral) -0.08 0.07 40 -1.10 0.28
Table 4.3: Parameter estimates for model one in Experiment 3 with anchor
type (PSA-DA vs. SA-SA) and target type (neutral or categorically related)
predicting location error (Dscore)
or neutral target words have no impact upon subjects’ ability to retrieve spatial
information from dual-memory cues (i.e., PSA-DA condition). This suggests
that discrepancies in the semantic representation between targets and each an-
chor point do not contribute to exclusivity. If all encoded objects (anchor one,
target, and anchor two) are stored within the same semantic category no signif-
icant benefits are observed. This suggests that interference between two related
target-anchor representations does not account for exclusivity.
Exploring memory for an object’s identity and location
The second part of the analysis focused on the relationship between recalling an
object’s identity and recalling its location. Experiment 1 of Chapter 3 found a
trade-off effect between these elements of a memory trace. It was hypothesised
that this may have been a consequence of excessive load reaching the ceiling
limits of memory and preventing the binding of a number of stimuli features,
namely an object’s identity and its location. Now load has been reduced by
using single words instead of sentences as anchor points, this relationship is
reassessed.
Two multi-level models were estimated and compared. Multi-level models were
employed due to the non-orthogonal predictor TRscore (Baguley, 2012a). The
first model included anchor type (PSA-DA vs. SA-SA) and target recognition
score (TRscore) as predictors of Dscore. The second model included the same
variables as model one but included the interaction term TRscore x Anchor type.
Comparisons of model one and two showed the one way model to be a better fit
of the data (see Table 4.4). This demonstrates that model two which included
the interaction between TRscore and anchor type was not a significantly better
fit for the data.
A summary for model one can be seen in Table 4.5. This indicates there to be no
interaction of TRscore x Anchor type on location accuracy (see Table 4.5). In
this case, it can be seen from model one that if one were to estimate the identity
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Model df AIC BIC logLik Test L.Ratio p
1-way 5 646.66 666.57 -318.33
2-way 6 645.79 669.68 -316.90 1 vs 2 2.87 0.09
Table 4.4: Summary of model comparison statistics for model one (TRscore vs.
Anchor type) and model two (includes the interaction TRscore x Anchor type)
in Experiment 3
of the target object correctly this would aid in recalling the location of the object
(reducing error by .32) and does not vary according to anchor condition (PSA-
DA vs. SA-SA). In other words, recalling what the target object was whilst
in the PSA-DA condition does not hinder location memory accuracy, as was
observed in Experiment 1. This suggests that a trade-off between recalling
a target’s identity and its location is not present in Experiment 3 and shows
that knowing what the target was increases memory accuracy across all anchor
conditions.
Estimates SE df t p
(Intercept) 0.79 0.07 372 11.44 <0.01
TRscore -0.32 0.07 372 -4.86 <0.01
Anchor type -0.03 0.05 372 -0.56 0.57
Table 4.5: Parameter estimates for model one in Experiment 3 with TRscore
(correct vs. incorrect) and Anchor type (PSA-DA vs. SA-SA) predicting loca-
tion error (Dscore)
The results showing no effect of a TRscore x Anchor type interaction combined
with the overall benefits of recognising the target object correctly support the
notion that the ‘what’-‘where’ trade-off observed in Experiment 1 is a con-
sequence of heavy processing load. Likewise, these findings suggest that the
reduction of processing load enhances memory ability by allowing elements of
the memory to work collaboratively to recall information stored within a mem-
ory trace. It also points to constraints on attention when processing demand
is high. Under such circumstances it would appear that individuals may be
robbed of working memory capacity needed to combine identity and location
information. However, when load allows for it both object features are available
for later recall. Since the change to stimulus load is most salient at the time of
learning it is plausible that the disruption of heavy load occurs at the encoding
stage.
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4.3 Experiment 4
Experiment 4 aims to retain the reduced-load stimuli of Experiment 3 but also
to alter the structure of target-anchor presentations. The alteration of anchor
and cue presentations could potentially lead to a number of insights. It will help
to establish under the current experimental design whether individuals are able
to retrieve two spatial memories if they are cued for each memory on separate
occasions. This can be achieved by introducing a separate-anchor separate-cue
condition. This will enable subjects to learn an object in relation to two anchor
points separately, just as before. However, the advantage of separate cueing is
that the quality of each memory can be assessed. This is important because the
idea of exclusive processing supposes that only one memory is either encoded
or retrieved. Thus, if the quality of each memory is assessed to be good (i.e.,
better than chance) this suggests that two memories can be retrieved when
they are learnt separately. If this is the case it naturally implicates concurrent
cueing as a factor that is preventing the retrieval of one memory. This would
put concurrent cueing under the spot light as an explanation of exclusivity.
Essentially, if the learning phase is held constant and different cueing strategies
are introduced (i.e., separate vs. concurrent), then the impact of each cueing
strategy on exclusivity can be assessed.
Not only will a separate-anchor separate-cue condition establish whether two
memories can be retrieved, but it will also allow for the testing of target pre-
sentation order on subsequent recall accuracy. This is important as it may
shed some light on any discrepancies between two memories that could result
in exclusive processing. Arcediano, Escobar, and Miller (2004) showed that
presentation of stimulus x-US and then xy-US causes blocking of y. This sug-
gests that order of presentation may result in a stronger association for the first
stimulus than the second. On the other hand there is evidence which suggests
because of the way spatial information is stored in memory the second object to
be presented may in fact be better remembered than the first. Ellen et al. (1984)
propose spatial information is stored in the form of a list of discrete non-spatial
items. They argue that the last acquired item (i.e., the most recent) is the best
remembered.
Another type of anchor-cue presentation is introduced which introduces the idea
of reversed exclusivity. It is plausible that if participants are able to view an
already integrated memory this provides certain advantages. For instance, if all
components of the two memories are viewed as a complete unit this may allow
both memories to be drawn on at test (Evans & Pezdek, 1980). Baguley et al.
(2006) employed a similar condition where participants viewed an integrated
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image at learning (DA-encoding). However, they induced recall by either pro-
viding both anchors simultaneously (DA-cueing) or by providing one randomly
(SA-cueing). They found that when subjects were tested with one cue randomly
their performance significantly deteriorated. They argued this was due to ex-
clusive encoding which meant participants only encoded one memory (i.e., the
target in relation to one anchor point). This meant that cuing with one random
anchor point at test would result in lower performance in comparison to that of
concurrent cueing with both anchor points. In line with this they showed better
performance with concurrent cueing than with one random cue. However, they
did not test to see if two memories were available in the condition where the
participants were cued with a single anchor randomly. This seemed like good
grounds to rerun the same learning condition as Baguley et al. (2006) which in-
volved presenting both anchor points and the target together (DA). In order to
determine whether only one memory is encoded it was important to offer both
cues at test. However, if this was achieved by offering only one of two cues at
test (i.e., SA-cueing), as had been used by Baguley et al. (2006), then it is dif-
ficult to decipher whether information regarding each memory is retrievable or
not. Thus, in the current experiment the test condition was altered and instead
of cueing with one anchor randomly (SA-cueing) both anchors were presented
on separate occasions (PSA-cueing). This meant the level of spatial information
contained within each memory could be assessed.
4.3.1 Design
A within-participant design was used where every individual completed a learn-
ing and test phase for each condition. The PSA-DA condition was retained
from all previous experiments where an individual is presented with each tar-
get twice in relation to two different anchor points and then tested given both
anchor-cues simultaneously. However, comparative conditions varied instead of
the SA-SA condition which had been employed previously. Now conditions ei-
ther took the form of a dual anchor learning followed by paired single anchor
test (DA-PSA) or a paired single anchor learning followed by a paired single
anchor test (PSA-PSA).
The DA-PSA condition meant participants now saw a complete representation
of a target with two corresponding anchors simultaneously at learning. For
example, a left anchor (‘Tiger’), right anchor (‘Lion’), and target word (‘chair’)
would all be presented on the screen at once. Just as previously, nine target
words would be presented in nine unique locations. At test participants would
be given the left anchor (‘Tiger’) or right anchor (‘Lion’) separately. This meant
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Figure 4.4: Example of design for experiment four
participants had the task of encoding the target’s position in relation to both
left and right anchors whilst being able to draw on an illustrative representation
of the by-product if integration were to occur (i.e., all relations between each
anchor point and the common target were combined).
The PSA-PSA condition is an amalgamation of both the PSA-DA and DA-PSA
conditions where the participants are presented with the learning phase of the
PSA-DA condition (i.e., they see the target in relation to both anchor points
separately) and the test phase of the DA-PSA condition (i.e., they are cued
for the target object with each anchor point separately). This meant that the
participants learnt each location as a unique spatial unit and were then tested
on these units independently. This allowed for comparison across each memory
for memory dominance and combined with the DA-PSA condition widens the
conditions under which exclusivity can be tested.
4.3.2 Stimuli
The results from Experiment 3 show that distinguishing between pairs of re-
lated memories with categorically related anchor points had little impact upon
overcoming exclusivity. Thus, for this experiment it was decided to drop the
different categories for each pair of anchor points for purposes of practicality (as
each participant would now partake in three conditions). However, to ensure
no interference between conditions different categories were used for each.
Materials consisted of a pool of 270 words constituting 15 categories each con-
taining 18 words. From this pool, categorically-defined groups of words were
selected for use in the three conditions. Different categories were used for each
condition, for example, PSA-PSA = musical instruments, DA-PSA = birds,
PSA-DA = countries. Both order of conditions and category-condition pair-
ing were counterbalanced. All target words were deemed to be neutral to the
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anchor word and were matched on average length, level of semantics, imagery,
and pronunciation (Paivio et al., 1968). The 15 categories ranged from ‘types
of Animals’ to ‘US States’. The categorical words acted as anchor points and
the neutral words were randomly allocated to these anchors to act as target ob-
jects. Neutral target words (i.e., not related to the anchor words) were selected
to possess high imagery (Mean = 5.9, SD = 0.70 out of a possible range 1-7)
and high meaningfulness (Mean = 6.7, SD = 0.80 out of a possible range 1-10)
values (Paivio et al., 1968).
4.3.3 Participants & procedure
Participants were recruited from Nottingham Trent University (N =62). Each
participant received research credits for their time. The experiment was de-
signed and carried out on a computer using E-prime c© software. Subjects were
presented with a series of anchor-word trials. Each trial consisted of a target
word located a distance from an anchor word at a fixed location (either to the
left or right hand side of the screen depending upon condition) and lasted for
14 seconds. The subjects were instructed to remember where the target word
was located in relation to the anchor word. In between the learning phase and
the test phase a short distractor task was employed (counting backwards in 3’s)
to prevent any short-term memory rehearsal. At test participants clicked using
a mouse where on the screen they remembered the corresponding target word
to have been located. After completing all location estimations they were given
all the anchor words again in the same format as previously and they had to
identify which target word was associated with a given anchor word.
4.3.4 Results & Discussion
The results show performance in all conditions to be better than chance (i.e.,
Dscore<1) which indicates some information for object location. The mean
Dscore for the PSA-DA condition was 0.74 (SD = 0.26). For the DA-PSA con-
dition mean Dscore was 0.80 (SD = 0.23). The PSA-PSA mean Dscore was 0.80
(SD = 0.23). Figure 4.5 highlights some promising performance gains for the
PSA-DA condition over both PSA-PSA and DA-PSA (both representing single-
memory recall). To test the differences in mean Dscore performance across all
three anchor conditions a linear model was estimated with Anchor type pre-
dicting Dscore. The results show that the overall model did not quite reach
significance (see Table 4.6). However they do illustrate for the first time that
PSA-DA Dscore is lower than the comparable anchor conditions at least for the
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current sample.
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Figure 4.5: Graph showing mean Dscores for all anchor conditions (PSA-DA,
DA-PSA, PSA-PSA) for Experiment 4 with 95% CI
Estimates SE df t p
(Intercept) 0.8517 0.0329 2707 25.86 p<0.001
Anchor -0.0297 0.0169 2707 -1.76 0.0782
Table 4.6: Parameter estimates for a linear model with Anchor type (PSA-DA
vs. PSA-PSA vs. DA-PSA) predicting location error (Dscore) for Experiment
4
These findings suggest that having two cues presented simultaneously (DA-
cueing) to prompt location of an object increase memory accuracy over being
prompted for each cue separately (PSA-cueing). This suggests that simulta-
neous cuing is not responsible for exclusivity, rather is must be attributable
to some aspect of encoding two spatial memories. This implies that encoding
interference plays a role in reducing the precision of both memories and thus
results in a reduction of accuracy when compared with single object location
encoding. However, this also offers an advantage when compared with a sin-
gle memory that has been exposed to similar levels of interference at encoding.
Although this is not statistically significant it is illustrative of a trend between
dual cueing and single memory cuing. This will be investigated further in the
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next chapter where repeated exposure over time is employed to see if learning
influences integration of spatial information.
4.3.5 Analysis of PSA-cueing conditions
This section reports further analysis of both PSA-cueing conditions from the
PSA-PSA and DA-PSA conditions. It shows that if participants are cued for
their memory of each anchor separately they show to have information regarding
both anchor-target relations. Analysis of each memory from the PSA-PSA
condition showed that location information for both memories was better than
chance (see Figure 4.6). This indicates that two memories are encoded and are
available at recall when prompted with each corresponding cue. However, the
average accuracy of these two memories is lower than when being cued for both
memories concurrently, as in the PSA-DA condition. This tentatively suggests
that the dual-cueing of two spatial memories may have some advantages over
single memory cuing. However, owing to the fact that the differences between
the PSA-DA condition and the other two single memory cueing conditions did
not reach statistical significance, these findings are further discussed later in
light of more robust experimental evidence in Chapters 5 and 6.
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Figure 4.6: Graph showing mean Dscores for left and right anchor cues for the
PSA-PSA condition from Experiment 4 with 95 % CI
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Analysis of each memory from the DA-PSA condition shows nearly identical
findings to that from PSA-PSA. Importantly, it shows that both memories are
retrievable at test which suggests both have been encoded at learning. It also
shows that no significant difference in terms of accuracy of spatial information
between both memories (t = 0.05, df = 59, p = 0.96).
4.3.6 Exploring memory for an object’s identity and loca-
tion
This section revisits the relationship between recalling an object’s identity and
its location. Two multi-level models were estimated and compared. Multi-
level models were employed owing to the non-orthogonal predictor TRscore
(Baguley, 2012a). The first model included anchor type (PSA-DA vs. PSA-PSA
vs. DA-PSA) and target recognition score (TRscore) as predictors of Dscore.
The second model included the same variables as model one but included the
interaction term TRscore x Anchor type. Comparisons of model one and two
showed the one way model to be a better fit of the data (see Table 4.7). This
demonstrates that model two which included the interaction between TRscore
and anchor type was not a significantly better fit of the data.
Model df AIC BIC logLik Test L.Ratio p
1 4.00 5306.26 5329.88 -2649.13
2 6.00 5306.71 5342.14 -2647.36 1 vs 2 3.55 0.17
Table 4.7: Summary of comparison statistics for model 1 and model 2 for
TRscore analysis Experiment 4
Model one is summarised in Table 4.8 and shows Target Recognition score
(TRscore) to be a significant predictor of location error (Dscore). Regardless of
anchor condition, if a participant identifies the target correctly mean location
error (Dscore) decreases by .18. This finding it again in line with that observed
in Experiment 3 and reiterates that when load is reduced features that comprise
an object memory work together to aid in recall of the other feature.
Estimates SE df t p
(Intercept) 0.86 0.02 2647 35.54 <0.01
TRscore -0.18 0.03 2647 -6.80 <0.01
Anchor -0.02 0.02 2646 -1.16 0.25
Table 4.8: Parameter estimates for model one with TRscore (correct vs. incor-
rect) and Anchor type predicting location error (Dscore) for Experiment 4
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Figure 4.7: Graph showing mean Dscore for the order of cue presentation (first
memory = first cue presentation) for Experiment 4 with 95% CI
4.3.7 Presentation order analysis
A linear model was estimated to test whether presentation order had an impact
upon location memory accuracy through memory dominance. The model in-
cludes presentation order (first vs. second) as a predictor of Dscore. The model
is summarized in Table 4.9 and shows presentation order not to be a significant
predictor of Dscore. This suggests that inequalities in terms of memory accu-
racy are not a consequence of presentation order. However, again it is worth
noting that significance was nearly reached which suggests it is possible that
one memory is more accurate than the other.
Estimates SE df t p
(Intercept) 0.79 0.05 1001 14.97 <0.01
Second memory 0.07 0.04 1002 1.85 0.06
Table 4.9: Parameter estimates for a linear model showing Dscore predicted by
presentation order - Experiment 4
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4.3.8 Distance from anchor point analysis
Owing to the fact that the PSA-cueing condition analysis shows that both mem-
ories are encoded, stored and available at recall (at least when cued separately),
additional analysis was carried out to examine whether proximity of the target
to the anchor point is a factor contributing to a disparity in memory accuracy.
This was also considered seeing as anchor position (i.e., left vs. right) or anchor
presentation order (first vs. second) generally show no discrepancy in terms
of memory accuracy. Research shows that recall accuracy for the location of
an object increases as the distance from a reference point decreases (Nelson
& Chaiklin, 1980). Thus, further analysis examined whether there was any
discrepancy in the accuracy of each memory according to its proximity to an
anchor point.
Analysis was carried out on the PSA-PSA data from Experiment 4. This showed
that of two related anchor points the anchor that was in closer proximity to
the target (i.e., the target was in locations 1,2,3,4 in relation to the anchor
point) has a significantly lower Dscore when compared to the anchor where the
target was more distal (i.e., in locations 6,7,8,9) (see Table 4.10 and Figure
4.8). This introduces one possible disparity between related memories that may
contribute to interference at encoding of two memories. It also demonstrates
that one memory can be more accurate than the other. This is interesting as
subjects clearly do not take advantage of this otherwise having two memories
and choosing the more accurate would result in greater memory performance
over a single memory, which is not observed.
Estimate SE t p
(Intercept) 0.73 0.05 14.77 <0.01
Distance 0.20 0.06 3.25 <0.01
Table 4.10: Summary of the comparison between mean Dscores of two cues
related to the same target based on distance from anchor point. A cue was
considered close if the target was presented in locations 1,2,3,4 and far away if
the target was presented in locations 6,7,8,9.
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Figure 4.8: Graph showing mean Dscore for each cue where the target was in
close proximity to the anchor point and when is was far away from the anchor
point. This data was re-analysed from Experiment 4.
4.4 General discussion
The main contribution of these two experiments to exclusivity is that they ex-
clude many possibilities that may be producing exclusive processing. These
include memory dominance between memories and interference between related
memories or between pairs of related memories. In addition, they provide a
better understanding of the mechanisms that may contribute to equal perfor-
mance levels between one and two memory conditions (i.e., PSA-DA = SA-SA)
other than exclusive processing. In other words, the observed similarities in
performance for the PSA-DA and SA-SA conditions may occur from encoding
interference stemming from PSA-encoding
4.4.1 Interaction between ‘what’ and ‘where’ information
The second part of the analysis focused on the relationship between recalling an
object’s identity and recalling its location. Experiment 1 of Chapter 3 found a
trade-off effect between these elements of a memory trace. It was hypothesised
that this may have been a consequence of excessive load reaching the ceiling
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limits of memory and forcing subjects attend to a limited number of stimuli
features, namely an object’s identity or its location. The load in Experiments 3
and 4 has been reduced by using single words instead of sentences as such the
trade-off effect was reassessed and is discussed below.
The findings from both Experiment 3 and 4 show that if individuals are able to
remember what the object is they are more likely to recall where that object is
with greater accuracy. This suggests that because of the reduction in load, more
resources were available to combining (probably in working memory) different
features of the visual array. This is in line with the literature which shows in-
tentional learning paradigm (i.e., paying direct attention to spatial information)
has a positive impact on location memory (Lansdale, 1998; Naveh-Benjamin,
1987, 1988; Dayan & Thomas, 1995). This finding also has implications for
the literature on the automaticity of coding spatial information. Specifically,
if effort is required in processing spatial information and that the level of ef-
fort (i.e., attention) determines the quality of spatial information recalled then
spatial information is probably not processed automatically (Hasher & Zacks,
1979). This is congruent with the majority of research which advocates at least
some effort is involved in coding spatial information(Caldwell & Masson, 2001;
Naveh-Benjamin, 1987, 1988; Lansdale, 1998). It also supports the argument
that studies where automaticity is thought to be present have used low effort
easy-to-encode targets or coarse grain scoring of location (e.g., Ellis, 1990, 1991;
Mandler et al., 1977) (hence, why they incorrectly concluded spatial information
was encoded automatically).
The results also demonstrate that when attentional load is reduced and thus
resources available ‘what’ and ‘where’ information may act collaboratively. This
suggests that these two types of information have been integrated into the same
memory unit at encoding. This is in line with neurological models which suggest
each type of information is processed mostly by different brain regions but also
at some stage needs to be integrated. Postma et al. (2004) posited there to be
three functional steps to remembering where something is located. First, the
object of interest must be recognised. Second, its location in space must be
specified, and third, the object’s identity and its location must be combined.
Hence, the findings from the trade-off effect suggests that individual components
of an object can be processed with relatively little effort. This is evidenced in
Experiment 1 which showed when load was high only one type of information
could be retrieved. However, for those pieces to be retrievable as common
features of the same object some form of integration must take place and this
process requires more effort.
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4.4.2 Semantic interference
The results show that semantic interference between related spatial memories
does not offer an account of spatial memory exclusivity. Experiment 3 allowed
for the explicit recognition that two memories were related by employing distinct
semantic categories. However, this recognition did not lead to any advantage for
two memories compared with one. Thus, any benefit from having categorically
distinct anchor words for each target was not localised to the PSA-DA condition
but rather increased the overall performance for SA-SA and PSA-DA conditions
alike. This presents similar findings to those of Experiment 2 and reiterates the
possible presence of exclusive processing.
With regards to interference between the target and anchor points, categori-
cal or neutral target words have no impact upon subjects’ ability to retrieve
spatial information from dual-memory cues. This suggests that discrepancies
in the semantic representation between a target and each anchor point do not
contribute to exclusivity. Hence, if all encoded objects (anchor one, target, and
anchor two) are stored within the same semantic category no significant benefits
are observed.
The findings from Experiment 3 specifically show that a bottleneck, preventing
parallel retrieval of information, does not account for spatial memory exclusivity.
These results could be attributable to a number of factors. First, a bottleneck
has been relieved for semantic information alone, leaving a bottleneck for spatial
information. However, this would suggest that semantic and spatial informa-
tion were not integrated into a memory trace which is against the prevailing
evidence (Luck & Vogel, 1997; Lee & Chun, 2001; Vogel et al., 2001). Second,
it could mean that a bottleneck has been relieved for both semantic and spatial
information but this has had no impact upon exclusive processing. This implies
that exclusive processing may not result from limited capacity at retrieval.
Arcediano et al. (2004) showed that presentation of stimulus x-US and then
xy-US causes blocking of y. This suggests that simply based on order of pre-
sentation one might be left with a greater association for the first stimulus
combination than the second. Results from the presentation order analysis
show that differences between first and second order presentation of the stimu-
lus does not significantly impact upon levels of performance. This suggests that
seeing a target for the second time does not improve memory for the first target
and its relation to the first anchor point. Thus, blocking due to an imbalance
in strength of association between two encoded representations is an unlikely
cause of exclusivity.
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Some authors propose that storing spatial information can be likened to the
storing of a list of words. Congruent with this is the idea that the second
object to be presented may in fact be better remembered than the first. Ellen
et al. (1984) advocate that spatial information is stored in the form of a list of
discrete non-spatial items and the last acquired item (i.e., the second memory)
is the best remembered. The current findings show otherwise and argue that
no effect of stimulus presentation order is evident. Again, this reiterates the
argument that when each anchor-target relation is presented it is encoded as a
distinct unit and recognition of the first object on presentation of the second does
not improve the recalling of spatial information contained within both stimulus
presentations. This highlights that the sequential order in which objects are
encoded does not cause blocking or disruption of either memory and therefore
has no baring on exclusivity. Thus, it appears unlikely that primacy and recency
effects observed in the verbal domain relate to spatial information. Hence, the
storing of spatial information appears not to be bound by the same mnemonic
rules as words encoded from a list.
4.4.3 The availability of two spatial memories
The exclusivity model argues that given the opportunity to utilise two spatial
memories only one memory can either be encoded or retrieved. Evidence from
Experiment 4 suggests that given the opportunity to encode two memories both
of those memories can be retrieved. Through the separate encoding and sub-
sequent cueing of two spatial memories it was shown that both memories were
retrieved with accuracy levels better than chance. This is incongruent with the
idea of exclusive encoding. Also note worthy were the differences between con-
current cueing and separate cueing of both memories. Although the findings
did not reach statistical significance they show that concurrent cueing perfor-
mance was better than separate cueing performance. This is interesting because
the learning conditions were held constant which isolated the effects of different
cueing strategies. This suggests, albeit tentatively, that concurrent cueing of
spatial memories may offer an advantage over separate cueing of each memory.
If this is the case then it would also be incongruent with the idea of exclusive
retreival of spatial memories being a result of concurrent cueing. If only one
memory were retrieved due to simultaneous cueing then no difference between
concurrent and separate cueing would be expected. However, the findings of
Experiment 4 suggest that a difference may be present.
This is of particular interest because it not only indicates that two memories
may be available at test, but also that concurrent cueing of those memories
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offers some kind of advantages in comparison to separate cueing. Logically,
the only way concurrently cueing would see such performance advantages over
separate cueing is if subjects were able to utilise two memories in some kind of
advantageous manner. For example, separate cueing performance equates to the
average accuracy of the two memories. Thus, if memory one had a Dscore of .7
and memory two had a Dscore of .5 then the average memory accuracy would be
.6. However, using the same memories as an example, if a subject was provided
with both cues simultaneously and were able to achieve a significantly better
accuracy score than .6 (i.e., the average of the two memories) then it could be
argued both memories were contributing information as to the target object’s
location. Although these effects did not quite reach statistical significance (α =
0.05), the tentative findings reported here will be returned to in Chapter 5 and
6 in the light of more robust experimental evidence.
Baguley et al. (2006) used a scenario where subjects would learn the location of a
target object whilst simultaneously presenting corresponding anchor points (DA
presentation). They then tested memory for the object by randomly presenting
one anchor point. They found significantly worse performance for DA-SA com-
pared to SA-SA and PSA-DA. They argued this was due to a retrieval blocking.
It was possible that individuals had only encoded one memory at learning. If
this was the case then using the same scenario of anchor presentations at encod-
ing but varying the test condition to include both memory cues would allow for
the assessment of each memory’s level of performance. The results were similar
to that of the condition where memories were encoded separately. Specifically,
they showed that two memories are retrievable at test which suggests that both
have been encoded at learning. This contradicts the idea that only one memory
is encoded when both anchor points and the target are presented altogether
and simultaneously at encoding which questions Baguley et al’s (2006) original
conclusions.
Following on from the presentation order (first vs. second) and anchor (left
vs. right) analysis a third possible factor was examined as a cause for accuracy
imbalance between related memories. This is important to assess as if it can be
shown that individuals possess a memory that is significantly more accurate, but
do not select it, it indicates that exclusive processing is not the most optimum
startegy. Analysis reported in Experiment 4 found that the distance from which
the target was located in relation to an anchor point had a significant effect on
location accuracy. Specifically, if the target was positioned in close proximity
to an anchor point it would be recalled with greater accuracy in comparison to
when it was located towards more distal locations. This is in line with the liter-
ature which shows accuracy decreases as a function of distance from a reference
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point (Nelson & Chaiklin, 1980). These findings suggest that when encoding
two related memories one of those memories will be more accurate because it
is closer to the anchor point. Owing to the nature of the experimental design
the target will always be closer to one of the anchor points and will therefore
be more accurately recalled. This provides a potential means for interference
between memories. If exclusivity is occurring then selection of one memory over
the other is not based on a factor which might offer a more accurate estimate
for an object’s location. In other words, individuals do not seem to be selecting
a memory on the grounds of the target’s proximity to the anchor point. If they
were doing this then a significant increase in perfromance would be observed in
comparison to the single memory condition (i.e., SA-SA).
4.4.4 Conclusions
It is clear that besides the findings of Experiment 4 (where dual cueing of
two spatial memories appears to offer signs of benefit), exclusivity as tested
in the original design (Baguley et al., 2006) remains present. However, there
are a number of possibilities that remain to be tested. One possibility is that
the task itself is too complex and resources are used up understanding the task
which reduces the availability of resources for non-exclusive processing. Another
possibility is that although familiar text has been employed, the spatial relations
themselves and the connections between anchor points and the target remain
novel to the subjects. It is plausible that one presentation of each stimulus is
perhaps not enough to transform two related spatial memories into an integrated
unit.
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Chapter 5
Learning and Exclusivity
5.1 Introduction
Real life spatial learning typically involves repeated exposure to locations. There-
fore, it is more realistic in some ways to study exclusivity and the possibility of
overcoming it when individuals are repeatedly exposed to spatial information
over time. The spatial memory research area suffers from a dearth of human-
orientated work when it comes to learning spatial information over time. Ad-
ditionally, learning arguably brings together elements of both semantics and
expertise under one approach.
The previous two chapters have investigated semantics and expertise through
forced means. That is, semantics were derived from generally accepted seman-
tic categories and expert stimuli were employed to take advantage of previous
extensive practice (i.e., reading). However, what participants lack is experience
of the actual spatial element of the task. The quantities of space (i.e., distance
between anchor and target) were only viewed on one occasion (or two in the dual
anchor condition assuming participants were able to recognise this again upon
second presentation). This chapter includes two experiments which exploit this
factor by employing a learning paradigm applied to two further experiments;
one over the course of 5 days and one over 10 days.
5.1.1 Practice and spatial memory generally
Much research has shown that practice improves spatial memory (Dayan &
Thomas, 1995; Naveh-Benjamin, 1987, 1988) and also dual-task abilities (Shaffer,
101
1975; Hatano et al., 1977; Spelke et al., 1976). Additionally, strategic processing
has been shown to proceed with practice such as ‘response chunking’. It is ar-
gued by some authors that only when such strategies have the opportunity to be
implemented would one expect to observe performance greater than serial pro-
cessing (Nino & Rickard, 2003). Response chunking can somewhat be likened
to Rohrer and Pashler’s (1998) findings on categorisation. In essence, response
chunking places each memory or information trace into a categorical unit which
means switching across categories is avoided. More generally it has been shown
that subjective strategies can improve spatial memory for large amounts of spa-
tial information (Ellis, 1990). Presumably allowing for greater time with the
stimuli and task will have higher potential for such strategy implementation.
Similarly, Kiesel et al. (2009) found that long-term practice prompts the acqui-
sition of visual memories of chess configurations with integrated form-location
conjunctions. They concluded that perceptual ‘chunking’ enabled complex vi-
sual processing outside of conscious awareness. Noudoost, Adibi, Moeeny, and
Esteky (2005) showed that elements of a target object are important for object
recognition when the object is unfamiliar. However, as objects become more
familiar over time configural processing of the object as a complete unit oc-
curs. For example, Garling, Lindberg, and Mantyla (1983) gave subjects the
opportunity to become familiar with a campus through repeated exposure (by
way of guided tours). They found four tours was enough to preserve spatial
knowledge between different reference points when tested a month later. This
suggests that repeated exposure may not only increase remembering but also
reduce forgetting of multiple object-to-reference point relations.
Training has also been implicated as a potential way to release blocking of
one cue due to a unbalanced strengthening of one association. Arcediano et
al. (2004) suggest that any stimulus cue blocking due to presentation order
should be released over time due to the random nature in which stimuli are
experienced. For example, on one exposure to two stimuli a subject may view
stimulus A then stimulus B. This, according to Arcediano et al. (2004) would
create a stronger memory for A. However, if on another occasion stimulus B
was presented first this would counteract the initial dominance of stimulus A.
Thus, over time one would expect equal memory strength for the two stimuli as
viewing order continuously changes. In the current learning experiments each
stimulus should, according to randomness, be presented the same amount of
times and in different orders. Thus, differences of association strength between
first and second order presentation should balance out as learning progresses.
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5.1.2 Repeated exposure and spatial memory integration
Baguley et al. (2006) acknowledge one possibility that the novelty and abstract-
ness of the stimuli and task may account for exclusivity. They highlight that
the combination of spatial information may require consolidation and practice
with each separate component. More specifically, they suggest that over time re-
hearsal of each memory trace may reduce demands on working memory, allowing
for the application of resources to integration processes. Baguley et al. (2006)
also hypothesize that an alternative benefit of repeated exposure might be the
conversion or initial sensory type representations (i.e., visual) into higher-order
representational units. This may allow for more abstract manipulation (i.e.,
integration) of each memory trace.
The idea that repeated exposure and long-term experience are important factors
in spatial integration is supported from early work involving animals (Ellen et
al., 1982, 1984; Sawa et al., 2005; Blaisdell & Cook, 2005; Tolman, 1948). Poucet
(1993) argues that experience with the environment is crucial when transforming
independent pieces of information and combining them. For example, Herrman,
Bahr, Bremner, and Ellen (1982) employed a three table problem (Maier, 1932)
to investigate integration in animals. This problem involves a rat learning an
entire spatial array and is then fed on one part of it (i.e., one table). The rat
is removed from the feeding table and placed in another area of the array and
required to return to the feeding table from which it has just come. This process
is carried out repeatedly with the tables being randomly organised every time
(so the rat does not learn a ‘turn’ strategy). Eventually the rat is allowed to
explore the environment and the spatial relations contained within it. The test
is to see whether the rat is able to make a novel judgement and get from the
start table back to the feeding table (Herrman et al., 1982). This was shown
to be the case and indicates that repeated exposure allows for the development
of higher-order orientation-free representations of space. This means that no
matter where an animal is in the array (i..e, a novel location) it can make
a judgement not reliant on local cues and reference points, but rather on an
aggregation of previous experiences.
Another study has since extended the findings of Herrman et al. (1982). Ellen et
al. (1984) allowed rats to explore a series of tables and runways for five consec-
utive days and found that rats constrained to explore areas independently were
not capable of integrating spatial information. However, if rats were allowed
to explore connections between areas over successive trials then a conceptual
link was established. This, it is argued, demonstrates that rats form cognitive
representations over time that quantify constant relationships amongst objects.
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If rats only experienced either table or the runways they showed no signs of
learning the spatial relations among tables. This evokes the idea that awareness
of the relations between spatial objects is required for integrative type perfor-
mance. More importantly, it indicates that such awareness is built up over time
through multiple exposures to all elements of the spatial array.
Ellen et al. (1984) noted that a crucial factor in the attainment of spatial in-
tegration is that spatial relations are experienced bidirectionally. This is in
response to findings by Maier (1932), who found that bidirectional locomotion
must be engaged if locations in an environment are to become related spatially.
This is in line with the idea that space is represented as a vector consisting
of magnitude and direction information (Collett, Cartwright, & Smith, 1986;
McNaughton, Chen, & Markus, 1991; O’Keefe, 1991; Baguley et al., 2006) and
bidirectional exposure may cancel out any interference attributed to direction.
Sawa et al. (2005) using a touch screen procedure and Blaisdell and Cook (2005)
using an open-field search task both demonstrate evidence for the possibility
of spatial information integration in pigeons. The experimental design was
such that pigeons would learn a stimulus pairing where the spatial distance
was kept constant (e.g., A-B). They would then train the subjects as to the
location of a target stimulus in relation to only one of the original stimuli (e.g.,
A-C). Therefore participants would have no a priori knowledge of the spatial
relation between C and B (e.g., B-C). Thus, it is argued that if they are able to
estimate C’s location given B as a reference cue then they have integrated the
representations (A-B + A-C). The measure of integration was whether there
was an observable increase in correct estimates of C’s location over successive
learning trials. Interestingly, Blaisdell and Cook (2005) showed that integration
was not apparent until some 7 months after separate paired association had
been learnt with the target stimuli. This suggests that integration of spatial
information, amongst pigeons at least, is a process which evolves over long
periods of time.
Diwadkar and McNamara (1997) found that memory for an object’s location
to be represented in a viewpoint-dependent manner. They proposed that when
participants make judgements from novel views (i.e., different than at encoding),
they must normalise such a view to ‘fit’ with an encoded view. Diwadkar and
McNamara (1997) also showed that with training, subjects are able to represent
novel views in memory rather than having to normalise the view to fit expe-
rienced ones. This suggests that a more viewpoint-independent representation
may develop over time. Thus, practice may play a role in enabling individuals
to make judgements regarding novel views by relying on integrated representa-
tions. Brockmole and Wang (2002) point out that using familiar environments
104
will maximise the chance of finding evidence for simultaneous access of multiple
environmental representations.
There is also evidence that processes in the absence of a stimulus that occur over
time may be vital. An excellent example of this comes from Ellenbogen, Hu,
Payne, Titone, and Walker (2007) who illustrated the importance of sleep when
it comes to making inferential judgements regarding learnt stimuli. In their ex-
periment subjects learnt a series of premises (A>B, B>C, C>D, D>E, E>F).
Contained within these premises was a hierarchical structure that the subjects
were not informed about. Three delay-test conditions were employed which in-
cluded 20mins, 12 hours (day), and 12 hours (over night) delays. They showed
that subjects in the 12 hour night condition were significantly better at recog-
nising the underlying hierarchy compared to both the 12 days and the 20mins
(who only performed at chance). The researchers concluded that sleep enabled
subjects to recognise and develop weak associative links between separate yet
related memory items.
Evidence from neuroscience also implicates different brain region in processing
spatial information as it becomes learnt. Using fMRI, Wolbers (2005) showed
as learning evolves the role of the hippocampus in spatial memory consolidation
diminishes. This suggests the creation of new memories (which the hippocampus
has been implicated in) is not necessary any longer and instead the already
acquired spatial information is processed in regions which deal which higher-
level cognitive processing.
In summary, the evidence that repeated exposure and learning play a role in
integrating spatial and non-spatial information is quite compelling.
5.1.3 Testing task complexity
The second aim of this chapter is to investigate the role of the experimental
design in exclusivity. Specifically, it examines whether task complexity is con-
tributing to poor performance in the dual memory condition (PSA-DA).
Although spatial memory performance was better than chance in the majority
of the previous experiments, there are signs of attenuation towards the limits of
processing capacity in some conditions. The levels of performance are typically
towards the upper end of location error between perfect accuracy and chance.
This is particularly noticeable for the two memory conditions (e.g., PSA-DA).
This suggests that the task itself may be quite complex and more importantly
the effort required to understand both tasks may be unevenly distributed be-
tween the one and two memory conditions. Thus, allowing individuals the
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opportunity to become familiar with the task will help to understand the con-
tribution of task complexity to performance levels in PSA-DA. This, in turn,
will have implications for any further conclusions relating to exclusivity.
5.2 Experiment 5
Experiment 5 uses the same stimuli and anchor presentation structure to that
of Experiment 4. Experiment 4 provided a combination of anchor presentation
and test trials where the PSA-DA condition showed signs of outperforming com-
parative single memory conditions (PSA-PSA and DA-PSA). Hence, if learning
increases the opportunity for memory consolidation, then testing it using a sce-
nario which illustrates a trend in that direction is a logical starting point.
The aims of Experiment 5 were to:
1. Test the effects of learning on exclusivity using Experiment 4
anchor comparisons
2. Test the effects of task complexity on exclusivity
5.2.1 Design
A within-participant design was used where every individual completed a learn-
ing and test phase for each condition over the course of 5 consecutive days. The
PSA-DA condition was retained from all previous experiments where an indi-
vidual was presented with each target twice in relation to two different anchor
points and then tested given both anchor-cues simultaneously. However, com-
parative conditions varied from the SA-SA condition which had been employed
previously. Conditions either took on a dual anchor learning/single anchor test
(DA-PSA) or a single anchor learning/single anchor test (PSA-PSA) (i.e., the
same as Experiment 4).
The DA-PSA condition meant participants saw a complete representation of a
target with two corresponding anchors simultaneously at learning. For example,
a left anchor (‘Tiger’), right anchor (‘Lion’), and target word (‘chair’) would all
be presented on the screen at once. Just as previously, nine target words would
be presented in nine unique locations. At test participants would be given the
left anchor (‘Tiger’) or right anchor (‘Lion’) separately. This meant participants
had the task of encoding the target’s position in relation to both left and right
anchors whilst being able to draw on with an illustrative representation of the
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memory-product if integration were to occur (i.e., all relations between each
anchor point and the common target were available and explicit).
The PSA-PSA condition is an amalgamation of both the PSA-DA and DA-
PSA condition where the participants are presented with the learning phase
of the PSA-DA condition (i.e., they see the target in relation to both anchor
points separately) and the test phase of the DA-PSA condition (i.e., they are
cued for the target object with each anchor point separately). This means
that the participants learn each location as unique spatial units and are then
tested on these units independently. This allows for comparisons across each
memory for memory dominance. Combined with the DA-PSA condition, these
new conditions widen the context under which exclusivity is tested. This will
provide greater insight into the underlying mechanisms of exclusivity.
5.2.2 Stimuli
Materials consisted of a pool of 270 words. The pool of words was made up of
15 categories each containing 18 words. From this pool, categorically-defined
groups of words were selected for use in the three conditions. Different cate-
gories were used for each condition, for example, PSA-PSA = musical instru-
ments, DA-PSA = birds, PSA-DA = countries. All target words were deemed
to be neutral to the anchor word and were matched on average length, level of
semantics, imagery, and pronunciation (Paivio et al., 1968). The 15 categories
ranged from types of ‘Animals’ to ‘US States’. The categorical words acted as
anchor points and the neutral words were randomly allocated to these anchors
to act as target objects. Neutral target words (i.e., not related to the anchor
words) were selected to possess high imagery (Mean = 5.9, SD = 0.70 out of a
possible range 1-7) and high meaningfulness (Mean = 6.7, SD = 0.80 out of a
possible range 1-10) values (Paivio et al., 1968).
5.2.3 Participants & procedure
Participants were recruited from Nottingham Trent University and awarded
research credits for their time (N =10, Mean age = 21.5, 5 female). Five par-
ticipants were assigned to a learning condition and five to a non-learning con-
dition. The learning condition involved seeing (in a random order) the same
anchor-target relations everyday. Thus, the target and its location would re-
main constant in relation to a specific anchor point everyday. The non-learning
condition changed the stimuli everyday. For example, day one might consist of
anchor words from the categories ‘animals’, ‘musical instruments’ and ‘foods’,
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one for each anchor condition. On day two these categories would change to
‘tools’, ‘cities’, and ‘body parts’. This meant participants would become famil-
iar with the task but not the stimuli. Thus, any significant signs of improvement
over five days would suggest the task itself may be placing unnecessary burden
on processing. Participants would complete all three anchor conditions (in a
random order) each day for five consecutive days. All stimuli were presented
on a computer screen and background light was kept to a minimum to prevent
any use of external reference points other than those provided as part of the
experiment.
All instructions were kept consistent and participants were informed of what
they would be tested on (i.e., where the target object was located). The first
of the three anchor conditions would then begin which would involve learning
numerous anchor-target relations. Each anchor-target trial was timed (with 14
seconds learning time in each trial) and would not cease until all anchor-targets
had been presented once. A short distracter task would then begin, where
participants were asked to count backwards in three’s from a given random
number. After this, subjects would be given instructions informing them of the
test phase. This phase required each participant to click (using a mouse) on the
screen where they remembered the target object to be in relation to whatever
corresponding anchor was presented at that time. After completion of the first
anchor condition, participants would then do the same for the remaining two
anchor conditions.
5.2.4 Results & discussion
The results section is split into two sections. The first section deals with the
findings from the learning condition when participants received the same stimuli
each day and therefore had the opportunity to become familiar with them over
time. The second section deals with the non-learning condition where partici-
pants were given different stimuli every day for five days.
Learning condition
Results show all conditions to be better than estimated chance values (i.e.,
Dscore< 1). The mean Dscore across all five days for each condition were 0.25
(SD = 0.13) for the PSA-DA condition, 0.50 (SD = 0.19) for the PSA-PSA
condition, and 0.42 (SD = 0.15) for the DA-PSA condition.
Overall Dscores were calculated and subjected to linear model analyses which
showed Dscore in the PSA-DA condition to be significantly lower than PSA-
108
PSA and DA-PSA, and also that there was no significant difference between
PSA-PSA and DA-PSA conditions (see Figure 5.1 and Table 5.1).
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Figure 5.1: Graph showing mean Dscores for PSA-DA (P/D), PSA-PSA (P/P),
and DA-PSA (D/P) over all days of learning for Experiment 5 with 95% CI
Estimates SE t p
(Intercept) 0.2365 0.04 5.21 <0.01
Anchor group (DA-PSA) 0.19 0.064 2.98 <0.01
Anchor group (PSA-PSA) 0.29 0.064 4.55 <0.01
Table 5.1: Parameter estimates for a linear model with Dscore predicted by
PSA-DA, PSA-PSA, and DA-PSA for Experiment 5
In terms of each anchor condition, results show a significant learning effect for all
three conditions across five days (see Figure 5.2). They also show a significant
difference between performance on the PSA-cue conditions (PSA-PSA & DA-
PSA) compared with the DA-cue condition (PSA-DA) (see Figure 5.2). This
shows that participants were better able to recall the location of the target object
when they were simultaneously given two cues to help prompt their memory.
To ascertain whether such performance gains can be regarded as evidence of
additivity or independence both models were estimated with the independence
model being the best fit of the data (see Figure 5.2). This reflects that the
kind of performance seen in the PSA-DA condition is similar to what one would
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expect if individuals were able to draw on both memories independently, based
on the observed performance of collapsed PSA-cue data (i.e., the average of
PSA-PSA & DA-PSA). This suggests that when one memory retrieval fails the
second is available for access. This is the first sign of potential for non-exclusive
processing.
Day p-value
Day 1 0.0625
Day 2 0.0625
Day 3 0.4375
Day 4 0.4375
Day 5 0.125
Table 5.2: Summary of Wilcoxon signed rank test of the differences between
PSA-DA and the other PSA-cue condition (PSA-PSA and DA-PSA) combined
for Experiment 5
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Figure 5.2: Graph showing the effect of having the same stimuli for five con-
secutive days on location error (Dscore) including an estimated independence
model line for Experiment 5
Across both conditions learning does not have any effect on being able to use two
cues in comparison to one. Arguably one would expect an increase in difference
between the PSA-DA condition and the two PSA-cue conditions if learning was
providing a disproportionate advantage to the two memory condition. This
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was shown not to be the case and in fact the difference between the conditions
appears to be converging somewhat as the days succeed (see Table 5.2).
Non-learning condition
The mean Dscore across all days for the PSA-DA condition was 0.57 (SD =
0.21), for the PSA-PSA condition is was 0.68 (SD = 0.16), and for the DA-PSA
condition it was 0.66 (SD = 0.14).
Results from the non-learning condition show no learning effects over five days
across all three conditions (see Figure 5.3). To analyse the non-learning effect
PSA-PSA and DA-PSA were collasped to form one PSA-cue condition as they
jointly represent scenarios of single-anchor cuing.
To asses the effects of learning over time progressively more complex models were
estimated which in essence tested whether there was any significant deviation
of each condition’s slope coefficient across days. If any slopes gradient was
significantly different from zero that indicates that some learning had occurred.
Thus, as days increase along the x-axis Dscore will decrease along the y-axis
(this would be a negative coefficient). Additionally, the models tested whether
the y-intercept of each slope (i.e., the grand mean for each anchor condition
[PSA-DA, PSA-PSA, DA-PSA]) were significantly different from one another.
The progression of model steps to achieve this are set out below.
A number of multi-level models were estimated which together illustrate that
neither PSA-cue (PSA-DA and DA-PSA combined) nor PSA-DA slope deviated
from zero or their y-intercepts were significantly different from one another (see
Table 5.1).
The results show the slope coefficient does not significantly deviate from zero
confirming that no learning took place for all the anchor conditions across all
days. Model-1 represents a null model and estimates the grand mean for all
participants across all days. Model-2 allows the y-intercept (i.e., means) to
vary between anchor conditions (PSA-DA vs. PSA-cue) but retains a common
slope. The results show a significant difference in mean Dscore across conditions.
Model-3 again allows the y-intercept to vary between anchor conditions and re-
tains a common slope but also treats Day as a continuous predictor of Dscore.
The results show difference in the y-intercept (i.e., mean) for each anchor con-
dition to remain significant. Importantly, it shows that a the slope coefficient
for the grand mean slope for all anchor conditions does not significantly differ
from zero (i.e., it is flat) across all learning days. Model-4 estimates the effect
of Day on Dscore and keeps the slope and y-intercept common for all groups.
111
1 2 3 4 5
0.
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
1.
0
Days
Lo
ca
tio
n 
er
ro
r (
Ds
co
re) l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
Anchor Condition
P/P
D/P
P/D
Figure 5.3: Graph showing the effect of having unique stimuli for five consecu-
tive days (i.e., becoming familiar with the task) on location error (Dscore) for
Experiment 5
Model Estimates SE df t-value p-value
Model-1
Intercept 0.62 0.05 45 12.61 0.00
Model-2
Anchor 0.11 0.04 45 2.49 0.02
Model-3
Anchor 0.11 0.04 44 2.47 0.02
Day 0.01 0.02 44 0.63 0.53
Model-4
Intercept 0.62 0.05 44 12.48 0.00
Day 0.04 0.16 44 0.22 0.83
Table 5.3: Summary of parameter estimates for four models from Experiment 5
non-learning condition. Model 1 predicts the grand mean Dscore for all groups.
Model 2 allows the y-intercept (i.e., means) to vary between anchor conditions
(PSA-DA vs. PSA-cue) but retains a common slope. Model 3 allows the y-
intercept to vary between anchor conditions and retains a common slope but
also treats Day as a continuous predictor of Dscore. Model 4 estimates the effect
of Day on Dscore and keeps the slope and y-intercept common for all groups
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5.3 Experiment 6
Experiment 6 is designed to further explore the effects of repeated exposure
and learning on location memory. It aims to confirm and extend findings from
Experiment 5. Although Experiment 5 demonstrated strong learning effects it
is difficult to establish the influences of learning upon the exclusivity effect as it
was originally observed (Baguley et al., 2006). The effects of learning cannot be
fully discounted until a test of PSA-DA and SA-SA is conducted under learning
conditions. This is addressed in Experiment 6.
Experiment 6 also sought to extend the learning period as a factor that may also
be preventing the realisation of any learning benefits for two spatial memories.
Experiment 6 thus doubled the learning period to ten days and also included a
two day consolidation period halfway. As evidence from humans and animals
shows the integration of spatial information can involve lots of exposure over
lengthy periods of time (Blaisdell & Cook, 2005), this also has the added advan-
tage of allowing for important periods of consolidation such as sleep (Ellenbogen
et al., 2007).
Owing to the comparative nature of the test for exclusivity (i.e., PSA-DA vs.
SA-SA), the benefits of learning on memory integration must outweigh any
general memory accuracy benefits due to learning. In other words, as learning
progresses memory will generally improve across all conditions (see Experiment
4 and Naveh-Benjamin, 1987, 1988; Dayan & Thomas, 1995). This means that
for any significant improvement to be observed for two memories the integration
process must be observable before performance reaches ceiling limits. Hence,
another reason why the learning period was extended.
Additionally, because of the striking improvement on location memory witnessed
in Experiment 5, the mechanisms that underpin such improvement are exam-
ined. This is achieved through the examination of confusion matrices to assess
how precision develops for each location across days.
5.3.1 Design
A within-participant design was employed where each subject completed all
conditions everyday for ten days. Two anchor conditions were examined, the
PSA-DA condition and the SA-SA condition. These were the original compar-
ative conditions where exclusivity has been extensively evidenced in this thesis
as well as previous work (Baguley et al., 2006).
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5.3.2 Stimuli
Due to the findings that task complexity was not contributing to exclusive pro-
cessing the memorability of the stimuli was reduced and the semantic informa-
tion was removed. This enabled subjects to attribute their own meaning to the
stimuli. It also meant the learning period could be extended without the risk of
reaching ceiling effects of location performance. The time period extension also
allowed more chance for any convergence across conditions to take place.
The stimuli comprised a pool of 470 four-letter nonsense words (see Table 5.4
for an example). From this pool, random sets of words were selected without
replacement for all three conditions. This meant 18 words were selected for the
SA-SA condition and 27 words were selected for the PSA-DA condition. This
was carried out for each participant.
Location Left Anchor Right Anchor Target
1 rarp hign ount
2 onde boag leld
3 slox oock arvs
4 koun zimb kwee
5 jewd tirp yieg
6 rirb glou ghiz
7 danz rhof zonc
8 donc dreg sylb
9 bleg rarg sykt
Table 5.4: An example of a randomly generated stimuli set for Experiment 6
5.3.3 Participants & procedure
Participants were recruited from Nottingham Trent University and awarded
research credits for their time (N =10, Mean age = 21.9, 6 female). Unlike
Experiment 5 where participants were divided into ‘learning’ and ‘non-learning’
conditions, all ten participants took part in the learning condition. Owing to
the striking non-learning findings from Experiment 5 it was decided that further
exploration of the non-learning condition was not required. This also gave the
experiment more power to detect any differences between anchor conditions.
All stimuli were presented on a computer screen and background light was kept
to a minimum to prevent any use of external reference points other than those
provided as part of the experiment.
All instructions were kept consistent and participants were informed of what
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they would be tested on (i.e., where the target object was located). The first
of the two anchor conditions would then begin which would involve learning
numerous anchor-target relations. Each anchor-target trial was timed (with 10
seconds learning time in each trial) and would not cease until all anchor-targets
had been presented once. A short distracter task would then begin, where
participants were asked to count backwards in three’s from a given random
number. After this, subjects would be given instructions informing them of the
test phase. This phase required each participant to click (using a mouse) on the
screen where they remembered the target object to be in relation to whatever
corresponding anchor was presented at that time. After completion of the first
anchor condition, participants would then do the same for the remaining anchor
condition.
Participants returned every day for ten days with a two day consolidation break
in the middle (i.e., after five days). Testing was kept constant every day with
little variation concerning the time of day across all participants for the entirety
of the learning period.
5.3.4 Results & discussion
The mean Dscore across all ten learning days for the PSA-DA condition was
0.51 (SD = 0.29). For the SA-SA condition it was 0.51 (SD = 0.30). As can be
seen in Figure 5.4 a striking learning curve is observed, where Dscore (location
error) decreases overtime, thus, location accuracy increases. Across ten days of
learning, location error was significantly reduced from a mean Dscore of 0.87
down to 0.26. As is also apparent there was no marked difference between SA-
SA and PSA-DA over the ten day period. This supports the conclusions from
Experiment 4 (Chapter 5) that learning plays little function in enhancing the
performance of multiple spatial memories over a single memory. For purposes of
comparison to Experiment 5 the independence model has been calculated and
included in Figure 5.5. This shows a clear disparity between performance in
the PSA-DA condition and what is predicted by the independence model.1 The
results also highlight that allowing subjects to attribute their own meaning to
the stimuli and group it in a way most easily processed or integrated does not
aid in aggregating spatial information.
1The independence model estimates performance based on SA-SA. It states that if failure
of memory occurs a second attempt of retrieval from the other memory is made. It is calculated
using the following formula:
1 − ((1 −Dscore) ∗ 2 − (1 −Dscore)2)
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Figure 5.4: Graph showing the effect of learning multiple object locations over
a ten day learning period on Dscore for PSA-DA and SA-SA conditions for
Experiment 6
Model df AIC BIC F p
Linear model 3 -23.30 -22.40
Non-linear model 4 -39.13 -37.92 34.62 <0.01
Table 5.5: Summary of model comparison statistics for a linear and non-linear
model estimating Dscore predicted by Day for Experiment 6
Two models were estimated to capture the increments in spatial memory per-
formance over time, a linear and a non-linear model. The non-linear model
(i.e., in this case a second degree polynomial) was a better fit for the data (see
Table 5.5 and is represented in Figure 5.6). As can be seen, performance gains
start very rapidly over the first 3-4 days of learning and then begins to tail off
at around day 6. Performance also begins to plateau around day 9-10. This
suggests participants were reaching the ceiling limits of performance. However,
it could also be attributed to the fact that participants knew it was a ten day
learning study and therefore performance may have waned owing to a drop in
motivation.
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Figure 5.5: Graph showing the effect of learning multiple object locations over a
ten day learning period for PSA-DA and SA-SA conditions. The graph includes
a line reflecting the level of performance as predicted by the independence model
- Experiment 6
Estimates SE t-value p-value
(Intercept) 1.0017 0.0322 31.09 <0.01
Day2 -0.1382 0.0135 -10.27 <0.01
Day2 0.0070 0.0012 5.88 <0.01
R2 = 0.9845; Adjusted R2 = 0.9800
Table 5.6: Parameter estimates for a non-linear model predicting Dscore by Day
for Experiment 6
117
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
2 4 6 8 10
0.
3
0.
4
0.
5
0.
6
0.
7
0.
8
0.
9
Day
D
sc
or
e
Figure 5.6: Graph showing a fitted polynomial learning curve estimating Dscore
across ten days of learning from Experiment 6. The line represents both PSA-
DA and SA-SA data combined
5.3.5 Analysing the development of precision over time
The purpose of this section is to model the types of learning strategy for acquir-
ing information about multiple objects’ locations over a ten day period. It will
graphically illustrate the pattern of errors for all nine target objects for each day
of learning. This will offer an insight into how individuals ‘pick up’ fragments
of spatial information over time.
The use of confusion matrices allows for the modelling of distributional changes
in the accuracy of participants’ responses (see Chapter 2, section: The use of
confusion matrices). This means one can examine two underlying possibilities
of multiple object-location learning. The first possibility is that participants
learn a few objects precisely and then add to this ‘pot’ of precise memories each
day. The second is that individuals encode all objects in a less precise manner
and then increase precision for all memories across each day. These hypotheses
can be tested by plotting the distribution of a confusion matrix for each day.
Under the first possibility, one would expect spikes in the matrix. That is,
responses which equate to precise locations of a few objects would appear across
the diagonals (or nearby) of the matrix from day one. The frequency of these
spikes would increase as learning progressed. Under the second possibility, one
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would expect a flat and low distribution of responses from day one which would
move inwards towards the diagonals slowly each day. Eventually this would
result in a mountain range-like distribution.
To illustrate the patterns of response accuracy surface plots were employed.
These are powerful tools when assessing the distribution of matrix format data.
Thus, Figure 5.7 shows the distribution of responses for day one. In order to
interpret the plots it is useful to imagine the square base of the plot as the
confusion matrix itself. The diagonal from the far corner to the closest corner
represents perfect accuracy. As one moves outwards from this line responses
become less accurate until they are positioned in either left or right hand corner
of the plot which signifies the largest amount of location error (i.e., deviations
from where the object was presented).
On examination of each surface plot in relation to its previous plot, the dis-
tribution begins reasonably flat and slowly progresses inwards away from the
outer corners toward the central diagonal. This culminates in relatively large
amounts of accuracy across all target objects, illustrated by the mountain range
like distribution on days nine and ten. This is in line with the second hypothesis
and suggests that individuals are learning each object’s ‘rough’ location every
day and then building on that precision henceforth.
Figure 5.7: A surface plot representing the distribution of responses for day 1
of Experiment 6. The shading illustrates the vertical height of the surface and
thus the volume of responses. As responses accumulate vertical height of the
plot increases. As responses decline the surface area moves vertically downwards
towards the base of the plot
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Figure 5.8: A surface plot representing the distribution of responses for day 2
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Figure 5.9: A surface plot representing the distribution of responses for day 3
Figure 5.10: A surface plot representing the distribution of responses for day 4
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Figure 5.11: A surface plot representing the distribution of responses for day 5
Figure 5.12: A surface plot representing the distribution of responses for day 6
Figure 5.13: A surface plot representing the distribution of responses for day 7
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Figure 5.14: A surface plot representing the distribution of responses for day 8
15-16 
10-15 
5-10 
0-5 
Figure 5.15: A surface plot representing the distribution of responses for day 9
Figure 5.16: A surface plot representing the distribution of responses for day 10
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5.4 General discussion
5.4.1 Learning and exclusivity
The results from Experiment 4 and 5 are conclusive and demonstrate that re-
peated exposure to the same location information does not overcome exclusiv-
ity. Across both experiments no observable advantage was shown for having
two memories of where an object is located in comparison to one. This sug-
gests that the repeated exposure of spatial relations did not enable any kind of
consolidation or transformation of information into higher-order units. This is
reflective of exclusivity in that only one memory is encoded or retrieved which
would make consolidation superfluous.
After exposure to the same stimuli for either five or ten consecutive days it is
implausible that participants did not recognise two memories as being related.
This suggests acknowledging that two memories point to the location of the same
target is not enough to encourage integration. It would appear that memories
act exclusively even when their relation to a common target object has been
specified explicitly. The neutral nature of the stimuli used in experiment five
and also the period of learning gave subjects the time and semantic freedom to
attribute subjective meaning to the stimuli, and thus, to organise it in a way that
may be conducive to aggregation. The results show that no such advantage was
observed and performance remains in line with that predicted by the exclusivity
model.
The findings are also in stark contrast to previous research, particularly the
work showing integration over time in animals (e.g., Ellen et al., 1982, 1984;
Sawa et al., 2005; Blaisdell & Cook, 2005; Tolman, 1948). Much of the animal
research has focused on path integration and shown that if two routes are learnt
(A-B, B-C) then a novel connecting route can be inferred (A-C). This suggests
that the previously learnt routes have been integrated and thus a judgement can
be made based on this integrated knowledge. This evidence makes the findings
of this research even more striking because the subjects do not necessarily have
to even make a novel judgement (i.e., A-C), rather they just have to make a
judgement regarding two learnt ‘routes’ (i.e., A-B, B-C, where’s B given A &
C?).
Nevertheless, the major difference between the current research and the previ-
ous research on animals is the test of exclusivity (non-exclusivity in the previous
case). In the current work comparative conditions are employed whereby perfor-
mance is compared to a control condition made up of encoding and retrieving
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a single spatial memory. In comparison, animal research seeks to establish
whether integration is possible not whether it is more or less effective to make
one judgement from memory (e.g., where is B given A?). This difference is also
witnessed in other animal research where rats are required to take a novel route
from one table to another (Ellen et al., 1984; Herrman et al., 1982). Thus, it
begs the question whether the type of comparison between conditions may go
some way to accounting for finding exclusivity.
It is also entirely possible that selection from two memories is not required.
Collett and Collett (2000) showed that only in unfamiliar environments is path
integration employed. When in familiar environments landmarks dominate and
are nearly always used. This could be equated with the current findings and
suggests that integration is simply not necessary. Therefore, any one landmark
will suffice and is just randomly chosen.
These findings do not indicate that learning does not play any role in spa-
tial memory integration, rather that repeated exposure does not play a role in
overcoming exclusivity under the current paradigm. There is some evidence
suggestive of no benefits of practice. For example, Nino and Rickard (2003)
found practice effects on two retrievals from a single cue to not overcome the
retrieval bottleneck and put forward a serial model for dual-task performance.
However, a bottleneck has been shown to be unlikely to account for the current
findings (i.e., Experiment 3). Additionally, unlike Nino and Rickard (2003) the
current experiments seek to understand the benefits of retrieving one item from
two cues, not two items from one cue.
There is also the possibility that the learning process has started the procedure
for integration but did not have enough time for it to come to fruition. Time
delays have been shown to influence such a process. Blaisdell and Cook (2005)
showed that integration was not apparent until some 7 months after separate
paired association had been learnt with the target stimuli. Garling et al. (1983)
illustrated that the benefits of repeated exposure to a campus was evident one
month later. This suggests that integration of spatial information is a process
which may evolve over longer periods of time. However, just considering the role
of medium term learning as in the current experiments the evidence suggests
five or ten days of learning does not show signs of integration for the learnt
stimuli.
The findings of this chapter extend the boundaries within which exclusivity
remains present. It shows that even with the benefits of learning to become
familiar with the stimuli and importantly the relational locations of the target,
the ability to develop and apply strategies over time, the opportunity for consol-
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idation periods of inactive learning, and the chance to make explicit connections
between all elements of the stimuli, exclusivity remains immutable. The gen-
eral performance increase for all conditions in Experiments 5 and 6 (excluding
the non-learning condition of Experiment 5) indicate that exclusive processing
still allows for improvement of spatial memory over time. This suggests that by
learning fragments of information for where an object is location (i.e., one of two
memories) builds a redundant set of memories that offer adequate performance.
This supports the argument that exclusive processing may be a mechanism to
avoid unnecessary effort. That is, to avoid the effort involved in either process-
ing two memories or attempting to integrate both when one memory is good
enough.
5.4.2 Task complexity
The findings from Experiment 5 show that unbalanced task effort between the
PSA-DA and other less complicated conditions (i.e., SA-SA) is not contributing
to poorer PSA-DA performance in comparison. The fact that no observable
change in performance for the PSA-DA condition over the course of five days
suggests that even when subjects completely understood the task and became
familiar with the procedure, this did not improve their spatial memory perfor-
mance. This means that performance levels can be attributed to elements that
comprise the task rather than the task itself.
5.4.3 Practice effects and spatial memory performance
The findings from this chapter quite conclusively show that becoming familiar
with the locations of objects, through practice, significantly improves memory
for those objects over time. This is in line with evidence that shows improve-
ment in spatial information retrieval with practice (Naveh-Benjamin, 1987, 1988;
Dayan & Thomas, 1995). It is in stark contrast to research which indicates no
practice improvements (Ellis, 1990, 1991; Mandler et al., 1977).
The significant impact of learning on performance also provides additional sup-
port to the idea that spatial information is not processed completely automat-
ically. Hasher and Zack’s (1979) criteria state that practice should not result
in any performance gains if a process is to be considered automatic. Thus, the
current findings are in contradiction to this and indicate that spatial processing
is not automatic by rather it is effortful.
However, some spatial coding can be achieved with minimal processing effort.
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For example, Naveh-Benjamin (1987) showed no difference between intentional
and incidental learning conditions for relative judgements. This suggests that
coarse spatial information, that used to make relative judgements (e.g., ‘left of
A’), is processed with little effort. However, for precise spatial judgements to
happen more effort is required. This is perhaps reflected in the second learning
experiment (Experiment 6) which shows precision to increase over time, pre-
sumably by incrementally applying effort to processing each target evenly every
day.
5.4.4 Spatial precision over time and multiple objects
The analysis of location precision over time echoes ideas that already exist in
the literature. The idea of increasing precision over time is in line with the
categorical-coordinate model as proposed by Kosslyn (1987). This model states
that category information (i.e., ‘left of A’) is encoded on initial viewing and then
coordinate information as to the exact location is encoded. This suggests that
the only qualitative difference between categorical and coordinate information
is the level of granularity. It also suggests that metric information is fine-tuned
over time which supports the idea that there is a continuum between categorical
and coordinate representations rather than these two representations being two
separate computations (Niebauer, 2001).
Niebauer (2001) argues stages exist in between switching from categorical to
coordinate representations, where categorical processing is initiated and from
this coordinate information can be derived. Thus, categorical encoding may
represent a preliminary step in specifying space with more precise coordinate
processing following. This also reflects the categorical adjustment model which
states that fine-grained information as to the exact location of an object is
constrained within a broader category of space (Huttenlocher et al., 1991).
A neurologically based model supports this idea and may also help to account for
the increments in precision observed in Experiment 6. Dynamic Fields Theory
(DFT) states that neurons in working memory establish spatial information over
time due to activation of neighbouring neurons (Spencer, Smith, & Thelen, 2001;
Spencer, Simmering, Schutte, & Schner, 2007; Schutte, Spencer, & Schoener,
2003; Schutte & Spencer, 2009). Through repeated exposure, excitation of
neurons becomes self-sustaining, precluding the need for continuous presentation
of the stimuli. Thus, the neurons in working memory leave a transient firing
trace in long-term memory. As this process is iterated neuronal firings become
less coarse and more precise. This implies that initially spatial information
is represented with little relative precision and that this precision is gradually
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increased over time.
The findings from Experiment 6 may be explained by applying the above models
of spatial memory learning. This suggests that when participants view the
location of an object they code it in a coarse manner. This specification of
space can be fine-tuned upon every viewing of the spatial relations between the
target and a local reference point.
5.4.5 Anchor presentation structure and exclusivity
Perhaps the most insightful findings from this chapter relate to the difference
between the PSA-DA, PSA-PSA and DA-PSA conditions, as observed in Exper-
iment 5. In contrast to Baguley et al. (2006) this experiment shows an advantage
for simultaneous cueing of two spatial memories.
This immediately begs the question, if spatial memories are exclusive why would
two cues be advantageous? According to the exclusivity model encoding or
retrieval of only one memory is attempted. This means that the prompting of
both memories with both cues should offer no advantage, unless two memories
are retrievable. However, if two memories are retrievable, then why is dual
anchor cueing consistently poorer than single anchor cueing (i.e., PSA-DA vs
SA-SA)?
One way to try and interrogate this further is to examine what is contributing
to i) the benefits of dual-cueing as seen in Experiments 4 and 5 and ii) what is
contributing to no observable advantage of dual-cueing as seen in Experiments
1, 2, 3, and 6. These are examined and discussed further in Experiments 7a and
7b of the next chapter.
5.4.6 Conclusions
It is clear from Experiments 1, 2, 3, and 6 that when comparing PSA-DA per-
formance and SA-SA as a test of exclusive processing this shows no advantages
from having two memories over one. According to previous work this is a conse-
quence of there being only one memory available in the PSA-DA scenario. The
contributions of the experiments contained within this thesis are convincing of
the fact that exclusivity is not overcome by the methods employed here. There-
fore it would be superfluous to some degree to keep investigating the route of
overcoming exclusivity. Instead it might be more informative to examine the
cases highlighted in Experiment 4 and 6 where exclusivity can not account for
the findings. Arguably, exclusivity may be difficult to overcome because the
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assumption that only one memory has been encoded is not the most appropri-
ate explanation of performance levels witnessed between PSA-DA and SA-SA.
Therefore, the final empirical chapter will attempt to understand the breadth
and application of the exclusivity model to both the findings of this thesis and
those of previous findings.
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Chapter 6
Encoding disruption and
spatial memory
performance
6.1 Introduction
This chapter revisits the exclusivity model and its ability to account for findings
reported in earlier chapters and in previous work. The results of two experiments
and further analysis of previous experiments (Experiment 3 and 4) are contained
within this chapter. This chapter aims to add further weight to the findings
of Experiment 4 and 5 which show DA-cueing to offer an advantage under
conditions when two related memories have been encoded and stored. Upholding
the idea that DA-cueing offers some advantage automatically implicates PSA-
encoding as a processing stage leading to later recall disadvantage (otherwise
PSA-DA should outperform SA-SA, which it does not). The rationale for this
chapter is to clarify, by way of isolating processing stages (e.g., encoding), why
two spatial memories (i.e., PSA-DA) might equal the performance of a single
spatial memory (i.e., SA-SA), other than exclusive processing per se.
It is quite possible that exclusivity may be occurring at one or both stages of
memory. That is, exclusive encoding, where individuals only encode one spa-
tial memory, or exclusive retreival, where only one spatial memory is retrieved.
One line of evidence at odds with an exclusive encoding account emerges from
Experiment 4. Analysis of memory for a target object given both anchor points
separately shows both cues provide information for an object’s location (Exper-
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iment 4). This suggests that exclusive encoding is not likely to be occurring. If
it were occurring then a significant detriment of at least one of the memories
as measured at recall would be expected because only one of the memories was
encoded.
The lack of evidence for exclusive encoding does not preclude the possibility
of exclusive retreival of spatial memories. The evidence from Experiment 4
shows that two spatial memories are retrievable, however, this observation was
achieved by testing each memory separately (i.e., through PSA-cueing). This
means that exclusive retreival of spatial information may still be occurring but
might be isolated to the concurrent cueing (i.e., DA-cueing) of memories, a
retreival problem which would be avoided by cueing each memory separately.
However, other evidence is at odds with the idea of exclusive retreival. If
both memories are encoded, stored and therefore available (as has already been
demonstrated in Experiment 4) there should be no difference between cueing
these memories separately or together. In other words, if a subject is given a
target (T) in relation to two anchor points on separate occasions (A and B)
and they encode both memories (e.g., A-T and B-T), then cueing with A and
B simultaneously or with A then B separately, should not have any effect on
recall performance (i.e., if the participant only attempts recall of one of those
memories). In fact, it could be argued that simultaneous cueing would cause
some kind of interference and therefore lower performance levels would be ex-
pected compared to that of cueing each memory on separate occasions. On the
contrary, the results of Experiment 4 and 5 show concurrent cueing to be an
advantage. This suggests that individuals are not simply retrieving one memory
in isolation but rather there is some kind of additive effect in the sense that they
are drawing on information from both available memories is occurring.
The above findings indicate that retreival of both memories is possible when
cued separately and a benefit is gained when cued concurrently. This suggests
that both memories are encoded, stored, and retrievable under both separate
and concurrent cueing conditions. Thus, the fact that concurrent cueing seems
to offer some kind of advantage over separate cueing suggests for one thing that
something must be occurring elsewhere in the processing stage other than that
of retrieval. Additionally, whatever is occurring it must introduce some kind
of detriment to memory performance in order to bring two spatial memories
performance, which sees a concurrent cueing advantage, in line with that of a
single spatial memory.
The results from Experiment 4 and 5 specifcially show that compared to PSA-
PSA, PSA-DA offers better memory performance. This difference in perfor-
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mance is attributable to the test contingencies (PSA-cueing vs. DA-cueing),
seeing as this is the only factor that varied between conditions. The appar-
ent DA-cueing advantage taken together with the consistent finding of equal
performance between PSA-DA and SA-SA begs the question as to why does
PSA-DA consistency see performance levels the same as SA-SA if DA-cueing is
advantageous?
One possible explanation is that PSA-encoding has a detrimental impact on
memory performance which DA-cueing cannot wholly rectify. However, as yet
no test of the encoding contingency’s impact (i.e., PSA-encoding) has been
carried out. That is, if PSA-encoding is having a detrimental impact on memory
performance then it would be beneficial to introduce PSA-encoding into the
SA-SA condition, a condition which typically sees performance levels equal to
that of the PSA-DA condition. This way a comparison can be made between
performance levels for a new single memory condition, which introduces PSA-
encoding (i.e., PSA-SA condition), and that of the PSA-DA condition. Thus, if
PSA-SA leads to poorer performance compared with both the SA-SA condition
and the PSA-DA condition then it would add weight to the argument that the
reason why two memories (i.e., PSA-DA) nearly always equal that of a single
memory (i.e., SA-SA) is because the encoding of two related memories (i.e.,
PSA-encoding) has a detrimental impact upon both encoded spatial memories.
This would by extension go some way to explaining why although DA-cueing
sees advanatges in some instances (e.g., PSA-DA vs. PSA-PSA), but in others
it seems to be attenuated by some factor (e.g., PSA-DA vs. SA-SA).
This chapter aims to test the hypothesis that PSA-encoding is responsible for
the equal levels of performance between the PSA-DA condition and the SA-SA
condition, an observation that has previously been argued to represent exclusive
processing of spatial information (Baguley et al., 2006). In this chapter the
learning context will be isolated and scrutinised as a factor contributing to a
decrement in PSA-DA performance bringing performance in line with SA-SA
performance.
6.2 Experiment 7a
This experiment is designed to hold the learning phase (PSA) constant and vary
the retrieval phase to assess to impact of introducing PSA-encoding to the SA-
SA condition. Owing to the previous findings which show equal performance
between PSA-DA and SA-SA, a comparison between PSA-SA and PSA-DA
will be made. The consequence of a comparison between PSA-DA and PSA-SA
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will also lead to insights as to the role of DA-cueing. For example, if PSA-
DA outperforms PSA-SA then it could be argued that DA offers some kind of
benefit at retrieval for spatial information. It would also support the previous
findings comparing PSA-DA with PSA-PSA which suggests DA-cueing, in some
contexts, is more effective as a means of recall compared with PSA-cueing.
6.2.1 Design
Experiment 7a is a within-participant design and uses a combination of learning-
test anchor conditions not previously employed. The anchor conditions consist
of paired-single anchor viewing followed by dual-anchor test (PSA-DA) and
paired-single anchor viewing followed by random single-anchor test (PSA-SA).
This provided a test of whether having the opportunity to retrieve two memories
was better than the opportunity to retrieve one.
Baguley et al. (2006) used PSA-DA and SA-SA in Experiment 1 and DA-SA
and DA-DA in Experiment 3. However, they did not offer a comparison of
conditions that allowed for the contribution of PSA-encoding to be examined.
PSA-encoding was always followed by DA cueing in Baguley et al. (2006) which
meant PSA was never isolated for the purpose of examination. What is in-
teresting is the comparison between DA-DA in Baguley et al. (2006), which
showed equal performance to that of PSA-DA and SA-SA. This implies that if
DA-cueing is found to be advantageous in the current experiment then it would
appear that what ever is occurring in the PSA-encoding condition is also likely
to be occurring in the DA-encoding condition.
6.2.2 Stimuli
The stimuli were taken from Experiment 5 which comprised of a pool of 470 four-
letter nonsense words (see Table 6.1 for an example). From this pool, random
sets of words were selected without replacement for all three conditions. This
meant 27 words were selected for the PSA-SA condition and 27 words were
selected for the PSA-DA condition. This was carried out for each participant.
The reason why these stimuli were used was to establish the benefit of cue-
ing each memory simultaneously. This meant non-words were used as anchors
because if categorically related anchors were employed (as have in previous ex-
periments) then participants in the PSA-SA condition might be able to cue their
second memory via the semantic connection with the presented cue. In other
words, if a participant had learnt Apple-chair and Banana-chair, then upon
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Location Left Anchor Right Anchor Target
1 rarp hign ount
2 onde boag leld
3 slox oock arvs
4 koun zimb kwee
5 jewd tirp yieg
6 rirb glou ghiz
7 danz rhof zonc
8 donc dreg sylb
9 bleg rarg sykt
Table 6.1: An example of a randomly generated stimuli set for Experiment 7a
(taken from Experiment 6)
the cueing of ‘chair’ with ‘Apple’ they may be able to cue the second memory
‘Banana’ from the cue of ‘Apple’. This would disrupt any performance gains
attributable purely to dual-anchor cueing as the subject may be able to induce
dual-anchor type cueing themselves.
6.2.3 Participants and procedure
Participants were recruited from the University of Leicester and paid £6 for their
time (N =26, mean age = 29.37, SD = 11, 16 female). The same procedure as
Experiment 4 was employed. The experiment was designed and carried out on
a computer using E-Prime c© software. Subjects were presented with a series
of anchor-word trials. Each trial consisted of a target word located a distance
from an anchor word at a fixed location (either to the left or right hand side of
the screen depending upon condition) and lasted for 14 seconds. The subjects
were instructed to remember where the target word was located in relation to
the anchor word. In between the learning phase and the test phase a short
distractor task was employed (counting backwards in 3’s) to prevent any short-
term memory rehearsal. At test participants clicked using a mouse where on the
screen they remembered the corresponding target word to have been located.
6.2.4 Results & discussion
The results show Dscore for both conditions to be better than chance (i.e.,
Dscore<1). The results show significantly better performance (i.e., lower Dscore)
for the PSA-DA condition (Mean = 0.82, SD = 0.28) compared with the PSA-
SA condition (Mean = .97, SD = .27) (see Table 6.2 and Figure 6.1). This
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first shows that when PSA-cueing is introduced into the SA-SA condition per-
formance gets worse. Second, this indicates that having two cues at test is an
advantage in comparison to having one. This supports the argument that the
differences in previous findings between having two cues at test and only one
(i.e., PSA-DA vs. SA-SA) is a consequence of something other than the test
phase. More specifically, it suggests that equal PSA-DA and SA-SA perfor-
mance may be accounted for by a disparity in the encoding phase of the test.
This implies that PSA-encoding has significantly detrimental effects upon the
encoding of two spatial memories that SA-encoding avoids. This arguably must
have something to do with the process of encoding two related memories.
Although Experiment 7a makes a comparison between PSA-DA and PSA-SA it
does not provide any direct comparison of PSA-SA and SA-SA. Thus, a more
direct comparison between PSA-SA and SA-SA is needed to strengthen the ar-
gument that it is the PSA-encoding stage of the PSA-DA condition that renders
location performance the same as SA-SA. This is addressed in Experiment 7b.
Additionally, it is also important to test the robustness of the findings from
Experiment 7a owing to the relatively small sample size as well as the close to
chance performance observed in the PSA-SA condition.
Condition SA Dscore (SD) DA Dscore (SD) t df p
Exp.7a PSA-DA vs. PSA-SA .97 (.27) .82 (.28) 2.34 25 < 0.05
Table 6.2: Table showing mean Dscore and SD for the PSA-DA and PSA-SA
condition of Experiment 7a. The table also shows summary statistics of mean
comparisons between PSA-DA vs. PSA-SA
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Figure 6.1: Graph showing mean Dscore with 95 % CI for the PSA-DA and
PSA-SA condition for Experiment 7a
6.3 Experiment 7b
Experiment 7b was designed to test the robustness of the findings from Experi-
ment 7a. In order to achieve this Experiment 7b used a larger sample size, and
different (more easily processed) stimuli. Specifically, Experiment 7b employed
the same stimuli to that which had been used to gather data for Experiment
3. This offered two primary benefits. First, Experiment 3 saw good levels of
overall location memory performance. Owning to the close to chance levels of
performance observed in experiment 7a it was important to establish the same
findings with more convincing levels of general memory performance. Second,
it allowed for a control comparison of PSA-SA with previously established per-
formance levels of SA-SA (taken from Experiment 3 where the same stimuli,
design, and procedure had been used). This allowed for direct isolation of the
PSA-encoding condition and a more concrete testing of the hypothesis that
PSA-encoding introduces some kind of detriment observable in later location
memory performance.
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6.3.1 Design
Experiment 7b used the same anchor conditions as Experiment 7a (e.g., PSA-
DA vs PSA-SA). This was done to establish generality of the findings and thus to
add support to the idea that in some circumstances two cues are an advantage for
retrieving two spatial memories. It also used data from Experiment 3 to provide
a control comparison. This meant two within conditions were used (PSA-DA
and PSA-SA) as well as one between condition (SA-SA: taken from Experiment
3). The between condition (PSA-SA vs SA-SA) allowed for the testing of the
hypothesis that PSA-encoding is negatively impacting upon performance in the
PSA-DA condition.
6.3.2 Stimuli
Experiment 7b adopts the stimuli used in Experiment 3 (see Table 6.3). The
stimuli comprised categorically related anchor words that were unique to each
target word. The target word was neutral to the anchor points. For example,
a set of paired anchor points might be drawn from the category musical instru-
ments (Guitar, Piano) and the target word would be neutral relative to this
(table).
Location Category Right Anchor Left Anchor Target (categorical) Target (neutral)
1 Body parts Elbow Foot hand hope
2 Furniture Chair Table bed chief
3 Fruit Mango Banana apple slave
4 Trees Oak Birch pine board
5 Bodies of water Pacific Atlantic nile vest
6 US States Texas Florida alaska brain
7 Birds Pigeon Eagle swan nun
8 Musical Instruments Piano Guitar flute judge
9 School Subjects Chemistry Biology history salad
Table 6.3: An example of a randomly generated stimuli set for Experiment 7b
(taken from Experiment 3)
6.3.3 Participants & procedure
Participants were recruited from the University of Leicester and paid £6 for their
time (N =30, mean age = 21.9, SD = 9.32, 20 female). The same procedure
as experiment 7a was employed. The experiment was designed and carried out
on a computer using E-Prime c© software. Subjects were presented with a series
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of anchor-word trials. Each trial consisted of a target word located a distance
from an anchor word at a fixed location (either to the left or right hand side of
the screen depending upon condition) and lasted for 14 seconds. The subjects
were instructed to remember where the target word was located in relation to
the anchor word. In between the learning phase and the test phase a short
distractor task was employed (counting backwards in 3’s) to prevent any short-
term memory rehearsal. At test participants clicked using a mouse where on the
screen they remembered the corresponding target word to have been located.
6.3.4 Results & discussion
The results show performance levels that were better than chance for all con-
ditions (i.e., Dscore<1). The findings also show that memory performance was
generally much better than in Experiment 7a. This is in line with the perfor-
mance levels observed previously with the same stimuli (i.e., in Experiment 3).
This meant ceiling effects owing to task difficulty could be eliminated as a con-
tributing factor to the findings of Experiment 7a. Importantly, the results show
the same decrement in performance for the PSA-SA condition (Mean = .86,
SD = .35) compared with the PSA-DA (Mean = .59, SD = .27) condition as
observed in Experiment 7a (see Figure 6.2 and Table 6.4). Additionally, results
show a significant difference between the PSA-SA condition (Mean = .86, SD
= .35) and the SA-SA condition (Mean = .58, SD = .25). This demonstrates
that when PSA-encoding is introduced into the SA-SA condition performance
is significantly impaired.
Condition Dscore (SD) Dscore (SD) t df p
PSA-DA vs. PSA-SA .86 (.35) .59 (.27) 4.11 29 < 0.01
PSA-SA vs SA-SA .86 (.35) .58 (.26) 2.99 48 < 0.01
Table 6.4: Table showing mean Dscore and SD for the PSA-DA, PSA-SA and
SA-SA for Experiment 7b. The table also shows summary statistics of mean
comparisons between PSA-DA vs. PSA-SA and PSA-SA vs. SA-SA
Together, these two comparisons can provide important insights into exclusiv-
ity. As has been shown in Experiments 7a and 7b, subjects in the PSA-SA
condition perform significantly worse than in the PSA-DA condition. This is
attributable to the test contingency (i.e., DA vs SA). This reiterates the benefits
of concurrent cueing. When compared with the SA-SA condition, participants’
performance in the PSA-DA condition are equivalent. This ensures that there is
no spurious difference between these two conditions and that performance levels
are equal between the conditions, which is in line with results consistently found
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Figure 6.2: Graph showing mean Dscore for PSA-DA and PSA-SA from Ex-
periment 7b and SA-SA from Experiment 3. An independence line is plotted
which indicates the levels of performance expected according to the indepen-
dence model.
in this thesis and previous work (Baguley et al., 2006). Also, the comparison be-
tween PSA-SA and SA-SA, where the only difference is the learning condition,
shows greater levels of location memory in the SA-SA condition in comparison
to the PSA-SA condition. This suggests that the PSA learning contingency has
a detrimental impact on location memory performance. Together these findings
strengthen the proposition that the positive influence of DA-cueing (i.e., PSA-
SA<PSA-DA) may be counteracted by the detriment induced by PSA learning
(PSA-SA<SA-SA) and result in equal performance between one and two spatial
memories (i.e., PSA-DA = SA-SA).
6.4 General discussion
There are two findings in this thesis which are in stark contrast to the idea of
exclusive processing. Together these findings isolate different stages of spatial
information processing (e.g., encoding and retreival) as potential explanations
for the performance levels consistently observed in this thesis and that of pre-
vious work. This chapter contributes to findings from Experiment 4 which
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together highlight the improbability that strict exclusive processing is occur-
ring at either encoding or retreival. This chapter specifically contributes to an
alternative explanation which suggests the encoding of two spatial memories
has a tangible and impact upon the spatial information contained within each
memory. Specifically, it isolates the PSA-encoding condition as the most likely
site for memory degradation.
6.4.1 Paired memory encoding detriment
The findings from this chapter make an important contribution to testing the
robustness of exclusivity as a model of multiple spatial memory performance. It
is evident from Experiments 4 and 5 that exclusivity has a problem explaining
why in some circumstances dual-cueing (DA) of memories offers a significant
benefit. The current chapter examined this further and suggests another possi-
bility that would account for single and multiple memory performance.
The findings from Experiment 7a and 7b implicate the encoding of related spa-
tial memories as the stage at which performance detriment occurs. Both ex-
periments show that if the encoding stage is held constant (i.e., PSA), then
dual-cueing offers an advantage over separate single anchor cueing (SA). Ex-
periment 7b also shows that single memory encoding (SA-encoding) avoids the
problems of paired memory encoding (PSA-encoding). This adds further weight
to the argument that the encoding of two memories is responsible for the perfor-
mance levels that have been observed between PSA-DA and SA-SA. Although
the mechanisms that are responsible for a detriment from PSA-encoding are
still unclear, it is likely to stem from some kind of interference from encoding
two memories which are regarded as distinct units.
In Experiment 1 of Baguley et al. (2006) they showed that repeated expo-
sure of the same anchor-target relation improved performance. The important
difference between Experiment 1 from Baguley et al. (2006) and the current
experiment (either 7a or 7b) is that in the current experiments the anchor/cue
differed every time the target was presented (i.e., PSA), whereas in (Baguley et
al., 2006) the anchor-target presentation remained identical. This suggests that
the number of presentations in the PSA-encoding condition are not a contribut-
ing factor to location memory detriment for PSA-encoding. This highlights
that the cause of interference in PSA-encoding is the changing of the cues be-
tween each viewing of the target. This suggests that when individuals encode
two related spatial memories they encode them as distinct units of information,
otherwise similar results to Baguley et al. (2006) would be expected and the
PSA-encoding condition would prove to be a slight advantage. This means that
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interference between distinct or incompatible elements of each paired memory
are likely to be responsible for the PSA-encoding detriment. Considering the
components which differ between related memories this interference may well
stem from how spatial information is stored in vector form (i.e., direction and
magnitude of space). In other words, during some point in the encoding of two
related memories the absolute quantities of space (i.e., large vs. small) and
direction (i.e., left->right vs. right->left) interfere and result in degradation of
the quality of information stored in each memory.
6.5 Conclusions
These findings suggest that if exclusivity is to remain as a dominant model of
location memory it must explain why in some circumstances dual-cueing offers
an advantage over separate single anchor cueing. If only one memory is retrieved
then concurrent cueing of both memories should have no impact on performance
compared with single anchor cueing. On the other hand, any new model must
account for the decrease in performance when compared with only one memory.
The results show that having categorically related anchor points does not help
to prompt one memory from the other by categorical prompting alone. This
would be in line with the idea that two memories are retrievable but are held
in distinct representations which prevents the cueing of another memory from a
different representation. This is also supported from the findings of Experiment
1 of Baguley et al. (2006) which showed repetition of anchor-target relations
to improve memory. Thus, if paired related memories are considered one and
the same then a similar performance gain should be observed in the current
experiments which it was not. This suggests that related memories are stored
as distinct units even though they share a common target object. Addition-
ally, that the distinction of each memory (perhaps magnitude or direction) may
become interfering factors when attempting to encode two memories which are
related via a common target object.
This chapter adds further support to the idea that exclusivity as a model might
not be entirely appropriate as to account for all the findings of this thesis. There
are a number of results which implicate the possibility of different underlying
mechanism that may be occurring other than exclusive processing. However,
these findings also imply a reason why exclusive processing is preferred. If
interference is inherent with encoding two spatial memories from different per-
spectives (perhaps stemming from a change in cue) then any strategy to avoid
this interference (i.e., encode only one memory) would be effective. This sug-
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gests that a reformulation of the exclusivity model may be required or a new
model proposed. This does not dismiss the idea that both strategies (i.e., exclu-
sive processing or degraded join memory processing) are employed as and when
required.
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Chapter 7
Conclusion
This thesis aimed to explore how related sources of spatial information interact
and provide an estimation for an object’s location. It began with the assump-
tion that exclusive processing may be a component of spatial memory. This is
inherently interesting for a number of reasons. First, the processing of spatial
information exclusively is counterintuitive with respect to how individuals recol-
lect their spatial environment, that which appears as a coherent and malleable
representation. Therefore, it is rare to be presented with the opportunity to
study a phenomenon that is in stark contrast to personal experience. Second,
it offers an example of a process that appears to be at a functional junction
between effectiveness and accuracy. At first glance exclusivity seems primarily
to hinder the retrieval of spatial information. However, as with many processes
that appear maladaptive there quite often lies an economical rationale in their
presence (e.g., forming stereotypes or spatial biases based on hierarchy). This
is motivation enough to pursue a line of enquiry into the role of exclusivity in
human spatial memory.
This thesis set forth a number of empirically grounded means with which to
overcome exclusive processing. However, exclusivity as a model has largely
remained resistant to such manipulations. Thus, the initial objective may well
have been to overcome exclusivity, but a body of evidence is mounting which
suggests an exclusivity model can account for the mechanisms that underlie
the processing of multiple objects. This thesis not only provides evidence of the
robust nature of the exclusivity model but also how objects are learnt over time,
the influence of expertise processing, and the influence of semantic information
on location memory. The findings also give grounds to propose an alternative
theoretical account of exclusivity which offers the field testable predictions for
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future endeavour.
This chapter will take the following format. First, it will summarise and discuss
the implications of the current findings in light of spatial memory generally.
Second, it will focus on the evidence in support of exclusivity and the role it
may play in object-location memory. Third, it will highlight the evidence that
does not fit with the idea of exclusive processing and propose a brief sketch of
an alternative model.
7.1 Summary of all experimental findings
The first part of this discussion will aim to bring together the totality of the find-
ings that compile this thesis. This is a good opportunity to provide a diagram-
matic overview comparing all experimental results. This is easily achievable due
to the consistent nature in which location memory performance has been mea-
sured. Thus, a forest plot has been constructed showing the mean differences
in location memory performance (Dscore) between the PSA-DA condition and
a range of comparative conditions. Each comparative condition is highlighted
to the right of each experiment (see Figure 7.1). The dotted line represents a
no effects line reflecting no difference between mean Dscore. Each square rep-
resents the size and direction of the difference between mean Dscore (i.e., effect
size) across experimental conditions.
As can be seen from the graph there is moderate variation across the range of
experiments carried out. Experiment 5 and Experiments 7a and 7b show the
largest effect sizes that deviate from the no effect line. However, the trend across
the majority of experiments suggests no major deviation from exclusivity, sup-
porting previous findings (Baguley et al., 2006). To sum up, under the typical
design for testing exclusivity (PSA-DA vs. SA-SA) no individual experiment
showed a clear advantage of two memories for an object’s location over one.
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Figure 7.1: Forest plot showing effect sizes (difference between mean Dscore for
PSA-DA vs. SA-SA; PSA-PSA; PSA-SA) across all experiments. The difference
in Dscores is presented to the right of the graph with corresponding SE. The
dotted line represents no difference between means (i.e., exclusivity). Plots to
the right of this line indicate larger effect sizes.
7.2 Discussion of the finding in light of spatial
memory generally
This section summarises the findings in light of spatial memory generally. It
does not focus on exclusivity or the encoding and retrieval of two spatial memo-
ries, but rather how the findings contribute to the broader literature on spatial
memory. Within this section the ideas of automaticity of spatial information,
precision for object location over time, and the role of semantic information for
spatial memory enhancement are discussed.
7.2.1 The role of automaticity in coding spatial information
This thesis provides evidence that spatial information is not processed auto-
matically. According to Hasher and Zack’s (1979) criteria a process can only
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be considered automatic if it is not impacted by attentional limits. It was ev-
ident throughout this research that location memory and therefore the coding
of spatial information is significantly dependent upon availability of resources.
Experiment 1 demonstrated a trade-off effect between recalling location or con-
tent information with regards to a target object. This, it was argued, was a
consequence of employing a large quantity of text that had to be attended to
for purpose of later recall (i.e., because it acted as a cue at test). The high level
of cognitive capacity used to memorising the text led to a trade-off between
recalling the identity or location of the object.
This is not to say that no information was encoded for location when an ob-
ject’s identity was recalled but rather one element (i.e., location) was recalled
at a cost to the other (i.e., object identity). This indicates that effort of pro-
cessing had a significant impact upon the quality of recall. In this instance it
may have prevented binding of what/where information in working memory.
The method of quantifying location memory employed in this thesis allowed
for such interpretation. For instance, location memory was assumed to take a
continuum form where it could vary from being exact to inexact. This meant
that the amount or quality of spatial information that has been encoded could
be assessed across memories. In much of the previous research location mem-
ory was assessed solely on the proportion of correct responses (e.g., Mandler
& Parker, 1976). Applying correct responses as a means to measure location
memory could potentially obscure an ability to capture location information.
Thus, the current findings not only demonstrate that location information is
dependent on processing effort but also that a finite amount of resources need
to be available to bind features of that object and determine the quality of
stored spatial and non-spatial information.
This is interesting because it suggests that only when resources are available
and allow for the binding of object features (probably in working memory) can
those features act together to enhance recall of other features of the object.
For example, if binding does not take place cueing with one feature does not
automatically cue all other features. It also suggests that features of an object
can be encoded with varying levels of strength (strength here relates to the
ratio of probability of recall to accuracy) and the degree of strength for each
component is dependent upon availability of resources at encoding.
Another contention with regards to the automatic encoding of spatial informa-
tion is whether practice effects should be evident. If a process is thought to be
automatic then practice should not influence its performance (Hasher & Zacks,
1979). The findings from Experiments 5 and 6 provide strong evidence that spa-
tial information can be dramatically improved upon through practice. If spatial
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information was encoded without effort then the initial level of performance
(e.g., for day 1) would remain constant over the entirety of the learning period.
However, the results from both learning experiments show steep improvements
in recalling location information. The absence of learning in the non-learning
condition of Experiment 5 adds weight to the idea that it is the coding of spatial
information that is being improved upon rather than familiarity of the task.
These findings indicate that although some (probably more coarse) estimations
of space may be encoded with little effort, in order for fine-grain estimations to
occur effort is certainly required. This point highlights that when assessing such
characteristics as spatial coding automaticity, the nature of the task (and the ca-
pacity of the response measure to discriminate between levels of precision) really
determine the level of effort required to make a spatial judgement. For example,
given a task where only coarse levels of location accuracy can be discriminated
(owing to the method of measurement), one would expect perfectly acceptable
location responses with minimal effort. However, if the measurement method al-
lows for discrimination between the finest levels of location judgement then one
would expect more effort is required to make such estimations. In essence, this
highlights that location memory precision and availability of resources/effort
are related on some continuous level.
It is clear that practice has a striking impact on location memory performance.
General models of practice effects have been proposed (e.g., Logan & Schulkind,
2000 and Rickard, 1997) which argue that as practice progresses the need for
algorithmic computations for retrieval are reduced through the process of direct
memory retrieval. More specific to object location memory, Dynamic Fields
Theory (DFT) states that neurons in working memory specify spatial informa-
tion over time due to activation of neighbouring neurons (Spencer et al., 2001,
2007; Schutte et al., 2003; Schutte & Spencer, 2009). Through repeated ex-
posure, excitation of neurons becomes self-sustaining, precluding the need for
continuous presentation of the stimuli. Thus, the neurons in working memory
leave a transient firing trace in long-term memory. As this process is iterated
neuronal firings become less coarse and more precise. This suggests that ini-
tially spatial information is represented with limited precision and that this
precision is gradually increased over time. Although the mechanisms behind
practice and spatial memory have not directly been examined in the thesis, how
spatial memory increases over time has been investigated. Specifically, a num-
ber of experiments sought to provide insights into the allocation of resources
across multiple objects over time. The results of this analysis are agreeable
with neuronal models. These findings are discussed in the next section.
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7.2.2 How are multiple object locations learnt over time?
Through the modeling of confusion matrices it was possible, arguably for the
first time, to assess how memory precision for multiple objects evolves through
repeated exposure. The results from Experiment 6 demonstrate that over a ten
day learning period precision arises in roughly equal increments across all target
objects. This begs the question of why might learning evolve in this way?
There are a number of possible explanations for this. One explanation is that
it could reflect the limits of encoding fidelity upon a single viewing of an object
under the current design (i.e., time constraints). That is, the level of precision
the task allows for upon each viewing of the object. It is most likely that the
level of resources available for coding spatial information will determine the
level of stored precision from each stimulus exposure. Hence, if the availability
of resources is high enough, multiple objects may be encoded exactly with just
a single exposure. In the situations when exact encoding is not possible the rate
of improvement will vary across different tasks, however the incremental process
may not change. For example, in a task where longer viewing time is allowed,
each stimuli exposure may result in higher levels of precision per viewing and
thus aggregation of an approximation to exactness would develop at a faster
rate. Thus, with each viewing granularity of coordinate information may be
superimposed upon the previous day’s memory trace. Over time this may act
in a cumulative manner which results in the kind of development of precision
observed in Experiment 6 (see Dynamic Fields Theory in the previous section).
The speed at which increments in precision progress is therefore determined
by the availability of resources. This suggests that incremental-type learning
evolves out of necessity in situations where certain factors preclude encoding
exact location. These factors could be anything that affects the amount of
available resources for processing an object. An example of this would be the
number of objects that are to be recalled. Research shows that as the size
of an object array increases, subsequent location accuracy decreases (Shadoin
& Ellis, 1992). The literature also shows that spatial information can quite
often be represented in an organisational manner that leads to biases (Hirtle &
Jonides, 1985; Stevens & Coupe, 1978). This suggests that the opportunity to
process an object exactly on one occasion rarely arises in everyday exposure to
multiple objects. On the other hand, with successive viewings of a single object
such biases can be rectified by accessing an existing representation and matching
that to an object’s actual location. There is neurological support for this idea
in the form of place cells, where a neuron only fires in a specific location. Upon
revising that location a ‘neuron matching’ occurs between current firing rates
147
and previous firing rates (O’Keefe & Dostrovsky, 1971; O’Keefe & Nadel, 1979).
The benefits of repeated retrieval for long-term memory retention is also well
established in the behavioural literature (Roediger, 2000; Karpicke & Roediger,
2007). This emphasises the importance of retrieving existing spatial information
as a mechanism for building more precise location memories over time.
It is argued that because object locations are often encoded as inexact a sce-
nario with multiple to-be-remembered objects would benefit from an incremental
strategy. The alternative is to focus on a select number of objects which will be
a waste of resources because of distortions that are inherent with object location
generally. Thus, it might be more prudent to spread resources across a number
of objects and rely on repeated exposure to resolve inaccuracies implicit in en-
coding. In essence, given the general inexactness of object-location memory an
incremental strategy is required when multiple objects are encoded.
The incremental nature of spatial precision also implies that capacity is shared
amongst objects. On the presentation of multiple objects it appears more pru-
dent to encode a limited amount of spatial information for each object than a
greater amount for fewer objects. This is probably because with the alternative
strategy (i.e., encoding a few items with great precision) there is a cost of im-
pairment to all other objects. The application of an incremental strategy may
be effective because it reduces the risks of making extreme errors. This would
be beneficial in situations when uncertainty with regards to the importance of
each item is a factor. For example, if an individual had to process a collection
of objects with no obvious goal (as in the current experiments) then it is wise
to make sure at least some information is available for each object in case one
of those objects turns out to be of importance post hoc.
This idea is strengthened by the type of experimental design employed in this
thesis. Subjects are expecting to recall information with regards to all objects
so it would be a maladaptive strategy just to remember a few items more ac-
curately. Of course, under the current paradigm all memories are averaged and
therefore this strategy does not offer any specific advantage. However, subjects
are not made aware of such calculations. As far as the participants are con-
cerned they are being tested for their memory of each object from a series of
objects.
The ideas relating to incremental learning strategies suggest that task factors
can influence the rate of precision development over time. Hence, if more precise
location information can be processed on one exposure then the rate of precision
increments will increase compared with a situation where only small amounts of
spatial information are available. This highlights that factors pertaining to the
148
learning context can impact general capacity to encode location information.
This idea is strongly supported by the findings of this thesis. The next section
highlights such factors. Specifically, it focuses on the role of semantic content
of the learning context and spatial memory performance generally.
7.2.3 How do semantics lead to improvements in spatial
memory accuracy?
Although the overall findings of this thesis show no significant benefit of seman-
tics in overcoming exclusivity, they do show improvements for general location
memory. The results show that enhancement of certain semantic aspects of the
stimuli typically have a positive effect on location memory performance.
In Experiment 1 participants were presented with either English or Turkish
sentences as stimuli. Owing to the similarity in the characters used for each
language (i.e., a Latin based alphabet), the only varying factor was the se-
mantic content. The findings showed significantly better recall when the par-
ticipants viewed English sentences than when they viewed Turkish sentences.
English stimuli could have offered a number of benefits for the participants,
such as a richness of processing (Craik & Lockhart, 1972). More specifically
to spatial memory, the processing of semantically rich stimuli may allow the
spatial component of the visual array to be better integrated into the memory
trace. Thus, when processing English sentences existing schemas in LTM can
be drawn on (Chase & Simon, 1973). An existing schema could be a single
word from the sentence that has some prior salient meaning for the partici-
pant. The introduction of semantic content may allow the object along with
corresponding location information to be integrated into information that was
more likely to be recalled owing to a pre established knowledge base of English
words (i.e., lexicon). Thus, the English sentences’ primary advantage in com-
parison to the Turkish sentences was that the semantic content of the English
sentence allowed for stronger retrieval pathways (via pre-existing knowledge) for
the encoded information. This advantage also must apply to information that
is encoded alongside the semantic information (i.e., an object’s location).
As the experiments progressed semantic content was applied in more elabo-
rate ways, resulting in parallel gains for spatial location memory. Although
semantic information was employed in different ways in Experiments 2 and 3,
arguably they benefited from the same mechanisms; that of memory distinctive-
ness. Experiment 2 employed nursery rhymes which meant that each memory
for a target object was associated with a different nursery rhyme. Inevitably,
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the components that distinguished the nursery rhymes from each other (e.g.,
semantic theme and words) also distinguished each memory from one another.
This meant any information that was encoded alongside the semantic content
also became more distinct.
A similar semantic advantage was apparent in Experiment 3 where the anchor
points were made up of single words sampled from unique semantic categories
(e.g., types of musical instrument). Here the distinctiveness was contained solely
within the anchor point. Thus, unlike Experiment 2 there was no information
associated with the target object other than one word, which made up the
entirety of the cue. Owning to the significant performance gains seen in Ex-
periment 3 compared with Experiment 2, this suggests that a crucial feature
that benefits from distinctiveness is the anchor point. This indicates that the
benefit of distinctiveness lies in the retrieval cues’ ability to prompt recall of
the correct target object. This is presumably because recognition of the anchor
is the primary means of object retrieval. Only after an anchor point has cued
retrieval is the distinctiveness of the object valuable. Thus, if interference be-
tween anchor points occurs resulting in an identification failure at test, there
is no possibility of target recall at all. Memory distinctiveness has consistently
been shown to aid in memory performance for a number of different types of
information (Geraci et al., 2009; Bireta et al., 2008; Conrad & Hull, 1964), it
appears spatial information is no exception to this.
These collection of findings suggest two mechanisms that underlie the benefits
of semantic content in spatial memory. First, the integration of spatial and
semantic information at the point of encoding (Vogel et al., 2001) allows for
stronger retrieval pathways via pre existing semantic knowledge in long term
memory. This presumably triggers information contained within a memory
trace, a component of which is location. Second, semantic information helps
to distinguish between memories regarding an object’s location (anchor point
distinction being of primary importance followed by target distinction). The
corollary of memory distinctiveness is a reduction in memory interference.1 The
anchor point is also emphasised as a feature of the visual array that benefits in
particular, namely because of its role in cueing object information at retrieval.
1It is not proposed (at this point) that interference is a consequence of any particular
component of a memory unit, instead it is suggested that such interference may arise from
many factors, semantic content being just one. In essence such interference is the converse of
distinctiveness. It is also worth noting that distinguishing between related spatial memories
is more complicated (discussed above) because it involves a common object.
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7.3 Discussion of the finding in light of exclusivity
This section summarises the findings in light of exclusive processing specifically.
It focuses on exclusivity and the encoding and retrieval of two spatial memories
in light of the findings.
7.3.1 Expertise and exclusivity
Prompted by one study that has implicated expertise as a means of overcoming
exclusivity (Harding, 2006), the current research sought to expand this idea
further. Although the original study suffered from a number of methodological
weaknesses (e.g., small sample size, small effect size), it provided a plausible
starting point from which to scrutinise exclusivity further. The overall findings
from this investigation are in contrast to the previous work. This is not to say
the expertise employed in previous work does not offer some advantage that was
not initiated under the current work. What the current research does provide
however, is evidence that expertise processing in the form of text expertise is
not enough to circumvent any limitations of the memory system that might be
contributing to exclusivity. Additionally, subsequent experiments carried out in
this thesis, those not specifically related to expertise, attest to the robustness
of exclusivity. This makes it more probable that the previous work on expertise
may well be the result of spurious findings.
Experiment 1 employed stimuli that are processed with little effort and in a
holistic manner (e.g., text). However, it was clear that the effortlessness typi-
cally associated with text processing hindered location memory. Although text
is processed easily, the recollection of text is a more arduous task. Experiment
2 however ensured that the memorisation of text was not needed (by employing
highly familiar sentences). This offered the benefit of holistic text processing
(i.e., expertise) but also reduced the amount of information (i.e., load) to be
encoded for later recall. This meant that load could be reduced isolating the
effect of expertise processing in a more reliable manner and one that would be
more in line with previous work using musical stimuli. The null effect of exper-
tise even after a reduction in load suggests, at least, that expertise processing in
this instance cannot be generalised to spatial information. It also suggests that
the general benefits of possessing expertise may not be transferable across mul-
tiple features of the stimuli. Hence, although reading is regarded as an effortless
process and involves the coding of some spatial information (i.e., distance be-
tween letters and words), other elements introduced to the stimuli may not be
processed in the same effortless manner (i.e., the location of a Greek symbol
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placed above the text).
Research shows that levels of expertise can be a crucial factor in determin-
ing the benefits such as chunking, holistic, and effortless processing. Bilalic,
McLeod, and Gobet (2008) found experts’ abilities to differ substantially from
non-experts’ but only with the greatest level of expertise. They found that
medium-level expert attainment can sometimes harm processing capabilities by
limiting their flexibility to problem solve. On the other hand extreme levels
of expertise can block the recognition of other lower-order relations. For ex-
ample, Gobet and Simon (1996) showed that expert chess players were poorer
at recalling chess configurations when the configuration was random. This was
attributed to a collection of pre-existing templates of chess configurations that
were interfering with the encoding of a random configuration. Thus, it is quite
possible that text expertise led to a greater ability to recognise a sentence as be-
ing a whole unit but this concealed lower-order information (i.e., the elements
making up each memory) such as the location of the object. The literature
highlighted above also illustrates the delicate balance between having too much
expertise and not having quite enough. This reiterates the limited circumstances
in which expertise may offer advantages.
7.3.2 Semantics and exclusivity
One hypothesis as to exclusivity’s presence is that some form of retrieval block-
ing may have been occurring. This was tested through the application of pre-
vious findings concerning parallel and serial processing (Logan & Schulkind,
2000; Rohrer & Pashler, 1998). These findings highlight the possibility that
an information bottleneck may be responsible for retrieval blocking (Carrier &
Pashler, 1995; Rickard & Bajic, 2004). This idea proposes that there is a central
processor that has limited capacity and is involved in dictating the amount of
information passed from memory. The relieving of additional effort inherent in
retrieving information from distinct categories has been shown to overcome such
bottlenecks (Rohrer & Pashler, 1998; Logan & Schulkind, 2000). This is due to
the freeing up of processing capacity that is usually consumed by such periph-
eral capacities as switching (Nino & Rickard, 2003). Thus, if concurrent cueing
of spatial memories was responsible for a bottleneck type effect, then freeing
up processing capacity may have helped to overcome any retrieval blocking of
spatial information.
Semantic categories were employed to alleviate any information bottlenecks in
the retrieval of multiple memories. Specifically, the use of semantic categories
reduced any extra processing load by allowing both memories to be stored in
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the same semantic category. Thus, two anchor points related to the same target
object shared a common category. This meant that although each representation
of an object’s location was encoded on separate occasions, both memories would
be stored within the same semantically defined memory unit. The findings from
Experiment 3 in particular suggest that this approach was not successful in
overcoming exclusivity. It is argued on the grounds of these findings that limited
capacity of retrieval processing does not prevent the retrieval of more than one
spatial memory, resulting in exclusivity.
Based on these findings it is put forward that exclusivity may not be a conse-
quence of capacity limitations per se. In other words, it is not likely that two
memories are wanted to be retrieved or integrated but are prevented in doing
so owing to a finite capacity of the cognitive system. However, instead of being
capacity driven there is a possibility that exclusive processing may be strategy
driven. This would make exclusivity the result not of a cognitive capacity fail-
ure but rather a frugal higher-level strategy. That is, for some purpose not yet
considered, exclusive processing may prove profitable. Any costs incurred from
exclusive processing may lead to gains elsewhere such as memory strength or
robustness through the avoidance of interference.
This is an important point as this possibility has not yet been considered else-
where in the literature. Often for a process to be considered efficient it must
have some advantage that outweighs any expense. It is assumed that exclusive
processing incurs a cost by way of potential memory accuracy (i.e., if integration
takes place). However, whether this cost is counteracted elsewhere which offers
advantages greater than those incurred through exclusive processing is of great
interest. Recent findings show that processes can be preferred not because they
yield the most accurate or fastest results, but simply because they require the
least amount of mental effort (Lehle, Steinhauser, & Huebner, 2009; Huebner &
Lehle, 2007). Thus, if the effort of retrieving two spatial memories is outweighed
by the potential gains in location memory accuracy then a preferred strategy
would be just to retrieve one memory whose level of accuracy is adequate enough
for a given task.
7.3.3 Learning and exclusivity
A learning experiment is an extremely powerful tool for testing the resilience of
exclusivity. Owing to the role of repeated exposure in spatial memory integra-
tion it was a crucial avenue of investigation (Ellen et al., 1982, 1984; Sawa et
al., 2005; Blaisdell & Cook, 2005; Tolman, 1948; Poucet, 1993). Not only does
repeated exposure offer familiarity with the stimuli generally but importantly it
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allows individuals to become familiar with the spatial relations that are integral
to the stimuli. Learning also offers a reduction of reliance on working memory
(Garavan, Ross, Li, & Stein, 2000). Owing to the temporal nature of learning,
opportunities for consolidation such as sleep were also available (Ellenbogen et
al., 2007). More obvious advantages are apparent in that every time a partici-
pant is presented with a two memory test condition (DA-cueing) they are able
to view the correct combination of anchor points. This would have been evident
at the test stage for all trials every day.
Despite all of the aforementioned advantages, the findings show no advantage
for holding two spatial memories over one. This indicates that if memories are
acting exclusively, this is not a consequence of a lack of exposure to the stimuli
or not enough time to develop resources amenable to non-exclusive processing.
There are a number of possibilities as to why this is the case. It is possible that
the encoded spatial information is still represented in a sensory-like form as
hypothesized by Baguley et al. (2006). Remaining in such a form may prevent
more abstract manipulation of each memory in a way that enables aggregation.
This could be attributable to the length of time employed in the experiments.
Research using animals has shown integration is not evident until several months
after initial stimuli exposure (Blaisdell & Cook, 2005; Garling et al., 1983).
However, evidence from humans shows integration is quite possible using time
periods much shorter than those of the current experiments (Molet et al., 2011,
2012; Escobar et al., 2001). Thus, the length of time can probably be discounted
as a factor not allowing for non-exclusive processing.
Not only do the findings provide no evidence of integration but also they do not
demonstrate any evidence for independence. The independence model proposes
that two memories are available but they are not selected in any kind of benefi-
cial way. Thus, any advantage for holding independent spatial memories stems
from the increased probability of retrieving at least one memory compared with
exclusivity where only one memory can be relied upon in total. This is quite a
sobering finding and suggests that in the event of repeated exposure to related
anchor-target relations two memories are still not accessed, even independently.
The findings from the learning experiments clearly show no signs of non-
exclusivity. However, what is of great interest is that even under potential
conditions of exclusivity, learning is still able to progress. What is more, exclu-
sive processing seems to allow for a progression of accuracy (i.e., learning) at
the same rate as that of a single memory. This suggests that whatever factor is
determining the retrieval of one exclusive memory that factor is systematically
applied each day during the learning period (i.e., the same memory is selected
each day), else learning might not develop at the same rate as one memory.
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For example, if individuals switched between memories each day then plausibly
precision would only increase at half the rate to that of a single memory where
the same memory has to be selected each day because it is the only available
memory. However, an interesting alternative strategy is to encode information
from both memories (in a fragmentary type manner). In such a case the quality
of information encoded from each memory is perhaps reduced but this strat-
egy has the advantage that twice as many cues are available at test. Such a
strategy must store multiple traces of information for each target that are made
available at recall (this alternative strategy is discussed later in the guise of a
fragmentation account).
7.4 An exclusivity account of object-location
memory
The consistent lack of evidence from expertise, semantics, and learning to sup-
port non-exclusivity leaves two plausible scenarios regarding exclusivity and
object location memory. One, exclusivity is a resilient component of object-
location memory where only one memory can or is relied upon. Two, a different
type of processing might be occurring and thus accounting for the observed
levels of performance. The first type of processing (exclusive) will be discussed
below. A second possibility of processing (fragmentary) will be addressed later.
If exclusivity is to be considered a robust feature of object-location memory,
its presence must be justified. Thus, why might exclusivity be occurring? The
findings from this thesis support the notion that exclusivity is not occurring as a
result of a cognitive capacity deficit preventing non-exclusivity. In other words,
it is not likely that individuals are attempting something other than exclusive
processing (i.e., integration) but cannot because capacity does not allow for it.
However, it seems more in line with the findings that a strategy is implemented
owing to the effects of finite cognitive capacity. Exclusive processing may be
considered a top-down process dictated by a higher-order strategy rather than a
bottom-up capacity limitation. Processing load has been continuously reduced
via changes in the amount and type of information to be processed. Overloading
of retrieval information (i.e., a bottleneck) has been diminished. Working mem-
ory load has been reduced, and task complexity has been discounted. Together
this evidence indicates that the overloading of cognitive capacity, whether at
encoding or retrieval, is not responsible for exclusivity. This suggests that it
may not be the amount or type of information involved but rather how that
information is processed.
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According to a strong form of exclusivity, only one memory is encoded or re-
trieved. This allows for a number of different processing styles to account for
the findings under the remit of an exclusivity model. Given the range of en-
coding and retrieval presentations it is difficult and perhaps implausible to fit
a global exclusive processing strategy to every condition. It is argued that ex-
clusive processing may take many forms which adapt to the level of interference
and availability of resources according to encoding and cueing contexts. In the
next section a number of processing stages where exclusivity could take place
(encoding and retreival) are discussed as possible explanations of why exclusive
processing may take place.
7.4.1 Exclusive processing and interference avoidance
The overarching hypothesis presented here for exclusive processing is one of
interference avoidance. In turn, interference itself is proposed to be a result of
the manner in which spatial information is represented. This is in contrast to
exclusivity being a consequence of cognitive capacity limitations. The findings of
Experiment 7a and 7b indicate that interference is a result of the PSA-encoding
condition. Comparing the findings of Experiment 7a and 7b with Experiment
3 of Baguley et al. (2006) it is likely the PSA-encoding sees a decrement in
terms of performance owing to interference between viewing the same object
but in different contexts (i.e., with two different anchor points). Specifically,
Baguley et al. (2006) showed that if anchor-target relations were repeated small
performance gains were observed. Thus, the number of trials or presentations
cannot account for PSA-encoding decrement but rather the change in anchor
points between separate presentations of a target. The reason why different
anchor points might disrupt the encoding of spatial information is discussed
below.
In order to understand how spatial information is represented in a manner not
conducive to integration (i.e., non-exclusivity), it is useful to compare situa-
tions where different sources of non-spatial information lead to superadditive
performance levels (i.e., non-exclusive). The findings from Rubin and Wallace
(1989) point to an explanation of why superadditivity (or independence) is not
observed with spatial information. They show that two clues as to a target
word (i.e., ‘it rhymes with dead’ and ‘it’s a colour’) offer better recall of the
target word (i.e., red) than the sum of the two combined clues together. This
is attributable to the fact that each clue significantly narrows down the possi-
bilities as to the target’s identity. Hence both clues are ‘pointing’ to the same
piece of information for retrieval. Thus, if this was occurring in the current ex-
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periments then non-exclusivity would be observed. However, this was not found
which suggests that each related memory is considered as being distinct from
the other memory and together both memories may not ‘point’ to the same
piece of information (i.e., an object’s location).
The fundamental difference between the Rubin and Wallace (1989) example is
that the word ‘red’ is not dependent upon the cue to define it, unlike spatial
location. If ‘red’ were reliant on something to specify it, it would change de-
pending on what it was being cued by. For example, if ‘red’ presented together
with ‘banana’ led to the retrieval of ‘APPLE’ and ‘red’ presented together with
‘table’ led to the retrieval of ‘CHAIR’, then cueing with ‘banana’ and ‘table’
would create interference because it is unclear whether to retrieve ‘APPLE’ or
‘CHAIR’. In this instance the cue has defined what is in need of retrieval. The
nature of locations work in a similar way. Locations are not absolute but are
defined by a reference point. Thus, to cue an object in a location is to define
that object’s location. For instance, given two reference points positioned at
varying distances from a target will create two different definitions of that ob-
ject in terms of space. This means that each anchor-target relation contains a
unique source of information that points to a target location. Although there
might be a common feature pertaining to both anchor-target relations (i.e., the
objects’ identity), this is not the information that is being cued for. Rather, it
is the quantity of space that is needed in order to acquire the location of the
object (not the identity of the object itself). Since there are two cues for each
target object there are two distinct pathways (i.e., two quantities of space) which
share a common element. In essence, the difference in anchor points may create
interference because the spatial information contained within each memory is
unique and therefore incompatible with one other.
This explanation of interference is in line with the proposition that space is rep-
resented as a vector consisting of magnitude and direction information (Collett
et al., 1986; McNaughton et al., 1991; O’Keefe, 1991; Baguley et al., 2006). Ow-
ing to the design of the experiments contained within this thesis (i.e., having
anchor points either side to the left and right of the target object), this always
resulted in different magnitudes and direction contained within each memory.
For example, if a target was located in position 7, this would result in a left-
anchor memory comprising a magnitude of space of 6 units (i.e., 1-7) and a
direction of left to right. In comparison, a right-anchor memory would com-
prise a magnitude of space of 2 units (i.e., 7-9) and a direction of right to left.
This highlights an inconsistency of representational information that is unique
to spatial information in comparison to situations where non-exclusivity is ob-
served. Owing to the findings that implicate the encoding of spatial information
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as a potential point of memory degradation, it is plausible that the encoding
of unique yet related elements of space (i.e., magnitude, direction, and object
identity) are responsible for such degradation by way of interference. Exclu-
sive processing as a means of avoiding such interference is discussed in the next
section.
Avoiding interference at encoding
Exclusive processing can potentially prevent interference in the PSA-encoding
condition by encoding just one anchor point. The idea that only one memory
is encoded (encoding exclusivity) out of efficiency is in line with some of the
findings from this thesis. The results show that processing spatial information
with any accuracy is an effortful process. Specifically, the more effort involved
in encoding spatial information the better the recall accuracy will be. Experi-
ment 1 showed that the amount of resources available will often determine the
level of accuracy at which spatial information is stored. Owing to the heavy de-
mands of the stimuli (i.e., unfamiliar text) mixed with the act of processing two
memories, Experiment 1 showed that spatial information can be sacrificed for
other types of information (i.e., object identity). Thus, if resources are compro-
mised a trade-off arises which significantly reduces the quality of information
contained within a memory trace. Additionally, evidence from Experiment 5
and 6 shows that significant performance gains occur when exposure to spatial
information is repeated daily for a period of time. This suggests that the fine-
tuning of previously acquired information requires a large amount of time and
effort investment.
These findings indicate that a strategy that reduces load may also reduce inter-
ference and thus increase accuracy. Therefore, a strategy to reduce the effort in-
volved in discriminating between two similar memories (i.e., interference) might
play a fundamental role for encoding exclusivity. If resources are spread across
the encoding of two memories then the amount of information will be reduced
for some memories. Thus, exclusivity may have evolved to prevent the need
for resource-sharing between two effortful processes (i.e., the encoding of two
spatial memories) and reduce the potential for interference. This is a prudent
strategy if individuals are able to easily recognise that two parts of a pair of
related memories share a common target.
Findings from Experiments 2 and 3 where the connection between related anchor
points was strengthened showed performance gains for the PSA-DA condition
compared with the performance of PSA-DA in Experiment 1 (i.e., with weaker
connections between anchor points). This increase could be attributed to the
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fact individuals can recognise that two memories are related and therefore can
discount one of the memories as being redundant. In essence, the benefit of
introducing distinctive pairs of anchor points may be one of allowing for re-
dundancy, not integration. More specifically, being able to recognise that two
anchor points are related increases the awareness of their incompatibility and
potential interference.2 This means that an individual can focus on encoding
one of the memories because they are aware that either one will provide enough
information as to the target’s location. Additionally, the encoding of a second
memory will double the amount of mental effort which will increase load of re-
sources such as working memory capacity and result in deterioration of memory
quality. The application of such a strategy creates one more robust memory
resulting in similar performance to that of a single spatial memory.
Exclusive processing can account for the finding that PSA-DA outperforms
PSA-SA. In line with the above explanation that only one memory is encoded
to avoid interference, the removal of a cue at test will predict a decrease in
performance in the PSA-SA condition compared with PSA-DA. For example, in
the PSA-DA condition it does not matter which memory is encoded, both are
available at test to cue which ever memory has been encoded. Whereas, in the
PSA-SA condition if only one memory is encoded and a random cue offered at
test there is a 50% probability that the cue at test was not the one encoded.
Exclusive processing of related pairs of spatial information could be considered
adaptive. Specifically, encoding exclusivity may prevent further decreases in
performance by avoiding any attempt to process a second incongruent memory.
In turn, this may increase the robustness of the memory that is stored.
Avoiding interference at retrieval
The second processing strategy is exclusive retrieval. In essence, this is where
only one memory (once encoded) is later recalled. When cued separately (i.e.,
PSA-cueing) both memories are shown to have been encoded, stored, and re-
trievable. This isolates concurrent cueing as the stage where retreival exclusivity
may take place. It also provokes the question of why when given two cues simul-
taneously for an object’s location individuals simply choose to retrieve one and
do not attempt the retrieval of a second memory, even though both memories
have been shown to be available? The findings from this thesis can provide
2This type of cue redundancy should be distinguished from that of Jones (1987) who states
if one cue is successful in retrieving a memory trace then so is the other, i.e., P(A or B) =
P(A). However, the term cue redundancy used in this thesis suggests that only one cue is
necessary because it is the only one associated with the memory trace. Thus, the presence of
a second is superfluous.
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a number of insights about what might be occurring at retreival. First, find-
ings suggest that concurrent cueing does not encourage exclusive processing
by straining capacity limits.3 Results from Experiment 4 and 5 show that the
reduction of load and increase in ease of parallel retreival do not improve perfor-
mance of two memories and therefore indicate that exclusivity is still apparent.
Second, exclusive retreival is more likely a consequence of the manner in which
spatial information is represented rather than a capacity issue. In other words,
there must be some kind of cost in retrieving a second memory that outweighs
the possibility that the second memory is more accurate. This suggests that
the retreival of a second memory may interfere with the already retrieved in-
formation from the first memory. Similarly, the already retrieved information
from the first memory may cause interference with information contained within
the second memory. Analogous to the hypothesized interference at encoding it
seems plausible that such an explanation of interference can equally be applied
to the retreival stage. Owing to the fact that both memories are represented
as distinct units of information yet share a common element, conflict in the
magnitude and direction of spatial information contained within each memory
may well be the cause of retreival interference. That is, once information has
been retrieved regarding one anchor point any attempt to retrieve further con-
flicting information from the second anchor point may be resisted due to the
potential interference or confusion between two incongruent sources of spatial
information.
Although the second memory may well be more accurate the cost of attempting
it’s retrieval, given that information has already been retrieved from a similar
yet different memory, may lead to degradation of both memories even further.
Thus, the preventing of the retrieval of a second memory means that at least one
memory remains in tacked (i.e., the first memory4). In other words, the amount
of interference (or confusion) from retrieving a second memory outweighs the
potential increase in accuracy a second memory may offer.5
In essence, the argument for exclusive retreival is based on the same idea of
interference avoidance as encoding exclusivity. Additionally, given the evidence
which shows both memories are retrievable when cued separately, this suggests
that both memories are encoded. This severely limits the possibility of exclu-
sive encoding and emphasises that if exclusivity is occurring it is most likely
happening at retreival and is a consequence of simultaneous cueing. In terms
3Experiments 4 & 5 also provide evidence that failed retrieval is not due to memory
blocking
4First in terms of retreival not encoding or presentation
5This strategy may also incorporate other factors such as mental effort, although interfer-
ence is considered as the primary motivation here.
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of the type of interference that is sought to be avoided, the level of potential
detriment to both memories upon retreival of the second most likely exceeds the
possibility that the second memory is more accurate.
7.4.2 Which memory is encoded or retrieved?
The previous explanations as to why only one memory is encoded or retrieved
does not offer any clarity regarding what determines access to one memory.
Based on the findings of Experiments 1, 2, 3, and 6, that show no difference
between the PSA-DA and SA-SA condition, the determining factor of which
memory is encoded or retrieved cannot be related to memory accuracy. If the
most accurate memory was accessed then performance equivalent to that esti-
mated by the independence model would be observed (i.e., PSA-DA performance
would be greater than SA-SA). Memory access must be determined by a com-
ponent that would not offer any increase in performance. Thus, on concurrent
presentation of each memory’s corresponding cue, one memory is retrieved based
on an encoded salient factor which has no connection with the accuracy of the
object. The primary component of the stimuli that offers any form of saliency
differential is the anchor points (seeing as the target is a common element no
distinction can be made between the two memories based on this). To encode a
memory by way of anchor saliency could be regarded as a wise strategy because
the anchor is the only element available to prompt retrieval of a memory at
test. It would after all be more reliable to focus encoding on an element of the
stimuli presentation that has the highest probability of retrieving the memory
and thus all the information therein (including spatial information). In the case
of the current design this salient feature is likely the anchor point at encoding
and hence cue at retrieval.
7.4.3 Section summary
Although exclusive processing is contrary to the idea of spatial integration
(Molet et al., 2012, 2011; Sturz et al., 2006; Blaisdell & Cook, 2005; Sawa
et al., 2005), it is clear that under certain circumstances mechanisms that bring
performance in line with exclusive processing may be the preferred manner in
which spatial information is processed. Exclusivity appears to be an efficient
mechanism on two levels. First, in the encoding of two spatial memories it
enables the avoidance of processing redundant information, reducing interfer-
ence. Also, owing to the manner with which spatial information is organised,
it avoids the cost of having to switch between distinct units. Such switching of
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course would only arise if two memories were encoded, which exclusive process-
ing avoids. It is also argued that the preference of memory selection (i.e, which
anchor-target relation is encoded and which one is made redundant) is based
on something other than memory accuracy. This is likely to be a feature of the
presentation that is most memorable to the individual (e.g., cue salience). This
is also a wise strategy because the anchor is the only retrieval pathway for the
target object. As to the question of integration, the strong effects of learning
on spatial memory accuracy question the incentive to resolve exclusivity and
therefore integrate information. Why increase the heavy burden of processing
and integrating two memories if the potential increase in performance is negli-
gible (i.e., outweighed by the costs)? The most plausible answer based on the
evidence is to treat each memory exclusively and encode or retrieve only one.
7.4.4 Is the exclusivity model still appropriate?
The previous section took the approach that exclusivity was a component of
spatial memory. This section highlights some findings which currently are dif-
ficult to explain assuming exclusivity. The majority of the findings contained
within this thesis supports the idea that two spatial memories are equal to one.
However, whether this equality can be completely explained through the notion
of exclusive processing is discussed. This section highlights the findings that are
incongruent with the idea of exclusive processing.
Although possible scenarios of exclusivity have been described above, there is
evidence which strongly suggests that exclusivity (at least in the strong form),
may not be accounting for the equal performance seen between one and two spa-
tial memories. The findings strongly suggest that exclusive encoding is not likely
to be taking place, as both memories are available at recall. This leaves exclu-
sive retrieval as the most plausible form of exclusive processing. However, there
is evidence which also questions the likelihood of exclusive retreival. The fact
that dual anchor cueing offers an advantage at recall signifies two things. First,
concurrent cueing does not appear to be the place where exclusive retreival is
occurring. If it were then cueing with each anchor on separate occasions would
result in greater memory performance because any disruption from concurrent
cueing is avoided. However, the evidence is in contrast to this and suggests that
concurrent cueing in fact offers an advantage and shows better levels of perfor-
mance in comparison to cueing each memory on separate occasions. Second, this
indicates that concurrent cueing allows information to be used in a beneficial
manner which unattainable for separate cueing. Taken with the above evidence
that both memories are available, this must mean that information from both
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memories is being used to make a location judgement and not only that but the
way in which this information is being used results in a more accurate judge-
ment than simply the average of those two memories if cued separately (as is
calculated for PSA-cueing conditions).
In summary, the probabilistic model (i.e., exclusivity model) which predicts per-
formance of two memories is equal to one is undeniably true and is supported
strongly by the findings of the experiments contained within this thesis. Cer-
tainly the idea that the average of two memories is equal to that of one memory
(i.e., this is what the exclusivity model states [memory 1 + memory 2 / 2 =
memory 1 | memory 2]) seems irrefutable. However, the process by which that
average is obtained is questionable. The interpretation of the model as exclusive
processing (i.e., either the encoding or retreival of only one of two possible mem-
ories) is therefore dubitable. Neither exclusive encoding nor exclusive retrieval
are consistent with all of the findings contained within this thesis. Some findings
support the idea of exclusive encoding or retreival whereas others are incongru-
ent with it. Most notably are the findings which show that information cued
by both anchor points is available at retrieval, suggesting both anchor-target
relations must have been encoded. This suggests exclusive encoding cannot be
occurring and consequently implicates concurrent cueing as a factor leading to
the possibility of exclusive retrieval (where the current cueing of both memories
results in blocking of one memory). However, given the findings which impli-
cate PSA-encoding as a detrimental stage of processing, if exclusive retrieval
were occurring and individuals were randomly selecting one memory at recall
then one would expect worse performance for two memories compared with one,
which is not observed. These inconsistencies with the idea of strictly exclusive
processing are formulated into a theoretical model as set out in the next section.
7.5 A fragmentation account of object-location
memory
This next section sketches an alternative model to that of exclusivity. This
model is different to exclusivity because it states that two memories can both
be encoded and retrieved. Exclusivity, it is argued, may arise out of efficiency
to avoid the encoding or retrieval of information that causes interference and
reduces memory performance. In contrast, a fragmentation account assumes
both memories are degraded by interference but are available for recall. The
fragmentation account is similar to the exclusivity model in that it supports the
notion that two memories are not better than one. However, it also extends this
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and proposes that potentially they could be better than one.
The underpinnings of a fragmentation account do not stem from the question,
why is exclusivity occurring? but rather, how can an individual comparatively
process twice as much information, yet perform the same? In essence, this is
what is happening in the PSA-DA condition compared to the SA-SA condition.
The core of the fragmentation account relies on the idea that fragments of
information are stored from multiple related memories. Such fragments have
been shown to be available at retrieval, as demonstrated in Experiments 4 and
5. The fact that information pertaining to each cue is retrievable at test is
not surprising given evidence from previous research. For example, although
spatial information has been shown not to be encoded automatically (according
to Hasher and Zack’s (1979) criteria), it is clear that on most occasions some
spatial information is encoded incidentally (Logan, 1998; Ellis, 1990, 1991).
Even accepting that the quality of this information may well be poorer it is
still processed none-the-less. Thus, upon presentation of a visual stimulus some
spatial information will be encoded. If with the presentation of multiple anchor
points some spatial information is encoded regarding each one, this means that
two fragments regarding a single object’s location are available. It is the manner
with which fragments are utilised at recall that offer an explanation of 1) why
concurrent cueing is advantageous and 2) why two spatial memory performance
equals that of one spatial memory.
7.5.1 Problems with the exclusivity model
The exclusivity model assumes that the encoding of one spatial memory yields
equal levels of accuracy as the encoding of two spatial memories. That is, when
an individual learns an object’s location in relation to one anchor point they
learn it with the same level of accuracy as when they learn an object’s location
in relation to two separate anchor points. Under the exclusivity model the
expected performance for two memories is based on the observed performance of
one memory. This therefore assumes that the process of learning two memories
does not diminish the level of accuracy contained within those memories in
comparison to learning a single memory.
The evidence suggests that this assumption is incorrect and in fact the process
of learning two memories degrades the quality of information stored in each
memory. In this respect the exclusivity model may need reformulation. For
instance, when an individual learns a series of objects as the number of objects
increase the probability of recalling every object within that array decreases
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(Vogel et al., 2001; Luck & Vogel, 1997). This is simply because there is only
a limited number of objects one can encode and recall given a limited amount
of exposure. For example, taking a hypothetical scenario where individuals can
recall on average 7 items, if an individual were presented with 15 items one
would expect on average the recalling of around 7 items. However, this form
of measurement fails to capture occasions where individuals may ‘kind of know’
the correct item (but not to the point of absolute correctness).6 This example
highlights a unique facet of spatial information measurement which does not
overspill to areas of absolute recall ability (i.e., memory for objects). This
difference makes spatial information conducive to measurement on a continuum
which has the potential to lead to important insights.
The method employed in this thesis allows one to measure the amount of spatial
information contained within each memory and hence quantify ‘near-misses’.
This is important as it affords the assessment of not only absolute correctness
but also inexact information. This enables an examination of the distribution
of encoded spatial information across all memories not just correct ones. When
this information is examined it shows that by increasing the number of to-be-
remembered memories this significantly impacts upon the amount of information
(or degree of accuracy) contained within each memory (see Experiment 7b). In
essence, the findings show that information appears to be diluted across the total
number of to-be-remembered anchor-target relations (i.e., memories). Logically,
this makes sense. If an individual was shown 3 to-be-remembered anchor-target
relations the level of location information (i.e., accuracy) encoded with those
memories would be greater (on average) than if an individual were presented
with 6 anchor-target relations. Thus, the level of location information contained
within a memory is a function of the total number of anchor-target relations
(i.e., memories). The potential processes behind such dilution are expanded
upon in the next section.
7.5.2 Dilution across multiple spatial memories
Although the idea of spatial encoding dilution may appear to represent the
capacity limit of memory, it is argued that such dilution is more specifically
a consequence of interference (of which, capacity is determined by). After all,
the level of interference will have a functional relationship with the number
of objects, similar to that of general capacity. In other words, the more to-
6This is similar to what has occurred previously in the object-location literature (see
Naveh-Benjamin, 1987, 1988). That is, percentage of correct responses were considered an
adequate measure of memory ability. However, by using such a quantification occasions where
memory is good but just not correct are disregarded.
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be-remembered items (i.e., anchor-target relations) the increased likelihood of
making an encoding error due to interference with similar items.7
Previous research supports this idea and proposes that the quality of a response
may not be a consequence of limited memory capacity per se but rather the
accumulation of errors (Vogel et al., 2001). The predominate type of error un-
der the current design has been shown to be a result of encoding two related
yet distinct spatial representations (i.e., two memories with a common target
object). In this case errors are plausibly a consequence of the interference or
confusion from encoding incompatible vector information. Thus, if the discrim-
ination of items8 is a function of the number of items in the stimulus array
(Luck & Vogel, 1997), then an increase in the number of items will result in a
reduction in discrimination. Inevitably such a reduction would lead to a larger
accumulation of interference errors. Thus, in the context of encoding and stor-
ing memories regarding a common target’s location, the greater the number of
memories will equate to a respectively larger number of errors (or inversely a
dilution of information).
The idea of an accumulation of errors or dilution of information is quite an inter-
esting take on spatial memory. It suggests that capacity for spatial information
is limitless and that with the encoding of more incongruent vector information
comes the accumulation of more errors. Rather, what is limited is a finite num-
ber of object-location thresholds which return enough spatial information for
exact spatial judgements (to a required level of fidelity). That is, the accumula-
tion of errors for a certain number of object locations’9 is minimal as to produce
a response that corresponds with the encoded (or absolute) position of an object
in space (dictated by the level of measurement precision). In other words, some
objects are recalled exactly simply because the amount of errors is less than that
required for the response. For example, if an object were encoded to be located
in a room with few errors then that object may be recalled exactly in terms of
whether is was recalled as being in the correct room. However, if the response
demanded the position of the object within the room and the amount of errors
were greater than the precision required by the response, then the recalling of
7Some authors argue that interference and capacity are indistinguishable given that one’s
ability to recall items it’s highly related to their capacity to distinguish between items (Neath
et al., 2006; Neath & Brown, 2006, 2007). However, in the current research it is important
to differentiate between these two concepts as it is argued that the amount of information
is not responsible for the degradation but it is rather the type of information (i.e., spatial)
that creates interference. This is important because experimental manipulation (Exp. 3)
has altered the distinctiveness of non-spatial components of each memory (e.g., the semantic
content of the anchors) with no effect. This emphasises the interference caused by spatial
information contained within a memory specifically over information per se.
8items is defined as vector information
9This has been shown to be around 3-4 objects (Cowan, 2001; Cowan et al., 2005; Broad-
bent, 1971; Vogel et al., 2001)
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the target would be deemed as incorrect.
7.5.3 The additive effect of fragments at retreival
The fragmentation account proposes that the interference between encoding dif-
ferent yet related memories is not avoided but rather recompensed by relying
on both sources of information to re-construct an object’s location. The next
component of the fragmentation account focuses on how two diluted memo-
ries might work together at recall to produce a location estimate that is the
equivalent to a single non-diluted memory and better than cueing two diluted
memories separately.
An explanation for how fragments (or diluted memories) can work together
beneficially (i.e., demonstrated with DA-cueing advantage) comes from a multi-
trace account of memory (Hintzman, 1986). This account argues that only
traces of the individual episodes are stored and that aggregates of traces acting
in concert at the time of retrieval represent the category as a whole (Hintzman,
1986). Thus, DA-cueing activates more fragments pertaining to the location
of the object, in comparison to PSA-cueing which would only active fragments
associated with a single anchor point.
This is important as the activation of more fragments narrows down the pos-
sibilities regarding what information is required from remaining stores of frag-
ments.10 In other words, the benefit of simultaneous cueing may allow for higher
degrees of resolution of accumulative errors created at encoding. Owing to the
fact that error is arguably a result of vector information interference between
related memories, simultaneous cueing (i.e., DA-cueing) may allow for the res-
olution of more vector-related errors (resulting in greater levels of accuracy)
compared to single-cue presentation (i.e., PSA-cueing). In essence, being able
to draw on more memories at test may allow for the cancelling out of a greater
number of errors related to the target object, resulting in a more accurate loca-
tion response.
7.5.4 Long-term learning under fragmentation processing
Fragmentary processing may lead to long-term robustness of both memories.
Owing to the learning studies which clearly demonstrate performance increases
overtime, suggests that the level of interference could be resolved (or at least
10If one were to assume that each memory is made up of error and location information,
then the error associated with one memory may be counteracted with location information
from the second memory
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reduced) with repeated exposure. This would then leave two intact and useful
memories that can be drawn on with reduced encoding interference (maybe as
a consequence of reduced encoding effort). This would offer long-term bene-
fits of concurrent cueing in a manner that would surpass performance of only
one memory, much in the same way that verbal information has the ability to
demonstrate superadditivity (Rubin & Wallace, 1989).
In line with a fragmentation account, findings from Experiment 6 suggest that
information encoded for all anchor-target presentations is built up over time.
This is potentially a more robust strategy than exclusive processing as it reduces
the risk of making extreme errors (i.e., not having any information regarding
some items). This is prudent if small errors made for each memory can begin
to be resolved through learning and repeated exposure, as hypothesized previ-
ously. If this were the case then fragmentary processing would lead to having
two usable memories for an object’s location as opposed to one. This might
be beneficial in real life scenarios when objects employed as anchor points at
encoding are removed or change place at retreival (i.e., they cannot always be
relied upon). Therefore, to encode an object in relation to as many objects
as possible (even if only in a fragmentary type manner) may be beneficial in
situations of uncertainty.
Fragmentation processing may also offer long-term benefits in terms of eliminat-
ing wastage of information (as it uses information from both memories). The
impact of this loss of information is probably negligible in the initial stages of
learning (i.e., no differences between PSA-DA and SA-SA) but has the potential
to increase over time.
In terms of integration and how we build coherent representations of space, the
fragmentation account offers a unique view as to the processes that may under-
lie such representations. Aligned with the fragmentation account the process
of integration is not so much a feature of LTM consolidation where higher level
abstractions of information form an integrated unit through an off-line process.
In contrast, the fragmentation account is allied with the idea that integration
may well be an on-line process. Owing to the findings which indicate that indi-
viduals may well use information from both memories to ‘piece together’ where
an object was located (by eliminating errors), this suggests that with repeated
‘piecing together’ one might expect the process of piecing together to become
more automatic with time (i.e., achieved with less effort and faster temporal
completion). This process would at least give the subjective experience of an
integrated spatial representation. This suggests that drawing on two sources of
spatial information separately might be apparent to begin with but over time
the disparity in drawing information from two sources becomes negligibly, even-
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tually becoming small enough to give the impression of a single integrated unit.
7.5.5 Summary of the fragmentation account
This account argues that fragments of information are encoded at varying levels
of precision upon presentation of the stimuli. The average level of precision of
each memory is the inverse of the accumulation of errors. Errors are a result
of interference between components of spatial representation (i.e., magnitude
and vector information) and are therefore a function of the number of spatial
memories to be encoded. Thus, the first few presentations may be encoded with
the same level of precision as the SA-SA condition, however as the learning phase
progresses (specifically, PSA-encoding) the amount of errors increases and the
quality of information that is encoded decreases. This process leaves stores of
memory fragments pertaining to each object. Upon concurrent cueing of the
target object memory fragments are drawn upon allowing for an estimation of
a target object’s location through a process of error elimination.
7.6 Exclusive and Fragmentary processing
In summary of the two accounts put forward in this thesis, it is quite possible
that both of these mechanisms may well be implemented as processing strategies.
That is, on some occasions elements from each memory are encoded and used
to estimate an object’s location (fragmentary) on other occasions one memory
is encoded (or retrieved) and the second memory is not encoded (or retrieved)
and becomes redundant (exclusive). In order to discriminate between occasions
when each strategy may be employed further research is needed. However,
overall it has to be noted that the evidence derived from these experiments
suggest that exclusive processing in the strictest sense (either one memory is
encoded or retrieved) is improbable, at least in the majority of cases. The fact
that information from both memories is available and retrieved, together with
the evidence which shows two cues presented simultaneously are an advantage,
strongly indicates that information is encoded and stored for both memories (on
average) and information from each memory is drawn upon to make an object
location judgement.
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7.7 Methodological issues
7.7.1 Individual differences
The first potential methodical issue is that individual differences have not been
examined explicitly in this thesis. It is quite possible that individuals may
apply an exclusive processing strategy or a fragmentation processing strategy
or a mixture of the two. However, assessing this idea with rigour is beyond
the remit of this thesis in terms of practicality. This should therefore be the
focus of future research. It should be noted that repeated measures design
was employed throughout the experiments in this thesis which meant individual
differences were controlled for.
7.7.2 Stimuli choice
The stimuli employed throughout this thesis were employed for a number of
reasons (highlighted in the main body of the thesis). However, it could be
argued that when dealing with object location memory, words do not constitute
objects in the classic sense. Thus, it may be prudent to extend some of the
crucial findings of this thesis using images rather than words. However, it
should be highlighted that previous work into exclusivity has employed more
object-like stimuli (e.g, aerial images of buildings) and has produced similar
findings to those of this thesis.
7.7.3 Ecological validity
The question of ecological validity follows on from the previously highlighted
issue of stimuli choice. The stimuli were not relatable to every day experiences of
object location. This means that although the experiments provide a situation
where the underlying processes may be similar to real life, they preclude the
richness of a real task involving object location. This perhaps limits to a degree
the application of the findings. However, employing abstract stimuli was a
necessary methodological choice to first allow for comparisons with previous
work on exclusivity and second to enable control over semantic manipulations
of the stimuli, which would have been more difficult using real-life spatial arrays.
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7.8 Implications for future research
This thesis proposes two competing models which account for object-location
memory performance on a series of experiments. Each model has the capacity to
account for a number of findings from this thesis and that of previous work. This
contribution provides the field of spatial memory with two empirically founded
models on which to build. There are specifically two avenues for future work
that would be fruitful for either model.
7.8.1 Proposal 1 - vector interference
It has been proposed that interference is occurring at encoding or retrieval owing
to the disparity between magnitude and direction of information stored within
each spatial representation. This disparity has been attributed to the fact two
different anchors are used to specify the same target location. The employment
of two anchor points in this way creates different quantities of space and direc-
tion for each memory. Thus, future research should look to test this prediction
by maintaining constancy of the distance and directions for each anchor-target
presentation. It is quite possible that because of the distinct nature in which
spatial representations are stored, that access from one representation to an-
other creates a decrement in later recall performance. Additionally, research
should examine the contribution of each element of a vector (i.e., magnitude
or direction). This would be important in understanding how simultaneous
viewing of multiple objects may create more memorable anchor-target relations
compared with other anchor-target relations (i.e., they are more aligned in terms
of vector information and therefore create less interference). Thus, any increase
in performance from a reduction of vector related manipulations may support
the idea of vector interference.
Another possibility is to allow for the resolution of such interference by the
individuals themselves. One method of achieving this is to increase exposure to
the stimuli (either through repetition or increasing presentation time) to try to
reduce interference. The experiments in this thesis assume a linear relationship
between the presentation time and number of objects encoded and recalled.
However, as with other processes in the cognitive systems quite often when load
is increase the amount of time needed to encode such information equates to a
non-linear relationship (e.g., exponential or power function). The reasons why
an exponentially greater amount of time is required may be for the reasons
stated above; that more objects introduce a greater probability of confusion
and interference with all other objects. Thus, if exposure time were increased
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to enable a matching of accuracy for every spatial memory encoded (e.g., if in
the PSA-DA condition 18 memories were created with equal amount of accuracy
as that observed in the SA-SA condition), then one might expect the advantage
for DA-cueing to become apparent. Only then would one would expect to see
some kind of advantage for holding two spatial memories over one.
A final possibility to investigate the function of interference with the number of
memories would be to match the number of anchor-target relations between the
PSA-DA condition and the SA-SA condition, rather than the to-be-remembered
objects. Thus, one might find that the first few presentations in the PSA-DA
condition are encoded with the same level of accuracy as the SA-SA condi-
tion. However, as the learning phase progresses (specifically, PSA-encoding)
the amount of errors increases and the quality of information that is encoded
decreases.
7.8.2 Proposal 2 - cue salience
A second avenue of investigation concerns the exclusivity model. Previously
it has been proposed that exclusivity may be dependent on a method of cue
selection employed by the subject. It was suggested that a cue may be selected
on some salient aspect other than the level of accuracy contained within the
associated memory. If cue saliency was shown not to play a role than a rethink-
ing of memory choice would be needed if exclusivity remained defined as a one
memory account of multiple object location performance. Thus, such an inves-
tigation might either add support to a one memory encoding account or provide
support for an alternative explanation (hence, the fragmentation account).
7.9 Final remarks
The research contained within this thesis makes an original contribution to the
field of spatial cognition. It has empirically scrutinised the idea of exclusive pro-
cessing of spatial information and presents findings predominantly in support
of the idea that two memories are not better than one. At first glance exclu-
sive processing could be considered counterintuitive and maladaptive to spatial
memory. However, the evidence shows that exclusivity may have developed as
a matter of economy by the human memory system. It is argued that the pro-
cessing of spatial information is effortful and any strategy that reduces load in
an efficient manner is preferable. However, a second model has been proposed
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which helps to account for the findings which are inconsistent with the idea that
only one memory is encoded or retrieved.
The work contained within this thesis presents a number of important contri-
butions to knowledge. It provides solid evidence that interference is generated
when encoding multiple related (i.e., but non-identical) presentations of location
information. It also demonstrates that such interference results in subsequent
detriment of spatial information. Through the modeling of spatial estimations
regarding multiple objects, this thesis imparts a unique insight into how in-
formation is built up over time. It has highlighted a learning strategy that
involves incrementally fine-tuning of coordinate information across multiple ob-
jects. This has widespread theoretical implications that extend past the field of
spatial cognition and into the general domain of learning and cognitive psychol-
ogy. Finally, this body of work puts forward important avenues of investigation
for future scientific endeavours. It recommends that vector interference be exam-
ined in order to develop a more inclusive model of exclusivity. It also provides a
fragmentation account of location memory which provides alternative directions
for future scientific research.
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